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Abstract 
 
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is a milestone towards lasting 
peace, but not the solution for the roots of a conflict. It is considered a highly 
politicised process because DDR is a cost-increasing provision that not only 
contributes to the security, but also builds confidence among warring parties. The 
United Nations has highlighted that without DDR, and specifically demobilisation, 
civil wars cannot end. Thus, DDR is a crucial aspect of any peace settlement; its 
greatest challenge is to design a programme and a strategy that convinces both parties 
that they have guarantees for surrender and disbanding and that their vulnerability and 
limits will be respected. 
 
This study tries to explain why not all agreements include DDR provision during 
peace negotiation, what determines this, and whether the DDR can explain the 
resumption of war or the emergence of new types of violence in post-conflict 
societies. This study contributes to a broader understanding of how DDR provision is 
determined by specific characteristics of the rebel group, country and conflict; how 
various components of DDR can have different impacts on the failure of peace and 
the new type of violence.  The findings suggest that including DDR within a peace 
agreement, especially a reintegration programme, has a significantly positive impact 
on peace and shows evidence of the importance of military reintegration in the 
process of peace consolidation. 
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Introduction 
 
Why do some peace agreements negotiate a disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR)? Is a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration provision an 
important factor to prevent the recurrence of war? Why do some civil wars have a 
negotiated DDR which has concluded, and yet these societies still present high rates 
of violence? Conversely, although the peace agreement in Zimbabwe between Zanu-
PF and the government excluded a negotiated DDR, peace was achieved. The 
Colombian government has signed five peace agreements with different armed 
groups. These accords have a negotiated DDR provision, but peace was not achieved. 
Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador signed a peace agreement with a DDR 
provision but currently these countries present higher rates of violence than during the 
civil war. 
 
From 1975 until 2012, 1291 peace processes with rebel groups were negotiated 
worldwide which included 260 peace agreements2 (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2016; 
Högbladh, 2012). Figure 1 shows the chronological distribution of peace process and 
DDR provision for this time period.3  The green line displays the number of peace 
processes by rebel groups. Bars indicate the number of processes which have a 
                                                 
1 The combined analysis undertaken within the database focuses on the peace process by rebel group. 
For instance, Cambodia has a peace process with KR, KPNLF and FUNCINPEC, and these were 
processed as distinct observations. A peace process can have many peace agreements. For example, the 
Guatemala case is one peace process featuring 16 peace agreements and only one rebel group. If the 
process only has ceasefire agreements, I drop these cases because they do not have any provision. See 
the dataset chapter for further detail. 
2 A peace agreement could be classified as ceasefire, pre-negotiation, interim, comprehensive or 
implementation (C. Bell, 2000). 
3 It is important to highlight that the information is focused on the bargaining phase and not on the 
implementation stage (B. Walter, 2002, p. 19). 
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complete DDR provision, at least one stage of DDR or have no DDR. Of the 129 
peace processes, 16 were signed between 1975 and 1989; during this time 31% (5) of 
the peace processes did not have DDR provision and 19% (2) had a complete DDR 
provision. Between 1990 and 1999, 64 peace processes were signed; of these 19% 
(12) did not have DDR and 34% (22) incorporated the entire programme. Finally, 
from 2000 to 2012, 49 were signed; of these 18% (9) did not have DDR while 63% 
(33) did. In conclusion, the DDR process is a provision which was rarely 
implemented in the 70s and 80s, but since the 90s the DDR has become an important 
provision to achieve peace.  
 
Figure 1: Number of peace processes by rebel groups and DDR provision 
Source: DDR dataset. 
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This study tries to explain why not all agreements include disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration provision during peace negotiation, what determines 
this outcome, and whether the DDR can explain the resumption of war or the 
emergence of new types of violence in post-conflict societies (Berdal, 1996a; 
Muggah, 2013; Nussio & Oppenheim, 2013). DDR is considered a highly politicized 
process because it serves as a key element of bargaining power. I argue that DDR is a 
cost-increasing provision because DDR increases the cost of fighting and changes the 
incentives for fulfilling the deal. This provision not only contributes to the security of 
a state, but also builds confidence among warring parties (Berdal, 1996d; Fortna, 
2004b; Spear, 2002; B. Walter, 2002). However, not all peace negotiation includes 
DDR provision: some may only incorporate certain stages of DDR or negotiate this 
provision many years later, because the security and trust were not initially strong 
enough to modify the complete cost-benefit structure. Consequently, DDR is 
considered a crucial aspect in any peace settlement because a fruitful disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration of a warring faction contributes not only to 
improving the security of both society and the rebels, but also to fostering trust 
between the negotiating parties for the implementation phase (Spear, 2002; UNDDR, 
2014).  The greatest challenge is to design a DDR provision that convinces both 
parties that they have guarantees for surrendering and disbanding and that their 
vulnerability and limits will be respected. When the parties obtain clear agreements 
about these preoccupations, they will negotiate and implement the settlement. When 
warring parties fail to obtain guarantees, they will eventually reject a negotiated 
settlement. Peace agreements normally have more provisions to solve the cause of 
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conflict and to avoid the commitment problem (Stedman, Rothchild, & Cousens, 
2002; B. Walter, 2002).  
 
In sum, this PhD dissertation is about DDR processes in the last 37 years and the link 
between DDR programmes and the end of armed conflict, peace duration and 
transformation of violence in the post-conflict stage.  There are three basic questions 
that different studies4 have tried to answer: the first considers why DDR is successful 
or not; the second concerns the general lessons that can be learnt—positive and 
negative—from different DDR programmes, and the final question focuses on the 
role of the international community and the United Nations, especially in relation to 
peacekeeping missions. There is a lack of comparative research focusing on the 
general characteristics and conditions of conflicts and countries that include DDR 
provision in a peace agreement (Berdal, 1996a). We need to improve formal analysis, 
data, and evaluation in order to have better elements and information for public 
policies. Policy-makers should think about the scope of the negotiation and the 
implementation of DDR provision, so as not to generate an unrealistically high 
expectation that the government cannot achieve, which then reduces the benefits for 
ex-combatants entering into an integration process within the society. This PhD 
dissertation intends to provide the enhanced research needed by policy-makers, while 
also closing the gap in the literature and generating new questions for further 
research.  
 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Colletta, 1997; Giustozzi, 2012; W. A. Knight, 2008; Matveeva, 2012; Muggah & 
Baaré, 2009. 
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The main limitation of my proposal is the difficulties encountered when trying to 
gather data. Because of this, there is genuine space for debate about both baselines 
and the recording of key statistics after a peace treaty (Specker, 2008). There is a 
clear measurement deficit (Bush, 1998), both regarding the identification of what 
should be measured and the quality, reliability and validity of the available data 
(Duffield, 1997; UNDDR, 2014). In sum, this research contributes to both the debate 
regarding the failure of peace processes, and to existing literature about negotiations 
and the cessation of civil wars. Additionally, it introduces a new dataset about peace 
agreements and DDR. 
 
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR): conceptualization 
 
Table 1 shows the accepted definitions of DDR for each stage; these definitions were 
developed by the United Nations and they are accepted by consensus. DDR, at its 
origins, had only three stages: disarm, demobilize, reintegrate. However, stakeholders 
decided to create a new short phase between demobilisation and reintegration—
reinsertion—which focusses special attention on primary needs and transitional 
assistance, as a condition to assist rebels on their way to social and economic 
integration into civil life. 
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Table 1:  Definition of DDR – UN approach 
Definition 
Disarmament  
This is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons carried by both combatants and 
sometimes civilians. Disarmament may also include the development of responsible 
arms management programmes.  
Demobilisation  
Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from 
armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend 
from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of 
troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, 
assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the 
support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion. 
Reinsertion  
Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation but prior 
to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional 
assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can 
include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-
term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, 
continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term 
material and/or financial means of assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last 
up to one year. 
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Reintegration   
Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain 
sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and 
economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at 
the local level. It is part of the general development of a country, and a national 
responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance. 
Source: Operational Guide to the Integrated DDR Standards (IAWG - DDR, 2014) 
 
Indeed, the DDR programme is a mechanism designed to disband or demilitarize 
armed groups which are official or non-state armies, and to control and reduce the use 
of arms. In addition, the DDR is a mechanism to placate former combatants by 
providing security and supporting them in the pursuit of legal incomes (Berdal, 
1996c, 1996b; W. A. Knight, 2008). This mechanism is developed in different stages. 
It is important to clarify that DDR is not a linear process, as the phases can overlap; 
for example, disarmament can be considered as a first step in the short term. In some 
cases, the government and international supporters may develop different strategies 
for ensuring that this stage is circular. Meanwhile, reintegration is a long process with 
an important impact on the recovery of a war-torn country. A good example of the 
circular cycle of DDR is the Nepalese case, where the civil society held numerous 
weapons. As a consequence, the government created a long-term disarmament 
programme that developed certain incentives and strategies, such as a lottery, for 
collecting weapons on a constant and continual basis (Joshi & Quinn, 2012). Thus, 
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the DDR programme is part of the provisions which are negotiated during or after a 
peace process.  
 
Additionally, the main objective of DDR processes is not only to contribute to the 
improvement of security and stability in post-conflict states, but also to establish an 
important connection between the military and civilian aspects of peace processes. 
For this reason, DDRs are multidimensional and complex processes involving 
“political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions” (IAWG - 
DDR, 2014, p. 24; Knight, 2008; Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2006). Therefore, their 
success is vital for sustainable and lasting peace. 
 
DDR can be regarded as a period of transition from war to peace in which the 
foundations of the new order are set in place. Given the high variation in the levels of 
success of DDR programmes implemented throughout the world, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the literature on small-n cases tends to be highly polarized. Positive 
experiences like the ones in Mozambique and Burundi are often used by those 
extracting the positive lessons from DDR (Douma & Gasana, 2008; Striuli, 2012).  
On the other hand, studies centred on the Centro-American processes, for example,  
show that the consolidation of peace is a difficult aim, because in these cases the 
homicide and criminality rates have increased significantly; moreover, the 
reintegration programme, social, economic and psychological efforts have also failed 
(Chamorro, 2015; Moser & McIlwaine, 2001). 
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As Caramés, Fisas, and Sanz (2009) assert, there are no magic bullets for DDRs. 
Although at a certain level of abstraction, all DDRs can be seen as consisting of the 
same steps and component elements (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2006, 2007a, 2008, 
2009), each takes place in a different context, involves a different set of actors 
(national and international), is subject to different constraints, and counts on different 
types of resources and assets. Nonetheless they all remain arduous (UNDP, 2009),.  
The relative success of DDR thus depends on achieving a lasting impact for the peace 
in ways that involve not only the monopoly of force, but also the provision of public 
goods that guarantee a significant improvement in the quality of life of the population 
(especially ex-combatants), and therefore serve to dissuade ex-combatants and 
civilians from resuming conflict.  
 
In sum, DDR programmes have played a significant role in determining peace after 
an armed conflict, particularly in the last twenty years (Banholzer, 2013; Joshi & 
Quinn, 2012). Figure 2 shows the number of peace processes with DDR arrangements 
between 1975 and 2012. Of the 129 peace processes, 26 did not have DDR provision, 
57 had the entire provision (D+D+R), and 28 had only two stages (10 had 
disarmament and demobilisation, nine had disarmament and reintegration, and nine 
had demobilisation and reintegration). Only 18 had one stage (nine had disarmament, 
four had demobilisation, and five had reintegration).5 In her dataset analysis, 
Banholzer6 highlights similar findings, stating that  
                                                 
5 See Figure 2 and Appendix A for details of the cases. 
6 It is important to bear in mind that while the Peace Agreement dataset reported DDR as a provision 
for disarmament (only), the researchers had coded other variables that we can interpret as part of the 
DDR process including, for example, Intarmy – Integration in army, and Intciv – Integration in Civil 
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according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme […] DDR has been 
mentioned in only 63 of 148 peace agreements (43%) since the end of the 
Cold War. This of course means in turn that, in 85 cases (or 57%), the peace 
agreement did not contain DDR measures (2013, p. 34).  
These last figures glaringly show that less than 50% of the cases have employed a 
complete DDR process. For this reason, it is relevant to understand the differences 
between cases if the DDR provision is considered to be a critical tool for achieving 
peace. 
 
Figure 2: Venn diagram of DDR provision (1975 – 2012) – peace process by rebel 
groups  
 
  DDR provision Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration 
No   26 (20%) 44 (34%) 49 (38%) 49 (38%) 
Yes 103 (80%) 85 (66%) 80 (62%) 80 (62%) 
Source: DDR dataset.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
Service. It is not clear if the author had calculated the percentage based only on the DDR variable or if 
she considered the other variables. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
9 
10
0 
57 
4 
9 
5 26 
Disarmament 
None 
Reintegration 
Demobilisation 
26 
 
Table 2 shows a summary of the percentage of peace processes with (column yes) or 
without (column no) at least one stage of DDR, taking into consideration some 
particularities. The first group is duration and intensity of conflict. I can conclude that 
there is a difference between long and short conflicts, but there is no difference 
between minor and major intensity. This means that duration could have a statistical 
impact, while intensity has no statistical significance; both characteristics are 
independent of DDR. The second group is the spoilers. Here I present two types of 
data, the first being multiparty conflicts7 and the second being the number of rebel 
groups in the country. Based on Pearson’s chi-squared test8 and a basic rule of 
thumb,9 I suggest that there is a difference between conflicts which are multiparty and 
those which are not multiparty, when it comes to negotiating a peace agreement. This 
category group is not statistically independent.   
 
The third group is about military and tactical capability, and the data suggests that 
there is an important difference between the categories of much weaker rebels and 
weaker rebels, and there is a divergence between weaker rebels and stronger rebels. It 
is important to clarify that most rebel groups are considered as much weaker than the 
government, and for that reason it is necessary to bear in mind other characteristics 
present within each group. For instance, a political wing is a proxy for “the ability to 
substitute nonviolent actions for violent activities” (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & 
                                                 
7 The multiparty and “maximum rebel group” data are different because “maximum rebels” represents 
the historical number of rebel groups during the entire conflict period, while multiparty is calculated 
year by year. 
8 Pearson's chi-squared test checks the hypothesis that the rows and columns in a two-way table are 
independent. 
9 The rule of thumb means that if the difference between the groups is more than 10%, then there is a 
difference existing between groups in the moment of negotiating a peace agreement.  
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Salehyan, 2009, p. 581) and if the political wing is legal the rebels will have “the 
opportunity to pursue their demands through legal political means” (Cunningham et 
al., 2009, p. 581). It is a dummy variable. Table 2 illustrates that there seems to be no 
differences between groups with or without a political wing. It is important to analyse 
the interaction of this variable with other rebel characteristics.  In sum, many peace 
processes with at least one stage of DDR are negotiated with rebel groups that have a 
clear central command, a political wing, low capacity for fighting and who are 
considered as to be much weaker or weaker in tactical terms. 
 
Research methods 
 
Two different datasets were gathered to develop a quantitative analysis. Statistical 
analysis allows comparison of multiple cases at the same time and identifies common 
patterns between cases. The first dataset, which is called the DDR data, collects 
information for chapters 3 and 4. This dataset provides information on DDR 
provision, duration of peace, the peace agreement, internal armed conflicts, rebel 
characteristics, and the political and economic characteristics of the country. The 
description of the dataset is included in this document.   
 
The second dataset presents information about the general characteristics of each 
municipality in Colombia (1,122 in total) from 2003 to 2014. The dataset is clustered 
into four groups: crime, DDR, the legacy of conflict and the municipality socio-
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economic characteristics. The crime block reports the rates of homicide and robbery. 
The DDR block represents the information related to the demobilisation and 
reintegration programme. The legacy of conflict data group indicates the presence of 
armed conflict in the past and present. Finally, the characteristic of municipality 
category shows different information relating to social conditions, regional 
distributions and economic conditions, such as poverty, the culture of violence and 
illegal economy.   
 
Using these datasets, I estimated different types of models and their statistical 
diagnostics. This type of analysis allows us to calculate the probability that some 
event will happen, or calculate the relationship between the control and dependent 
variable. However, this type of analysis has its limitations. First, we can identify 
some patterns, although important differences, such as beliefs, culture, and history, 
can cause governments and rebel factions to act in ways not predicted by the 
statistical model.  Secondly, statistical analysis can reveal the correlation between 
each control variable and dependent variable, but it cannot reveal the causal 
mechanism. We need to develop case studies to identify certain particularities which 
are difficult to measure by number, but should help to reveal the limitations of the 
theory.  
 
 
 
29 
 
Table 2: Historical record of DDR based on characteristics of the conflict 
DDR  (at least one stage) 
    No Yes 
Characteristics of the Conflict 
1.  Duration 
Longevity conflicts 
22,39% 77,61% 
15 52 
Short conflicts (less 5 
years) 
17,74% 82,26% 
11 51 
Pearson Chi2 (1): 0,43 Pr: 0,511 
2. Intensity 
Minor_Intensity 
19,13% 80,87% 
22 93 
War_Intensity 
28,57% 71,43% 
4 10 
Pearson Chi2 (1): 0,69 Pr: 0,406 
3. Spoilers 
Multiparty_No 
26,32% 73,68% 
10 16 
Multiparty_Yes 
17,58% 82,42% 
28 75 
Pearson Chi2 (1): 1,27 Pr: 0,26 
Rebel groups_0 
32,43% 67,57% 
12 25 
Rebel groups_1 
5,71% 94,29% 
2 33 
Rebel groups_2 
16,67% 83,33% 
4 20 
Rebel groups_3 
14,29% 85,71% 
3 18 
Rebel groups_more 
than 4 
41,67% 58,33% 
5 7 
Pearson Chi2 (1): 
21,92 Pr: 0,001 
 
DDR  (at least one stage) 
    No Yes 
Rebels military and tactical capability 
4. Balance of power 
Rebels 
strength_much 
weaker 
26,92% 73,08% 
7 19 
Rebels 
strength_weaker 
18,92% 81,08% 
14 60 
Rebels 
strength_parity 
14,29% 85,71% 
3 18 
Rebels 
strength_strong 
25,00% 75,00% 
2 6 
Pearson Chi2 (1): 
2,41 Pr: 0,660 
Political wing_No 
21,59% 78,41% 
19 7 
Political wing_Yes 
17,50% 82,50% 
69 33 
Pearson Chi2 (1): 
0,2843 Pr: 0,594 
Legal political 
wing_No 
20,59% 79,41% 
21 81 
Legal political 
wing_Yes 
19,05% 80,95% 
4 17 
Pearson Chi2 (1): 
0,025 Pr: 0,873 
Fight_low 
25,00% 75,00% 
17 51 
Fight_moderate 
13,21% 86,79% 
7 46 
Fight_high 
40,00% 60,00% 
2 3 
Pearson Chi2 (1): 
3,721 Pr: 0,156 
 
Source: DDR Dataset. 
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How the thesis is organized 
 
The following five chapters examine the relevance of the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration provision and its relationship with peace and post-
conflict violence. Chapter 2 introduces the new dataset “DDR Data”. This new 
dataset provides a quantitative picture of peace negotiation results worldwide from 
1975 to 2012, and explains the advantages compared to previous sources of 
quantitative datasets on peace negotiation as well as its limitations. 
 
Chapter 3, entitled “Determinants of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
during peace negotiation”, focuses on analysing characteristics of conflicts, the 
rebels’ capabilities, and the economic and political factors of the states that have had 
peace negotiations with or without DDR provision. This study is the first to employ 
the rebel – government approach to examine why some peace processes have a DDR 
provision while others do not. I develop a Hawk-Dove game to explore the incentives 
and conditions of the adversaries for including a DDR provision in the agreement. 
The findings suggest that conflicts which are high cost, in terms of duration and 
death, are less likely to have a DDR in a peace negotiation. This highlights the fact 
that the weariness and state weakness have an important effect on the decision to 
negotiate a DDR. I also argue that rebel groups which are considered strong and have 
territorial control are not expected to negotiate a DDR. However, the rebel groups 
with a clear and identifiable political wing are more prone to negotiate a DDR 
provision, because they can use political means to advance their demands. When the 
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conflict does not have more than two rebel groups, the rebel groups are more likely to 
negotiate a DDR. Countries considered to be a stable regime and with a solid 
economy are less prone to have a DDR in a peace negotiation, because the society 
may assimilate former combatants without the need for a special programme. 
 
Chapter 4 is titled “Failure of Peace and Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration”. This chapter is primarily interested in the effect of the DDR provision 
on the likelihood of peace failure after parties have signed a peace agreement. This 
chapter argues that a DDR mechanism within a peace negotiation can make peace 
more durable because this provision has a high political and economic cost for both 
sides, should either party decide to renege on the commitment or to alter the 
agreement. This research finds something different, compared with previous work: 
the reintegration stage, especially military reintegration, has a positive impact on 
peace due to the long process involved, which develops different programmes 
focused upon  generating new opportunities. In other words, the reintegration is going 
to change the individual incentives for preferring civil life over war. This result arises 
for two reasons. First, because the dataset uses the disaggregation of DDR, while 
others simply use one variable. Second, the research also shows that not all peace 
agreements have a complete DDR strategy: this dataset also provides for this 
distinction. 
 
Chapter 5 is entitled “Reintegration programme, ex-combatants and post-conflict 
violence: the Colombian case”. This chapter considers why rates of violence typically 
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increase in post-conflict scenarios and what the relationship is between DDR 
processes and the new forms of violence in the post-conflict period. This chapter 
answers these questions by examining the dynamics of violent crime in the 
Colombian case, after the peace negotiations with the United Self-Defence Forces of 
Colombia (Autodefensas Unidad de Colombia – AUC), and the consolidation of the 
individual demobilisation of combatants as a counterinsurgency strategy, which is 
focused on guerrilla groups. This work intends to characterise the regional dynamics 
of the conflict and the post-conflict violence. The focus is on the presence of ex-
combatants who participated in DDR programmes and patterns of different types of 
violence, such as homicide and robbery, at the municipal level.  Do communities with 
more ex-combatants experience more crime? And do DDR programmes matter? We 
are going to determine the factors that might explain this violence in a spatial context, 
including regional, demographic and economic perspectives. 
 
Chapter 6 reviews the findings presented in the thesis. It concludes by outlining the 
implications this study may have for scholars interested in questions of peacebuilding 
and post-conflict recovery.  
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Dataset for DDR analysis 
Description – Version 1.2, October 2014 / January 2016 
 
This dissertation seeks to explain why some peace processes have DDR and some do 
not.  A necessary first step is to map out the different negotiations and to identify 
which has a DDR provision. After we comprehend the patterns of negotiation of 
DDR, we can turn our attention to explaining its determinants and its relationship 
with peace. 
 
This chapter draws primarily on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) peace process dataset. This new dataset provides a quantitative picture of the 
global peace negotiation results from 1975 to 2012.  The dataset is comprised of 
information from individual peace negotiations and other sources. The DDR data 
provides information on the peace process, number of peace agreements, DDR 
provision, type of reintegration (military, civil, or both), duration of peace (number of 
years to resumption of conflict), if the peace agreement was implemented, conflict 
with other rebels and the characteristics of rebel groups. 
 
This chapter serves to introduce the DDR dataset, explaining the advantages it offers 
compared to previous sources of quantitative datasets on peace negotiation, as well as 
outlining its limitations. This dataset only measures DDR at one point in time (the 
bargaining moment–inclusion in peace agreement). For this reason, it cannot properly 
address the longer processes. The long process (implementation) is therefore 
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misleading in the dataset. This is a limitation of the dataset which could 
underestimate the effect of DDR. For further research, I want to include the long path 
and extend the data to include the implementation phase. 
 
A new dataset on DDR 
 
This project builds a new dataset of DDR use in peace processes. There were three 
existing datasets with DDR information: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
Peace Agreements Dataset (PAD), the Banholzer dataset, and the Peace Accords 
Matrix database (PAM). These data resources collect important information, but are 
not adequate for this project. First, PAD (Harbom, Högbladh, & Wallensteen, 2006), 
version 2.0-2012, registers peace agreements signed in armed conflicts after 1975 and 
includes five main topics: military, political, territorial, justice and implementation. 
However, it uses a different definition of DDR, as although the dataset has a variable 
called “DDR”,10 this variable only represents disarmament. However, PAD has other 
variables which are closer to the wider dimensions of DDR, such as “Intarmy – 
Integration in army”, “Intgov – Integration in government/Civil Service”, and “Intciv 
– Integration in Civil Service”. This dataset reports 216 peace agreements. Second, 
Banholzer’s dataset collected information for 40 cases. Her material focuses on three 
questions: “1) What is the state of the conflict? 2) If the conflict has ended, how has it 
ended? 3) Are international actors involved and if so, in what way?” (Banholzer, 
                                                 
10 “DDR: 1) The agreement included provisions for the disarmament of the warring parties. Coded as 
yes even if the disarmament only concern one of the warring parties. 0) The agreement did not provide 
for any disarmament of the warring parties” (Högbladh, 2012, p. 6). 
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2013,  p. 9). This dataset includes cases from 1989 to 2010 which represent different 
ways of ending conflicts; for example, there are six military victories, six low 
activity, three ceasefires, twenty peace agreements and five outcomes which are 
unclear. The issue in this case is that the information does not distinguish between the 
three stages of DDR, in spite of the author acknowledging in the text that “Although 
DDR programmes usually consist of three components, not all of them are 
implemented in all cases. Some programmes focus exclusively on disarmament and 
demobilization, while others skip the “DD” part to directly address the issue of 
reintegration” (Banholzer, 2013, p. 10). Third, the Peace Accord Matrix is an 
excellent resource of qualitative and quantitative data, covering 34 comprehensive 
peace agreements, including their provisions and implementation from 1989 to 2007. 
The matrix distinguishes between 51 different types of provisions and collects 
information about disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. These three 
sources of information are excellent, but they do not match the definitions employed 
within this study or the purpose of this thesis. These databases also do not provide 
disaggregated information about disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. 
Therefore, I have used them as a verification tool and a secondary resource. 
 
Definitions  
 
The unit of analysis of this dataset is a peace process between government and rebel 
groups which are/were engaged in internal armed conflict. Consequently, this dataset 
uses the following definitions. First, conflict is defined according to the UCDP 
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description as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (UCDP, 2015). 
Moreover, UCDP classifies conflict into four types, which are extra-systemic armed 
conflict, internal armed conflict, internationalised internal armed conflict and 
interstate armed conflict. The UCDP dataset is based on the first three types of 
conflict.  
 
Second, following the UCDP definition, a peace process is understood as a set of 
peace agreements which are compromises on how to solve the causes of conflict and 
to rebuild war-torn societies. The compromises are basically political issues, which 
use different mechanisms such as transitional justice, security reform, elections, 
political reform, land reform, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR), in order to give incentives to rebels for reaching peace and starting a political 
and civil transition. This dataset is based on peace negotiations signed after 1975, 
which could include one or more peace agreements. 
 
Third, following the UN definition, disarmament is interpreted as the collection and 
control of weapons; demobilisation is the discharge of active combatants from armed 
groups and provision of basic assistance (medical, financial, material needs); 
reintegration is a long-term process where the former combatants obtain social skills 
and civilian status (IAWG – DDR, 2014). The information is collected from each 
peace agreement which is signed during a peace negotiation. 
37 
 
 
In sum, this database is limited to internal armed conflicts which have a peace 
negotiation between the government and rebel group(s) from 1975 to 2012. This data 
is focused on DDR provision, and whether or not it is included in the agreement as a 
guarantee of security and whether it serves as an important tool of credibility between 
parties.  
 
Data collection 
 
As explained above, there are three important data sources which were used to obtain 
complementary information. For gathering information about peace negotiations, 
peace agreements and its provisions, this dataset used the UCDP dyadic Conflict 
Termination Dataset (CTD), version 1-2010, which collects information on “at least 
one year of non-activity, or more specifically, when the conflict ceases to be 
registered in the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset” (Kreutz, 2010, p. 2).  I obtain 
the text of the agreements and code the information. For this purpose, I utilize the 
Transitional Justice Peace Agreements database (University of Ulster, Transitional 
Justice Institute, & Incore, 2006); the Peace Accords Matrix  (Joshi & Darby, 2013); 
the Peace Agreements Database (UN, 2006); the Peace Agreements Digital 
Collection (USAIP, 2009); the IMPACT (Implementation of Pacts) dataset (Jarstad, 
Nilsson, & Sundberg, 2012); annualized implementation data on comprehensive 
intrastate peace accords (1989–2012) (Joshi, Quinn, & Regan, 2015); the Yearbooks 
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on Peace Processes and DDR programmes,11 UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (UCDP, 
2015); Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II (DeRouen & 
Heo, 2007) and other research about specific cases. 
 
I collect the information and identify the three components of DDR, if these are 
mentioned or the implementation is explained, the type of reintegration (military, 
civil, or both), the number of years to resumption of conflict, and the transformation 
of the rebel group. I also gather information about certain characteristics of the peace 
negotiation and rebel groups. Some variables are dichotomous and others are 
categorical. The information was collected until 2012. Table 3 shows the variables 
and definitions. 
 
Table 3: Variables 
Variable name Description Type 
1. Disarmament_has_1 
2. Demobilization_has_1 
3. Reint_has_1  
4. DDR_1  
5. Army_reint  
6. Civ_reint 
1, if the peace negotiation has DDR (or 
disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, 
military reintegration or social reintegration); 
0, in other cases. 
Dichotomous 
7. Disarmament_has 
8. Demobilization_has 
9. Reint_has 
 
2, if the peace negotiation has a road map 
(yes-implementation rules) of the DDR; 1, if 
the peace negotiation mentions the DDR 
(yes-mention); 0, in other cases. 
Categorical 
 
10. DDR_2  1, if the DDR only includes one stage; 2, if 
the DDR includes two stages; 3, if the DDR 
is completed; 0 in other cases. 
Ordered 
 
                                                 
11  (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2009, 2016) 
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Table 3: Variables (continuation) 
Variable name Description Type 
11. Failure of peace 0, if the peace negotiation failed (civil war 
recurrence); 1, in other cases (Absence of war 
– peace). 
There are five dummy variables which 
measure if the conflict had ended after the 
first year (second, third, fourth, fifth and 
tenth) since the peace agreement was signed. 
Dichotomous 
12. Number of years to 
resumption (duration 
of peace) 
Time (in years) between the cessation of 
conflict by peace negotiation and the start of 
another war between the same parties. 
Continues 
13. Conflict after peace 
negotiation 
What happened to the conflict after the end of 
the peace negotiation. 
1. Negotiation in process  
2. Ongoing 
2.1. Ongoing and negotiation in process 
2.2. Ongoing and rebel splits 
3. End 
3.1. End and negotiation in process 
4. Low activity  
4.1. Low activity and rebel splits 
4.2. There are no military actions 
4.3. Frozen conflict 
5. Resumption after some years 
6. Resumption of conflict with an alliance 
of rebel groups 
Categorical 
 
14. Rebel group after 
peace negotiation 
What happened to rebel groups after the end 
of the peace negotiation. 
1. Active  
1.1. Active and joint 
1.2. Active / joint / political party 
1.3. Active and low activity 
1.4. Active and political party 
1.5. Active and split 
2. Split 
2.1. Split and political party 
2.2. Split and army 
3. Political party 
4. Army  
4.1. Army and disbanded 
4.2. Army and political party 
4.3. Army and civil reintegration 
4.4. Army and civil reintegration and 
political party 
5. Disbanded or dissolved 
5.1. Disbanded OR political party 
5.2. Disbanded OR joint  
6. Unclear 
Categorical 
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Table 3: Variables (continuation) 
Variable name Description Type 
15. Type of rebel group 1. Ethnic 
1.1. Ethnic / grievance 
1.2. Ethnic / secessionist 
2. Grievance 
3. Ideological 
4. Political  
4.1. Political / religious 
4.2. Political / grievance 
4.3. Political / secessionist 
5. Pro-independence 
6. Religious 
7. Secessionist 
7.1. Secessionist/ethnic/ideological 
8. Unclear 
Categorical 
 
16. Is there conflict with 
other rebel groups? 
1, if there is a conflict with other rebel 
groups; 0, in other cases. 
Dichotomous 
17. Is there a previous 
peace failed 
negotiation by rebel 
group? 
1, if the previous peace negotiation with the 
rebel group had failed; 0, in other cases. 
Dichotomous 
18. Is there a previous 
peace failed 
negotiation by 
conflict? 
1, if the previous peace negotiation by 
conflict had failed; 0, in other cases. 
Dichotomous 
 
Structure of the data 
 
The DDR dataset is a unique source of comparable data on the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration provisions signed between 1975 and 2012. The 
resulting dataset consists of 129 observations (dyads) regarding 102 peace 
negotiations with 260 peace agreements during 1975 to 2012.  Figure 3 shows the 
logical structure of the dataset. Appendix A provides a summary of the cases and 
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outlines some of the criteria considered. These cases are included as peace 
negotiations because they meet the following three rules of decision: 
1. The negotiation is for solving the same incompatibility. 
2. It is negotiated by national government and at least one rebel group. 
3. This study considers a peace process as new if: 
o During the negotiation, the main rebel group or government retires 
from the table. 
OR 
o There are more than three years between signed agreements. 
Negotiations that do not meet these operational criteria are not included in the 
database. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the unit of analysis in this research is peace 
negotiation by dyad. The observations increase as there are many cases that have 
more than one rebel group. I therefore duplicate the observation according to the 
following criteria. If the peace negotiation has more than one rebel group, the 
information is duplicated for each rebel group. For example, in 1991, Cambodia had a 
peace agreement with KR, KPNLF and FUNCINPEC. I process these as distinct 
observations and collect individual information for each rebel group.   
Table 4 shows how many peace processes were negotiated by the number of 
participants (rebels). 
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Figure 3: Basic structure 
 
 
 
Table 4: Peace negotiation and number of rebel groups involved 
Peace negotiation with one rebel group  84 
Peace negotiation with two rebel groups  12 
Peace negotiation with three rebel groups  3 
Peace negotiation with four rebel groups  3 
TOTAL 102 
 
In summary, this dataset is used to provide a large-n statistical picture of peace deals, 
provisions and their results. The collected data allows quantitative analysis of various 
issues related to conflict and rebel characteristics, conflict resolution, effects of DDR 
provision, transformation of the rebel group and other outcomes. This database 
provides broad comparative quantitative data across 102 peace processes. The 
database could be used in combination with other important datasets, for example, the 
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Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the World Bank Database, Polity IV Project: this 
will allow exploration into different questions related to theory of conflict, conflict 
resolution and post-conflict outcomes. It will provide an evidentiary basis to rethink 
the gap relating to how peace negotiation and its settlements, such as DDR, are 
understood for peace-building. 
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Appendix A: Summary of the cases, including comments and notes.  
 
1. Afghanistan 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
137 First 2 
 
1 
1993 Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan 
 
Hizb-i Wahdat 
137 Second 1 1996 Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan 
 
2. Angola 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
131 First 2 1991 The National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola 
131 Second 1 1994 The National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola 
131 Third 1 2002 The National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola 
192 Fourth 1 2006 Front for the Liberation of the 
Enclave of Cabinda 
 
Number of rebel groups: seven. Number of conflicts: three.  1989, The Gbadolite 
Declaration which was a dead letter. 1991, The Bicesse Agreement was a cease-fire 
accord. The Lusaka Accord, 1994, was the implementation of the accords signed in 
Lisbon in May 1991. In 2002, the Luena Memorandum of Understanding was 
reached.  
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3. Bangladesh 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
126 First 1 1997 Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati 
Samiti 
 
4. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
203 First 1 
 
1994 The Croatian Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Croatian irregulars 
194 Second 1 1995 The Croatian Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina  
Serbian irregulars 
 
5. Burundi 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
90 First 1 2000 Palipehutu 
The National Council for the 
Defence of Democracy 
Frolina 
90 Second 4 2003 The National Council for the 
Defence of Democracy-Forces for 
the Defence of Democracy 
90 Third 3 2008 Palipehutu-National Forces of 
Liberation 
 
Palipehutu and The National Council for the Defense of Democracy split into two 
new factions. “Kabura thus founded the Palipehutu-FNL. The original group lost its 
military capacity and begun to focus solely on a political struggle, becoming inactive 
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as a warring party”(International Crisis Group, 2001). “The National Council for the 
Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy was created in 1998 
when the first National Council for the Defence of Democracy split in two as a 
consequence of a leadership struggle. […] The first National Council for the Defense 
of Democracy entered into negotiations with the government, signing a peace 
agreement in the year 2000” (Nindorera, 2012). 
I follow the rule of thumb, and for that reason I code as peace after a peace agreement 
is signed, although the conflict is ongoing with the new factions.  
 
6. Cambodia 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
103 First 1 1991 Khmer Rouge. 
Khmer People's National Liberation 
Front. 
National United Front for an 
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and 
Cooperative Cambodia. 
103 Second 1 1998 National United Front for an 
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and 
Cooperative Cambodia 
 
Khmer Rouge signed the peace agreement in 1991, but they continued fighting until 
25/12/1998. In the termination dataset, this case is registered as a victory by 
government. 
 
7. The Central African Republic 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
222 First 2 2008 Union of Democratic Forces for 
Unity 
222 Second 2 2012 The Convention of Patriots for 
Justice and Peace 
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 “On 13 April 2007, negotiations between the government and Union of Democratic 
Forces for Unity resulted in the signing of a peace agreement in the city of Birao. […] 
The ceasefire was respected, and no fighting has subsequently been reported between 
the government and Union of Democratic Forces for Unity. […]. In December 2012, 
a new rebel group called Seleka started a rebellion in northern Central African 
Republic. Seleka was an alliance of the former The Convention of Patriots for Justice 
and Peace, Union of Democratic Forces for Unity, and CPSK groups. Seleka fought 
against President Bozize as he had dishonoured the-peace agreements of 2007 and 
2011.”12 In light of this, I code this event as peace having failed. 
 
8. Chad  
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
91 First 3 
1 
1979 The Armed Forces of the North 
Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Chad 
91 Second 1 1993 National Council for Recovery 
91 Third 1 1994 Committee of National Revival for 
Peace and Democracy 
91 Fourth 1 1995 Movement for Development and 
Democracy 
91 Fifth 3 1997 Chadian National Front 
91 Sixth 1 1998 Armed Forces for a Federal 
Republic 
91 Seventh 1 1999 Movement for Development and 
Democracy 
91 Eight 1 2002 Movement for Democracy and 
Justice in Chad 
91 Ninth 1 2005 Movement for Democracy and 
Justice in Chad 
91 Tenth 1 2006 Front for Democratic Change 
91 Eleventh 1 2007 Union of Forces for Democracy 
and Development  
Rally of Democratic Forces 
                                                 
12 http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=31&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa# 
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“The agreement lasted for 6 years, July-early August (probably 2 August) 2000. After 
the agreement was signed, Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy 
became a legal party and joined the government. In September 1994, the Higher 
Transitional Council adopted amnesties for the former fighters of Committee of 
National Revival for Peace and Democracy. The integration of former fighters into 
the army began in November 1994. Kette was sacked from the government in 1996, 
but soon re-joined the government where he was security advisor until March 2000 
when he was again removed from his position. A local paper reported on 3 August 
2000 that government forces clashed with Committee of National Revival for Peace 
and Democracy fighters, resulting in two deaths. Clashes against civilians were also 
reported. The government forces killed Kette in September 2000” (Högbladh, 2012). 
“22 October 1993. It ended after government forces killed the leader of the National 
Council for Recovery, Col. Abbas Koty, on 22 October 1993” (Högbladh, 2012). 
“In the end of October, a Libyan brokered peace agreement was signed between the 
Chadian government and four different rebel groups (including Union of Forces for 
Democracy and Development). However, after a month the rebels took arms again 
stating that the reason for this was the lack of implementation of the agreement” 
(‘Chad profile’, 2017). 
National Council of Chadian Recovery: “the National Council of Chadian Recovery 
has not participated in armed conflict since 1997. In 2006 National Council of 
Chadian Recovery joined the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development 
alliance” (UCDP, 2015). 
Rally of Democratic Forces and Union of Forces for Democracy and Development: 
“On 25 December 2006 the parties signed a peace agreement […] After this 
agreement was signed Union of Forces for Democracy and Development and Rally of 
Democratic Forces decided to unite and continue fighting against president Déby. In 
2007 the conflict in Chad continued in a similar way as the two earlier years” (UCDP, 
2015). 
“The Rally of Democratic Forces is allied with the Concord National Tchadien as the 
Rally of Democratic Forces - Concord National Tchadien […] The Rally of 
Democratic Forces appeared to serve as a partial successor to the Rally of Democratic 
Forces in 2007. In January 2009 the Rally of Democratic Forces served as a core 
founder of the Union of resistance forces, an umbrella for some eight rebel groups 
dedicated to the overthrow of President Déby” (‘Alert 2010’, n.d.). 
“The Union of Forces for Democracy and Development, Union of Forces for 
Democracy and Development Fundamental, Rally of Democratic Forces, and other 
small groups announced the formation of a National Alliance to continue the anti-
Déby campaign” (Lansford, 2015). 
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9. Colombia 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
92 First 1 1989 M-19 
92 Second 1 1991 Popular Liberation Army 
92 Third 3 2002 Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia 
92 Fourth 1 2012 Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia 
 
10. Comoros 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
213 First 3 2003 MPA/Republic of Anjouan 
 
11. Congo 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
214 First 1 1999 Ninjas 
Cocoyes 
Ntsiloulous 
Cobras 
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12. Croatia 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
195 First 1 1995 Serbian irregulars 
The Serbian Republic of Krajina 
 
13. Djibouti 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
184 First 1 1994 Front for Restoration of Unity and 
Democracy 
184 Second  2 2001 Front for Restoration of Unity and 
Democracy - Ahmed Dini 
 
“The fighting was on low-scale for the first years after the 1994 agreement but the 
situation intensified in the second half of 1998 following the Eritrea-Ethiopia border 
conflict” (UCDP, 2015). 
 
14. DR Congo (Zaire) 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
86 First 4 2003 Rally for Congolese Democracy 
Movement for the Liberation of the 
Congo 
86 Second 1 2009 National Congress for the Defence 
of the People 
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15. El Salvador 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
120 First 9 1992 Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front 
 
16. Georgia 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
197 First 1 1992 The Republic of South Ossetia 
198 Second 3 1994 The Republic of Abkhazia 
 
17. Guatemala 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
36 First 16 1996 Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity 
 
18. Guinea – Bissau 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
216 First 1 1998 Military Junta for the Consolidation 
of Democracy, Peace and Justice 
 
“The peace agreement lasted for 6 months, i.e. from 1 November 1998 to 7 May 
1999. In late January 1999, there was a brief period of fighting in the capital but talks 
resumed quickly and a new ceasefire was reached on 9 February. On 6 May, new 
fighting erupted and the President Vieira was overthrown on 7 May” (Högbladh, 
2012). 
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19. Haiti 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
186 First 1 1993 Military faction (forces of Raoul 
Cédras)   
 
20. India 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
139 First 1 1988 Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) 
227 Second 1 1993 All Bodo Students Union 
139 Third 1 1993 All Tripura Tiger Force 
 
21. Indonesia 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
134 First 1 1999 Fretilin 
171 Second 2 2005 Free Aceh Movement 
 
22. Israel 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
37 First 7 
2 
1999 Fatah  
Palestinian National Authority 
37 Second 1 2007 Fatah 
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On 19 June 1992 Israeli negotiators met with their Palestinian counterparts to discuss 
the possibility of having more informal talks between Israel and the Fatah/PLO. Some 
of the pre-negotiations were mediated by Terje Larsen, a Norwegian socialist, in 
preparation for the actual negotiations. The first substantive talks between Israeli and 
PLO teams were held on 20-22 January 1993 in Oslo.   The negotiations resulted in 
The Declaration of Principles (Oslo Agreement), signed on 13 September 1993. 
Several peace agreements were signed between 1997 and 1999; however, these 
catered only to some minor issues (such as continued Israeli withdrawals) and did not 
address the core of the problem. All in all, these negotiations are commonly referred 
to as the ‘Oslo Peace Process’.  
 
23. Ivory Coast 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
225 First 2 2003 Patriotic Movement of Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Ivorian Popular Movement of the 
Great West 
Movement for Justice and Peace 
225 Second 7 2008 Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Ivory Coast 
 
24. Lebanon 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
63 First 1 1989 Lebanese Army (Aoun)  
Lebanese Forces 
Lebanese National Resistance Front 
Lebanese Forces - Hobeika faction 
 
The Lebanese National Movement (LNM) dissolved after the Israeli invasion of 
1982. It was replaced by the Lebanese National Resistance Front. 
The Lebanese Forces (LF) merged with several minor groups, such as Al-Tanzim, 
Guardians of the Cedars, Lebanese Youth Movement, and Tyous Team of 
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Commandos. The LF split with the Tigers Militia in 1980. The Tigers Militia was the 
military wing of the National Liberal Party. 
The war finally came to an end with a peace accord signed in October 1989. It is not 
clear how many rebel groups signed the agreement.  
 
25. Liberia 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
146 First 4 
5 
1991 National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
Independent National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia 
146 Second 5 1996 National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
146 Third 2 2003 Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy 
Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia 
 
26. Macedonia 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
223 First 1 2001 National Liberation Army 
 
27. Mali 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
177 First 2 
1 
1992 
(1991) 
Azawad People’s Movement 
Arab Islamic Front of Azawad 
177 Second 1 2012 National Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad 
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28. Mauritania 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
253 First 1 1979 POLISARIO 
 
29. Mexico 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
205 First 1 1996 Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation 
 
30. Moldova 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
199 First 1 1997 Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic 
 
31. Mozambique 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
136 First 5 1992 Mozambican National Resistance 
 
The conflict resumed in 2013 (after 21 years). 
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32. Myanmar 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
34 First 1 1993 Kachin Independence Organisation 
23-56-
228-
264 
Second 1 
1 
2 
1 
2012 Karen National Union 
Karenni National Progressive Party 
United Wa State Army 
Myanmar National Democratic 
Alliance Army 
 
33. Nepal 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
72 First 4 2006 Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist 
Centre) 
 
34. Nicaragua 
Conflict  
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
140 First 5 1990 Contras / Nicaraguan Democratic 
Force 
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35. Niger 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
255 First 1 1993 Liberation Front of Air and 
Azawak 
255 -
178 
Second 2 
1 
1995 Coordination of the Armed 
Resistance 
Union of Forces of the Armed 
Resistance 
 
The Liberation Front of Air and Azawak, and the Coordination of the Armed 
Resistance: “The first group to emerge was the Liberation Front of Air and Azawak 
that fought for a federal system in Niger. The conflict ended in 1993 when the  
Liberation Front of Air and Azawak signed a peace agreement, but the Tuareg rebels 
fractionalised with the result of a new umbrella rebel organisation, the Coordination 
of the Armed Resistance, instigating an armed conflict over territory in 1994 striving 
for autonomy for northern Niger” (UCDP, 2015). 
 
36. Papua New Guinea 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
174 First 1 1991 Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
174 Second 1 1994 Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
174 Third 1 2001 Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
 
37. Rwanda 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
179 First 6 1993 Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda 
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38. Philippines 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
112 First 1 1976 Moro National Liberation Front 
112 Second 1 1987 Moro National Liberation Front 
10 Third 1 1995 Military Faction (forces of 
Honasan, Abenina & Zumel) 
112 Fourth 1 1996 Moro National Liberation Front 
112 Fifth 6 2002 Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
112 Sixth 4 2012 Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
 
39. Senegal 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
180 First 1 2004 Movement of Democratic Forces in 
the Casamance 
 
40. Serbia (Yugoslavia) 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
189 First 1 1991 The Republic of Slovenia 
218 Second 1 1999 Kosovo Liberation Army 
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41. Sierra Leone 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
187 First 1 1996 Revolutionary United Front 
187 Second 2 2000 Revolutionary United Front 
 
“In May 2000, Revolutionary United Front began attacking United Nations mission 
troops in Sierra Leone, culminating in the kidnapping of several hundred UN troops 
in an ambush. Sankoh’s dash for control of the country was however foiled by large-
scale civil society protests, and the arrival of battle-hardened and well-equipped 
British forces that aligned themselves with the remnants of the Sierra Leone army to 
battle the resurgent Revolutionary United Front. […] The military action of British 
forces, Revolutionary United Front’s disastrous fighting with the government of 
Guinea in September 2000 to early 2001 and the strengthened presence of United 
Nations mission in Sierra Leone combined to finally break the back of Revolutionary 
United Front. The rebels began, under the leadership of Issa Sesay after Sankoh's 
capture, to cooperate with the Lomé peace agreement and the Abuja agreement, 
which was signed in November to reaffirm the earlier accord that had been disrupted 
by the May 2000 disturbances. Consequently, the disarmament process began to gain 
pace and in January 2002, 72,490 combatants had been disarmed, marking the official 
end to the war. Conflict activity has at this time not been recorded since the year 
2000” (Rashid, 2000, p. 26). 
 
42. Somalia  
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
141 First 2 1994 United Somali Congress/Somali 
National Alliance 
141 Second 1 1997 United Somali Congress/Somali 
National Alliance 
141 Third 2 2008 Alliance for the Re-liberation of 
Somalia 
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43. South Africa 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
101 First 1 1978 South West Africa People’s 
Organisation 
150 Second 5 1993 African National Congress 
 
44. Sudan 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
113 First 1 1988 South Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement in Opposition 
113 Second 7 2005 South Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement in Opposition  
113 Third 2 2005 National Democratic Alliance 
113 Fourth 1 2006 Sudan Liberation Army-Minni 
Minawi 
113 Fifth 1 2011 South Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement in Opposition - North  
113 Sixth 3 2012 Justice and Equality Movement 
 
“The duration of the DPA ended at the end of 2010. At that time, the government and 
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi) clashed 
at three different times. In addition, Minni Minawi said that he was thinking of 
joining forces with Sudan Liberation Movement/Army led by Abdul Wahid. In 
addition, the government declared Minni Minawi and his forces to be a legal target” 
(BBC, 2010). 
2010: 
Most of the fighting took place between the Justice and Equality Movement and the 
government, but fighting between the government and the Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army also caused many battle-related deaths. 
2011: 
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Fighting continued, and in Darfur the Justice and Equality Movement and Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Army continued their struggle against the government, 
although at a lower level of intensity compared to previous years. Still, no durable 
solution for the continuing crisis in Darfur was within sight (‘Sudan Tribune: Plural 
news and views on Sudan’, n.d.). 
 
45. Tajikistan 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
200 First 5 1997 United Tajik Opposition 
 
46. Uganda 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
118 First 1 1985 National Resistance Army 
118 Second 1 1988 Uganda People’s Democratic Army 
118 Third 1 2002 Uganda National Rescue Front II 
118 Fourth 7 2008 The Lord's Resistance Army 
 
Despite this, the parties for a long time refrained from fighting each other. However, 
when Kony missed a November 2008 deadline for signing the agreement, and The 
Lord’s Resistance Army launched attacks on civilians in southern Sudan and also 
initiated attacks in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it seemed to 
confirm suspicions that the rebel group, while engaging in negotiations, had in fact 
been buying time and preparing for war. (Arieff et al, 2015) 
 
47. Zimbabwe 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
122 First 1 1979 Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe 
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48. United Kingdom 
Conflict 
ID 
Peace 
process 
Peace 
agreements 
Year Rebels 
119 First 1 1998 The Provisional Irish Republican 
Army 
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Determinants of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
during peace negotiation 
 
 
 
Abstract  
The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process (DDR) is often 
proposed as a mechanism to build trust and avoid defection or cheating between 
parties, during conflict negotiations and an implementation phase. Previous studies 
consider DDR as one of the most important stages for a lasting peace, and a necessary 
if not wholly sufficient condition for solving causes of conflict. Based on a newly 
created database of peace negotiations from 1975 to 2012, this paper considers how 
the characteristics of a conflict, the rebel capabilities, and the economic and political 
factors of the state affect the likelihood that peace negotiations may include a DDR 
agreement. The findings suggest that long-lived and multiparty conflicts, as well as 
conflicts where rebel groups have territorial control and high tactical and military 
capacity, are less likely to have a DDR provision in a peace negotiation. This paper 
further finds that DDR is less likely if a country has had a stable regime and a solid 
economy. 
 
Keywords: disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, peace agreements, logistic 
model. 
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Introduction 
 
From 1975 until 2012, 10213 peace negotiations have been negotiated worldwide, of 
which 80 agreements have DDR provisions. Some agreements have a clear mandate 
about DDR, while some have only mentioned it without citing specific details. The 
remaining 22 agreements did not negotiate a DDR provision. This paper addresses the 
following questions: why do some agreements include disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration provisions during peace negotiations, while others do not? 
Moreover, what determines whether or not a peace negotiation has a DDR provision?  
 
Following the UCDP definition, a peace process14 is a set of peace agreements, which 
are defined as arrangements to resolve the basic incompatibility. Numerous peace 
processes have different provisions for achieving more sustainable objectives and 
long-term stability as well as solving the causes of the conflict. Both the peace 
process and some of their provisions have been extensively studied to establish the 
incentives for negotiation, the duration of peace, and the causes of peace failure. For 
example, Mattes and Savun (2009) identify two types of “commitment-enhancing” 
conditions that have a significant effect on creating long-lasting peace and preventing 
                                                 
13 A closer look at the data indicates that a peace process is an important way to finish and solve an 
internal armed conflict. (Ballesteros et al., 2016; Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2016). The dataset reports 
129 peace processes with rebel groups involving 260 individual peace agreements. 
14 A peace process is a common practice for settling the causes of an armed conflict. UCDP has 
defined a peace process as a “formal process including more than one peace agreement, in which the 
warring parties have either decided to settle the incompatibility through a process where one issue at a 
time is regulated by an agreement, or settings where the peace agreements concluded explicitly build 
on previous peace agreements.” A peace agreement is defined by UCDP as “an agreement between 
two or more primary warring parties in a conflict, which addresses the disputed incompatibility either 
by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate 
the incompatibility” (Högbladh, 2012). 
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the recurrence of war: fear-reducing provision and cost-increasing provision. The 
former condition aims to decrease the rebel insecurity and reduce the opportunity 
“[…] that one side behaves opportunistically by imposing internal or external 
constraints on the parties’ ability to renege on the peace agreement” (Mattes & Savun, 
2009, p. 742), such as power-sharing and third-party guarantees. The latter provision, 
which could entail peacekeeping operations, withdrawal of foreign forces or the 
separation and dispersal of troops, is focused on increasing the cost of fighting or 
going back to war. This provision “make(s) it more attractive for the parties to stick to 
the deal in the short-run and allow the peace agreement to be fully implemented” 
(Mattes & Savun, 2009). The authors highlight that the cost-increasing condition has 
received little scholarly attention, except in relation to peacekeeping operations, while 
Berdal15 (1996) emphasises that there are few comparative studies, in relation to this 
provision, which identify common factors between cases. 
 
This paper focuses on an important cost-increasing provision: disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration.  It will argue that DDR is a cost-increasing 
provision because it increases the cost of going to war or reneging on the agreement. 
Additionally, DDR “contributes to the security necessary for the successful 
implementation of a civil war peace agreement” (Spear, 2002, p. 141). DDR is also 
considered a highly politicised process because it represents a fundamental element of 
bargaining power, where the rebel leaders can keep the majority of weapons, maintain 
control of their ex-combatants as a “secret rebel army” and preserve territorial control 
and use these strategies as a “reactive commitment” to force a result. This was 
                                                 
15 See Berdal, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d, 1996e . 
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precisely the case in Angola after the peace agreement in 1994 (Berdal, 1996e, p. 22).  
Thus, DDR is considered a crucial aspect of any peace settlement, because a fruitful 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of a warring faction contributes not 
only to improving the security of both society and the rebels, but also to fostering 
trust between the negotiating parties for the implementation phase.  
 
The process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is by definition 
a multidimensional and complex mechanism involving political, military, security, 
humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. DDR establishes an important 
connection between the military and civilian aspects of a peace process and it is a 
transitional link between rebel life and new civil life (W. A. Knight, 2008; UNDDR, 
2014). DDR is considered the last stage of a peace process or any other consensus for 
reaching peace (B. Walter, 2002). To achieve peace, the main objectives of the DDR 
are to contribute to the improvement of security and political stability in post-conflict 
states, to prevent recidivism and a shift to other forms of violence and to preclude 
parties from reneging on the commitment to the peace process. The parties decide to 
include DDR provision in peace agreements particularly when security is ensured for 
all sides. For example, in the South African case, the national peace accord was 
signed in September 1991 by the white majority government and the National Party 
on the one side, and the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party on 
the other side. The political violence increased during the period from 1991 to 1993 
because the parties did not want to disengage their armies. However, after 18 months, 
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when the violence was under control, the DDR negotiations started16 and the official 
demobilisation process was initiated in April 1995 (Lamb, 2013). At this stage, there 
were 135,927 demobilised personnel (statutory and non-statutory forces); some of 
these were integrated into the new military force, and others were socially 
reintegrated. 
 
In accordance with various DDR’s aims, there are cases of peace processes with a 
DDR provision that could be considered successful, partially successful or 
unsuccessful. The positive results of DDR can be measured in terms of the levels of 
recidivism, improvement in the quality of life or the disappearance of other violence. 
For example, after two decades of civil war in Mozambique, in 1992 Frelimo and 
Renamo signed a peace agreement with DDR provision. The Mozambican process 
has been considered a successful case, because the conflict ended and the violence 
disappeared. Striuli (2012) has highlighted that the DDR provision has been 
particularly positive in terms of demobilisation and reintegration, but less so in 
relation to disarmament.17 Different reports indicated that DDR in Mozambique was a 
necessary but insufficient condition for reaching peace. Although it helped to build 
trust and stability, it failed because the rate of collection and destruction of weapons 
was diminutive (Berdal, 1996d; Striuli, 2012). Another example is Colombia, a 
country with an armed conflict since 1946, which has signed three peace 
                                                 
16 “In April 1993, formal military negotiations between the SADF and MK were initiated. The 
negotiation focused on the control of the defence force during the transition, the creation of a new 
defence force and the integration of the various armed forces into this new defence force (the South 
African National Defence Force - SANDF). APLA did not participate in the military negotiations and 
only formally suspended the armed struggle in 1994” (Lamb, 2013, p. 9). 
17 The process demobilised around 110,000 rebels (supporters and combatants) and 30,000 core force 
personnel and developed a community approach for reintegration. See Striuli (2012). 
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agreements,18 each with a DDR provision. Nonetheless, the armed conflict is ongoing 
with other armed groups. DDR in Colombia could be considered partially successful 
because it disengaged the rebel group involved in the peace process, but the presence 
of other rebel groups supplanted the original combatants, and thus the conflict 
continued. Also, some ex-rebels had been recruiting again for these groups due to a 
poorly designed reintegration programme, which was bereft of economic 
opportunities for ex-combatants (Gutiérrez & González, 2012; Nussio & Howe, 
2014).19  
 
In this paper, I focus on analysing the characteristics of conflicts, the rebels’ 
capabilities and the economic and political factors of the states that have had peace 
negotiations with or without DDR provision. There are two main motivations for 
developing this research. First, there is evidence, borne out by different reports and 
studies, that the DDR process has played a significant role in determining peace after 
an armed conflict. DDR is one of the instruments for reaching a lasting peace that 
could help to solve the commitment problem in a peace agreement. Additionally, the 
rebels could use DDR as a negotiating power strategy. For example, Muggah 
emphasises that while “there is a widespread consensus about the centrality of DDR 
in post-conflict settings, there is comparatively less awareness of the way in which 
disarmament and demobilisation, in particular, are negotiated and institutionalised” 
                                                 
18 The first peace agreement was reached in 1953 with “la guerrilla de los llanos”, the second was 
agreed in 1989 involving the 19th of April Movement (M-19), the People’s Liberation Army (EPL) 
and some small groups, and the last was negotiated in 2003 with paramilitary forces – AUC. 
19 Maedl et al. make clear that “the risk of re-recruitment is high when ex-combatants fail to reintegrate 
economically and socially into their civil host communities” (Maedl, Schauer, Odenwald, & Elbert, 
2010, p.186),  which may cause post-conflict violence or resumption of the conflict. 
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(Muggah, 2013, p. 21). Finally, the DDR provision needs to be studied in more detail, 
as currently most studies are based on evaluation and policy analysis or case studies. 
If we do not understand when DDR should be included, models that evaluate their 
success may suffer from selection bias. In sum, there is a lack of comparative 
research focusing on the general characteristics and conditions of conflicts and 
countries that include DDR provision in a peace agreement. 
 
This research contributes to the debate regarding the failure of peace processes, and to 
existing literature about negotiations and the cessation of civil wars. I examine the 
relationship between the government, rebels, and conflict by focusing on the 
characteristics and the inducements that encourage both sides to negotiate a DDR 
provision. This study is the first rebel-government approach examining why some 
peace processes have a DDR provision while others do not. I develop a Hawk-Dove 
game to explore the incentives and conditions of the adversaries for including a DDR 
provision in the agreement. The findings suggest that conflicts which are high cost, in 
terms of duration and death, are less likely to have a DDR in a peace negotiation. This 
result highlights the fact that weariness and state weakness have a substantial effect 
on the decision to negotiate a DDR. I also find that rebel groups which are considered 
to be strong, and have territorial control, are not expected to negotiate a DDR. The 
rebel groups with a clear and identifiable political wing are more prone to negotiate a 
DDR provision because they can use political means to advance their demands. When 
the conflict does not have more than two rebel groups, the rebel groups are also more 
likely to negotiate a DDR. Countries considered to have a stable regime and robust 
70 
 
economy are less prone to have a DDR in a peace negotiation because the society has 
the potential to assimilate former combatants without a special programme. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured into three sections as follows. The first 
section considers the importance of this process and why and when DDR is included 
in peace agreements. This question is explained using a review of the DDR literature 
and a brief review of the existing literature on the resolution of conflict, negotiation 
and peace processes that support the paper’s hypothesis. Second, I present the data 
collected, outline the methodology and analyse the empirical results. Third, there is a 
discussion of the main empirical findings and their implications for our understanding 
of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration mechanism. 
 
Literature review: The concept of DDR and theory of conflict resolution 
 
Different studies have investigated why some peace processes (or negotiations) have 
brought peace while others have not. This literature has shown that peace negotiations 
could fail for a variety of different reasons, such as the presence of spoilers, problems 
of distrust, secrecy between negotiating parties, and a lack of credible guarantees (B. 
Walter, 1997). The most popular cause is the commitment problem,20 which can be 
understood as a lack of credibility between the government and rebel groups 
concerning their ability to fulfil expectations. On the one hand, the government does 
                                                 
20 This paper does not focus on this issue. For further information, see Coyne & Mathers (2011) and  
Mattes & Savun (2009). 
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not believe that rebels will cease their military activities; on the other hand, rebels do 
not trust the government to follow and uphold the agreement. In addition, the rebels 
may feel vulnerable to any aggression or military attacks due to the shifting balance 
of power.  
 
To solve the imminent distrust between parties, which dissuades agreements, the 
international community and mediators have designed different mechanisms; one of 
them is the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration provision. DDR can be 
understood not only as a bargaining power tool to solve the mutual mistrust issue, but 
can also be a guarantee of security, especially when the security situation is fragile 
due to the presence of other armed groups or spoilers and weak institutions. For 
instance, during the ongoing Colombian peace talks (2012) the parties defined a 
common agenda that consisted of six points.21 The fifth point was the end of conflict, 
where both sides discussed the abandonment of arms by the FARC, reincorporation 
of the FARC into civil life, guarantees of security and a definitive ceasefire, and an 
end to hostilities. The negotiators agreed to discuss these conditions in the last stage 
of the process as a measure of credibility and power. However, there are other cases 
which do not invoke the whole DDR, as for example in Zimbabwe’s peace 
negotiation (1979). In this instance, the rebels and government decided to actualise 
only a demobilisation stage, because the mistrust between warring parties was too 
severe to consider any further measures (Giustozzi, 2012). There are other cases 
which negotiated disarmament exclusively, such as Indonesia with Fretelin (1999), or 
                                                 
21 The six points were: rural reform, political participation, illicit drugs, victims, end of conflict, 
implementation. 
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negotiated only reintegration, such as India with the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) 
(1993). In certain cases, DDR is subsequently negotiated a few years after the peace 
process, such as in South Africa. 
 
These examples show us that we can find some peace agreements where the DDR 
provision is partially negotiated, not negotiated or negotiated after a prudential time. 
The reasons for this situation are twofold. First, the mutual mistrust can result in an 
aversion to implementing DDR because, as Glassmyer and Sambanis point out, “once 
the rebels demobilise, they lose bargaining power, and the government can renege on 
its promise” (Glassmyer & Sambanis, 2008, p. 365). Humphreys describes the second 
reason as a “security dilemma”  (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007), due to the presence 
of other armed groups or spoilers and weak institutions. In sum, DDR  may be 
perceived as a provision for solving the commitment problems by increasing the cost 
of defection (Mattes & Savun, 2009), or by altering the incentives (cost and benefits) 
for combatants to maintain illegal activities (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007).  
 
In brief, this paper understands DDR as a mechanism for reaching peace, but not as a 
solution for the causes of conflict. Every stage in DDR is described according to the 
United Nations definition.  I acknowledge that the DDR is an important stage because 
it is a bridge between the end of the military actions and a new civil life. The 
guarantees, tools and opportunities, which are developed during negotiations, serve as 
the bridge connecting the former combatant to a new path and a fresh start in a post-
conflict life. The DDR contributes to the improvement of security and political 
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stability in post-conflict states, prevents the recurrence of violence, and builds long-
term confidence between former adversaries. 
 
A basic game for bargaining a DDR process22 
 
This paper studies the determinants of bargaining a peace process with or without 
DDR provision. These determinants are based on the conditions and reasons that 
different actors in an armed conflict have for negotiating peace. The literature review 
shows that DDR is a provision for solving the commitment problem, because it 
increases the cost of defection and alters the motivations for former combatants by 
influencing them to refrain from war or illegal activities. The literature also highlights 
the importance of a clear understanding of the context, the social, political and 
economic dynamics of each country, and the characteristics and incentives of the 
insurgent organization for fighting or not fighting. Additionally, it is important to 
analyse the security dilemma, the conflict’s political economy, war incentives and 
commitment and credibility among actors in order to understand and analyse why a 
DDR process is negotiated. In other words, it is necessary to analyse the groups of 
incentives for negotiating DDR. 
 
To facilitate a better understanding of the above ideas, this section develops a basic 
game-theoretic model. The model shows that decisions made at the bargaining stage 
of the peace process are based on the combatants’ beliefs about fulfilment in relation 
                                                 
22 I would like to thank Camilo Argoty for his comments and help with this brief section. 
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to the agreed-upon DDR and the economic incentives. In other words, if the armed 
groups have a strong economic motivation for fighting, they should be less likely to 
start a “real” DDR process; instead, they will want a provision that enables their 
armed structures to become an army reserve, and preserve the established 
coordination networks which can be easily reactivated and maintain territorial 
control. I am going to develop the Hawk-Dove game because “it is a negotiation 
environment with a non-equitable distribution of payoff in equilibrium” (García, 
Aguilar, & Muñoz-Herrera, 2015, p. 289). The game has two strategies: 
• Hawk: It denotes an aggressive behaviour. In this case it corresponds to 
readiness to fight or to stop the negotiation. (H) 
• Dove: It represents a cooperative behaviour. In this case, it denotes 
willingness to come to a reasonable compromise about DDR. (D) 
 
In this game there are two players, a rebel group (RG) and government (G) that are 
contesting for some plunder with value V > 0.  The cost of the struggle for each 
player is C > 0, so if both players decide a Hawk strategy, each one will receive 
𝑉
2
−
𝐶. If one player decides to use the Dove strategy but the other does not, the 
aggressive player will take the plunder (V), while the steady one will receive nothing 
(0). If both players decide to adopt the Dove strategy, each one will receive 
𝑉
2
. The 
plunder represents the expectations for each agent and can be economical, political, 
social or a combination of these three. The payoffs are given in Table 5, where the 
first entry is the payoff of RG, and the second entry is the payoff of G. 
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The game has four possible outcomes: 
1. Both players negotiate a DDR. This outcome entails a payoff of (V/2) but it is 
never a Nash equilibrium. 
2. Both players assume an aggressive strategy (Hawk – Hawk). They are going 
to fight or stop the negotiation. Each can win with a probability of 0.5 and 
each pays a cost (C).  In other words, if V>2C there is a Nash equilibrium. 
This means that both players are likely to stop the negotiation, since the 
plunder is worth the struggle. 
3. In the case of V  2C, we have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in Hawk-
Dove and Dove-Hawk. In this equilibrium, one of the players will stop the 
bargaining process, since there is no reason for continuing the dialogue. 
4. There is a fourth possibility and this is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in 
which both players will bargain with probability 
𝑉
2𝐶
 . This means that the 
“desire of bargaining” of each player, depends on the gap between  
𝑉
2
   and C. 
 
It is important to highlight that an egalitarian bargaining process is not likely to 
happen and the closer the cost of stopping the negotiation is to the expectation of 
plunder, the stronger the willingness to solve the conflict. Because this game 
represents the cooperation and conflict environments, as both players are trying to 
avoid the outcome Hawk – Hawk, it is not clear who is going to be given the 
advantage.  
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The literature about conflict and negotiation shows that the commitment problems 
and the asymmetries of information make it difficult to reach an agreement through 
dialogue, as the resulting outcome or strategy can lead to the worst possible scenario. 
However, this disagreement could be used by one of the players to influence the 
strategy of another player: in other words, one of the players is going to send a 
message with his strategy.  In this case, it is important to send a “reactive 
commitment”,23—a threat, a promise or both—which can only be effective if it is 
credible. As Schelling argues,  “In bargaining, the commitment is a device to leave 
the last clear chance to decide the outcome with the other party, in a manner that he 
fully appreciates; it is to relinquish further initiatives, having riffed the incentives so 
that other party must choose in one’s favour” (Schelling, 1980, p. 37). In sum, player 
2, in this case the government, can send a warning showing its power (military or 
political) or its compromise with the implementation of the agreement; in other 
words, the government can increase the cost of defection (C) or alter the rebel’s 
incentives (V) for participating in legal activities.      
 
Following Hirshleifer (2000), the game with reactive commitment has the following 
protocol: 
• First comes the commitment (threat – promise – both) 
• Then the target player (RG) makes his movement  
• Then the committing player (G) makes his reactive movement 
                                                 
23 “Reactive commitment occurs when the decision-maker who will be acting last pledges to respond, 
in a specified contingent way, to the opponent’s earlier choice.” According to Hirshleifer, this can be 
regarded as a pre-play move (Hirshleifer, 2000, p. 2). 
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This game has the same payoff structure as shown in Table 5, with the first row and 
column representing the more cooperative actions and the second row and column 
displaying the less cooperative strategies.  The second–mover is the one who makes 
the warning (or pre-play move). The important point here is that the threat or promise 
must be credible. Let us suppose that player 124 (rebel group) assigns the likelihood 
PP to the promise or the likelihood Pt to the threat being fulfilled. 
 
If the government uses a threat, then the rebel group will rationally accede to it, rather 
than defy it, if its level of credibility is   Pt > (V/2C). 
 
Similarly, if the government uses a promise and a threat, the expected utilities and 
payoff will be: 
• If the rebel group chooses to be cooperative (H), the government will carry 
out its promise and the payoff for the rebel will be:  
𝐸(𝑈1)(𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) = (
𝑉
2
− 𝐶) 𝑃𝑃 + 𝑉 (1 − 𝑃𝑃) 
• If the rebel group chooses to be less cooperative (D), the government will 
carry out its threat and the payoff for the rebel will be  
𝐸(𝑈1)(𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) = (
𝑉
2
) 𝑃𝑡 + 0 (1 − 𝑃𝑡) 
It follows that the rebel will rationally choose his cooperative strategy if and only if: 
(
𝑉+2𝐶
𝑉
) 𝑃𝑝 + 𝑃𝑡 ≥ 2. 
                                                 
24 It is also possible to play the game with the warning being sent by the rebel group. The rebel group 
would show its military power, its territorial control and its capacity to control the rebels.  
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Table 5: The Hawk-Dove game: Payoffs 
 
In conclusion, this game suggests that the bargaining of a DDR programme between a 
rebel group and government depends on the size of plunder, or the expected utilities 
each of them obtains from war, and the credibility of the threat or promise in terms of 
influencing the decision of another player. The conditions and incentives of each 
player are likely to be different and can determine whether the parties negotiate a 
complete DDR, partial DDR or no DDR. The next section presents the possible 
determinants of these conditions.  
 
Determinants for DDR 
 
As mentioned previously, DDR is the bridge for a peacebuilding process. It can help 
to create a transition from military life to civil life, build confidence, improve security 
and start the recovery of a war-torn society. Berdal highlights the importance of 
identifying the factors in play, but taking into account the “uniqueness of individual 
conflicts and the variety of local actors and cultural settings” (1996e, p. 9). Glassmyer 
 Government 
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and Sambanis (2008) point out the determinants of rebel-military reintegration. They 
conclude that “Postwar hostility measures are not significant determinants of MI […] 
we find that MI is more likely to be implemented if income growth is high, and it is 
less likely to be implemented if resource-dependence is high […] High hostility does 
not prevent the implementation of MI” (2008, p. 376). Banholzer (2013) argues that 
conflicts which end with a peace agreement are more likely to develop a DDR 
programme. However, few studies identify common factors25 between cases. To fill 
this gap, this paper identifies the common characteristics of countries and conflicts, in 
term of rebels’ characteristics as well as economic and political factors. My purpose 
is to contribute to the discussion about the DDR process as a negotiation tool, giving 
a clearer appreciation of the context and features of the DDR by determining those 
characteristics which increase the likelihood of DDR being included in a peace 
process.  
 
My core hypotheses are consistent with the literature on conflict resolution. Five 
underlying conditions can be identified to make war less desirable and motivate 
warring parties to pursue peace negotiations with a DDR provision: the cost of war, 
the presence of spoilers, the balance of military power and the strength of economic 
and political institutions. The following sections develop the main ideas about these 
conditions and their relationship with DDR. 
 
                                                 
25 Berdal emphasises there are “[…] common features both directly and indirectly relevant to 
considerations of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. These features - whose intensity and 
importance vary greatly from case to case - derive from the intra-state character of conflict, the socio-
economic legacy of protracted war, and the proliferation of arms in the countries and regions where 
disarmament and demobilisation have been attempted” (Berdal, 1996d, p.7). 
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Characteristics of conflict: duration,26 war-related deaths and spoilers 
 
The economic theory of civil war suggests that wars will be longer when there is 
positive utility from warfare (Collier, 2004). The Lebanese civil wars are a clear 
example of this theory. The first Lebanese civil war started in 1975 and lasted 15 
years. During these 15 years of war, the parties adjusted to a low-intensity conflict 
and created an economy of war, which generated positive benefit for both sides. 
During the conflict, the rebels were able to accumulate different kinds of assets,27 
which were of higher value than the cost of war. However, a new cycle of violence 
emerged from 1989 to 2003 which increased the cost of war significantly, resulting in 
an economy of war that became impossible to sustain (Richani, 2002). This situation 
facilitated a negotiated peace process with a DDR process based on economic 
dynamics and legal profit maximising. One of the objectives was to prevent the 
“greed” factor of civil war and generate legal earning based on employment and 
formal training (Munive & Jakobsen, 2012). 
 
In sum, the economic theory of civil war argues that armed groups are more likely to 
fight when it is less costly for them to reach their objectives. Following this 
argument, the decision to fight or negotiate is determined by the utility (benefits) of a 
military victory or a peace negotiation (settlement)28 (Mason & Fett, 1996). Walter 
                                                 
26 “The costs of war tend to be directly related to its duration. Data on battle deaths in civil war reveal 
that internal conflicts that are two years or shorter generate an average of 3,000 deaths while civil wars 
that are longer than two years result in an average of 44,000 deaths” (Cunningham, 2006, p. 875). 
27 Richani reported that the economy of war was equivalent to around 25% of GDP. 
28 It is important to highlight that this paper is not focused on when parties start to negotiate, but 
concentrates on the stage when the negotiations include DDR arrangements. 
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highlights that “settlement occurs when combatants believe they can do no better by 
continuing to fight than by bargaining” (B. Walter, 2002, p.8). This theoretical logic 
suggests that DDR arrangements are a key element to be included in a peace 
agreement when assuming “greed” to be the main factor for fighting; consequently, it 
is important to define what is the desired utility of ex-combatants. Munive et al. point 
out that “ex-combatants’ reintegration is linked to successfully eliminating greed 
through the provision of a new economic livelihood [...] if you have a job, you do not 
go fighting” (2012, p. 375). 
 
The theory concerning the duration of war has concluded that prolonged conflicts 
have negative consequences for countries. For instance, they create state weakness in 
terms of re-establishing a legitimate state monopoly on violence, have an impact upon 
the recovery of the economy and the welfare of its inhabitants, generate vendettas, 
and divide societies. These consequences could have potentially “negative” 
implications for developing DDR arrangements during a peace process. First, the 
prolonged conflict and the weakened state of the government contribute to the 
inability of the post-conflict government to follow through with the proposed 
settlements derived through negotiations; second, the negative consequences 
mentioned above result in reintegration aims that cannot be achieved due to the lack 
of economic support. The case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is 
pertinent as the demobilised rebels were attacked and robbed by other rebel groups, 
such as the CNDP (Richards, 2013). The case of Liberia is another relevant instance, 
where the former combatants were reintegrated into standards of poverty. Finally, the 
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case of the Central African Republic demonstrates how the weakness of the state and 
the presence of other armed groups led to accords that were not implemented and the 
war resumed (Caramés & Sanz, 2009). 
 
Other significant factors which are emphasised by Berdal (1996c) are the intensity 
and type of the violence, which 
have a direct bearing on disarmament and demobilisation efforts […] First, 
and most obviously, confidence and mutual trust between parties are 
necessarily more difficult to generate and far more susceptible to reversal and 
rapid erosion when violence has been acute, indiscriminate and widespread. 
Second, more often than not the armed forces to be “reformed” as part of a 
settlement have, in the past, been the instrument of state repression and 
violence. (p. 6)  
When wars are extreme and one side commits different violations against civil society 
and its enemy, the parties are more prone to include a partial DDR or to negotiate it 
after some years, because the credibility of the adversary is low, and in these 
circumstances it is difficult to believe that the adversary is going to fulfil the deal. 
The case studies of South Africa, El Salvador and Guatemala illustrate this point. The 
combined estimated death toll in these conflicts was nearly 700,000, and the majority 
of violations were committed by the state army.  
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Alternatively, some authors have considered that, after a long and high intensity war, 
parties could have a “positive” stance towards DDR, because in this scenario 
participants can experience weariness and discouragement and therefore want to sign 
a peace agreement. For the rebels, DDR represents a new opportunity for achieving 
their goals by using “legal” tools. On the other hand, for the government, it is the 
chance to solve a conflict in situations where they were unable to obtain a military 
victory (Cunningham et al., 2009). Thus, the fatigue and discouragement produced by 
a long drawn out and intensive conflict should induce a DDR inclusion, because it 
increases the rebel’s incentives to be in the legal arena: this would mean that the cost 
of war is bigger than its utility, and in terms of the game V≤ 2𝐶.  A notable example 
is the negotiation between Burundi and the Palipehutu-National Forces of Liberation 
(FNL). In July 2007, the leadership of the rebel group decided to abandon the 
demobilisation process, which resulted in a split within Palipehutu-FNL and an 
inevitable clash between the factions. One faction (Lovers of Peace) “said they were 
tired of war and wished to be demobilised”29, while the other faction wanted to fight 
because the leader (Palipehutu-FNL) considered that the government had been 
cheating. Other samples of weariness can be traced in the Angolan and Mozambican 
cases.  
 
An important element of the longevity of conflict is the number of parties involved in 
the war. For example, Christia (2012) points out that multiparty civil wars30 are 
longer in duration and higher in intensity because “an increase in the number of actors 
                                                 
29 http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=26&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#  
30 Multiparty civil war is defined as a conflict with three or more armed groups. 
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leads to heightened informational asymmetries and shrinks the range of acceptable 
negotiations for the multiple parties involved” (p. 12). Nevertheless, Cunningham 
(2011) argues that multiparty conflicts could end “when all parties see a greater 
benefit from signing and implementing a negotiated agreement than from continuing 
fighting” (p. 58). The presence of other rebel groups can be seen as a negative 
element for the DDR provision because they constitute a threat (Doyle & Sambanis, 
2006) to security for negotiating parties, in particular on the rebel side, due to revenge 
issues. 
 
For this reason, I consider other rebel groups as outside spoilers, taking into account 
the concept developed by Stedman (1997), who defines spoilers as “leaders and 
parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, 
world view, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” (p. 
5). The spoiler theory proposes threats to peace processes on two levels, indicated by 
the position of spoilers as either inside or outside the conflict. The former “signals a 
willingness to implement a settlement, and yet fails to fulfil key obligations to the 
agreement” (Stedman, 1997, p. 8), while the latter “are parties who are excluded from 
a peace process or who exclude themselves, and use violence to attack the peace 
process” (Stedman, 1997, p. 8). In conclusion, the presence of spoilers, who are other 
rebel groups, implies that the rebels do not feel secure and that they do not want to lay 
down their arms. This was the case in South Africa, where the DDR provision was 
negotiated after the negotiation of a peace accord because the members of the African 
National Congress (ANC) did not feel secure, due to the political violence that they 
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suffered at the hands of their enemies—the Inkatha Freedom Party. However, if the 
negotiation includes more rebel groups, the fear of a security dilemma is going to 
diminish and the incentive for including a DDR will increase. 
 
Balance of power: Tactical and military 
 
My study examines which characteristics of the rebel groups are more important to 
facilitate discussion of a DDR provision during peace negotiation. I follow the logic 
developed by Hultquist (2013), Cunningham et al. (2009), Walter (2002), Weinstein 
(2002) and Organski (1968) about the importance of the relative military capabilities 
of both parties in the resolution of conflict, because the end of war depends on the 
rebels’ disposition to stop fighting or lay down arms. Cunningham et al. (2009) argue 
that we should analyse the civil war duration and outcome by considering the state 
and rebel characteristics, focusing on strength and the ability to obtain their goals 
(repression and nonviolent strategies). The power of the rebels is a mix between 
tactical and military capacities, which is analysed as two components; first, 
“offensive strength, or the ability to inflict costs on a government in the centre, and 
the ability to resist or evade government repression in the insurgent’s “home”  
territory in the periphery and the underground” (Cunningham et al., 2009, p. 575). In 
the same logical vein, McQuinn (2006) argues that the internal organisation of armed 
groups, such as their command profile and financing architecture, affects the post-
conflict DDR strategy. He concludes that “armed groups which exercise highly 
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regimented, role-based control over their rank-file fighters are more likely to sustain 
this type of control during a DDR transition”31 (McQuinn, 2016, p. 5). 
 
There is an academic consensus that if the rebels are considered weak by the 
government, the likelihood of a peaceful resolution of conflict is slim.  This is 
demonstrated by Hultquist, who concludes first, if the rebels are weak the government 
has few incentives to negotiate because this negotiation can legitimise the rebel group 
(extreme asymmetry). Second, power parity increases the likelihood of negotiation 
because their costs (for fighting) are high. Third, rebel superiority, negotiations are 
less likely in this case of asymmetry (Hultquist, 2013).  Similarly, B. Walter (2002) 
argues that in the resolution of civil war the: 
combatants who are fairly equal on the civil war battlefield should be more 
likely to negotiate a settlement […] military stalemates […] indicate a 
determined opponent who promises a costly war of attrition […] military 
stalemates produce uncertainty as to eventual winner, making each side less 
willing to risk a decisive loss. (p. 9)   
 
Accordingly, rebel strength is an important characteristic for starting a negotiation. 
For example, the rebels who are considered weak or much weaker have the capacity 
to attack, to hide and avoid confrontation which means that the conflict could be 
perpetual (Cunningham et al., 2009). Bearing in mind that both sides are negotiating, 
                                                 
31 For research on the importance of command structure, ideology, cohesion and financing architecture 
in the DDR phase, see Beardsley & McQuinn (2009); de Vries & Wiegink (2011); Munive (2013); 
Munive & Jakobsen (2012); Staniland (2012, 2014) and Torjesen (2013). 
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which means that the government has decided to offer some concessions and the 
rebels have considered laying down arms, we can ask the question: Which attributes 
of the rebel group could impact the willingness to include DDR during peace 
negotiations? What is the impact of rebel strength, in tactical and military terms, on 
DDR bargaining? One potential impact is that when the rebels are considered as 
“much weaker” and they have a political wing, they are more prone to negotiate a 
DDR provision because it could be an excellent way to achieve their objective by 
legal means and to start a new life. From the government’s point of view, if the rebels 
are much weaker, the government has incentives for including DDR, because a 
military victory could be more expensive financially and politically than a peaceful 
transition. To clarify this point, a clearing up exercise to get rid of the last rebels in a 
conflict is relatively costly compared to the (small) concessions that would be 
required to settle with them politically. Additionally, the government can use this 
weakness as a “reactive  commitment” to force the rebels into the cooperative 
strategy.  As Weinstein (2002) highlights, it is important to ask with “[…] whom are 
we dealing?” When the government is designing the DDR programmes, therefore, it 
needs to keep in mind the structure of the rebel group, “its command and control, and 
the capacity of its leadership to influence the behaviour of its dispersed and armed 
membership” (Weinstein, 2002, p. 3), in order to prevent high political costs such as 
criminality or post-conflict violence.  
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Economic and political factors 
 
Studies32 relating to the onset and duration of civil war, the implementation of 
agreements and the duration of peace have discussed the influence of different 
economic and political factors. Economic factors include low income, low 
development, lack of state capacity, poverty and inequality. Political factors comprise 
regime type, human rights, transparency, corruption and fair elections. Doyle and 
Sambanis (2006) have highlighted how weak states, in terms of economic 
development and local capacities, are more prone to violence because the cost of war 
is low. Additionally, “Increased hostility due to the experience of war makes 
reconciliation more difficult” (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, p. 30). Following the same 
logic, Fearon and Laitin (2003) have emphasised that violence becomes more 
probable when the state is unable to deter or repress challengers because of its 
weakness or lack of capability. Collier, Bank  and Group (2003) have developed the 
concept of the conflict trap, which basically states that  
the risk of civil war is much higher in low-income countries than in middle-
income countries […] Once a country has had a conflict it is in far greater 
danger of further conflict: commonly, the chief legacy of a civil war is another 
war. ( p. 11)  
This conflict trap is illustrated by the case of the Central African Republic (CAR). 
This country has launched peace processes, but they have not been fully implemented 
due to the unstable security situation, poor governance, poor leadership, dysfunctional 
                                                 
32 For instance,  see Collier (2004); Collier, Bank, & Group (2003); Dixon (1994); Doyle & Sambanis 
(2006); Kinsella & Rousseau  (2009) and Leatherman (1999). 
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institutions, and dependence on multilateral foreign aid, poor infrastructure, limited 
taxation and scarce private investment. Therefore, the conflict resumes because of the 
on-going structural problems. 
 
With respect to political factors, Hegre et al. (2001) have noted that democratic or 
autocratic countries have a low risk of war, while anocracies33 are more likely to 
experience conflict; thus the statistical association between peace (war) and the type 
of regime is quadratic (it is U-shaped34) (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Hegre, Ellingsen, 
Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001; Kinsella & Rousseau, 2009). Collier and Rohner (2008) 
have shown that democracy is peace-promoting and it is related to high income 
because of “the inability of democratic governments to use techniques of repression 
that autocracies find effective” (p. 538). In sum, different studies have argued that 
democracies35 are less likely to experience a conflict because democracy forces the 
society to solve their conflicts through negotiation. There are no incentives to fight as 
a democracy normally has a powerful economy, and there is a political responsibility 
to maintain the electoral system and the essential checks and balances system. In 
short, the influence of democracy on an armed conflict is that a democratic 
government will be less liable to restrict individual liberties, rights and freedoms, and 
therefore the openness of the democratic political system allows group discontent to 
be expressed non-violently (Hegre, 2014). 
                                                 
33 Anocracies are mixed forms of government, which combine democratic with autocratic features.  
34 “The most democratic societies face few rebellions because the level of grievance is generally lower; 
group conflict is more often resolved non-violently, even if sometimes contentiously. But the most 
authoritarian societies may also face few rebellions, despite a higher level of grievance, because group 
conflict tends to be suppressed by the state” (Kinsella & Rousseau, 2009, p. 485). 
35 Hegre (2014) gives us a good summary and analysis of the different theories which study the 
relationship between conflict and democracy. 
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There is some research showing the relationship between the implementation of 
DDR, state capacity and political regime but, to my knowledge, there are no studies 
exploring the relationship between the negotiation of DDR and those factors. Kingma 
and Gebrewold (1998) highlight that a significant factor for implementing a DDR 
programme is the state’s capacity,36 because it permits governments to both fulfil 
their commitments and to provide security. A lack of state capacity may cause ex-
combatants to regress into poverty (M. Knight & Ozerdem, 2004), or to relapse into 
criminal activities or illegal armed groups (Collier, 1994). Banholzer (2013) argues 
that “if income-generating opportunities even for skilled individuals are simply 
lacking, the vocational training offered by DDR initiatives will not produce the 
desired effect of giving former combatants an alternative to employment in armed 
groups” (p. 17 ). Subsequently, the DDR provision will be harder to implement if the 
“national” economy is devastated, and ex-combatants are not integrated into the 
labour market. For example, Richards (2013) reports that the DDR process in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo was affected by the absence of security:  
the interviewees also highlighted that demobilised former members of RCD-
Goma had been targeted by active members of the CNDP. An ex-combatant 
who quit RCD-Goma stated: “From CONADER I received USD 400 the same 
day CNDP came to my place. They took the USD 400 and burned my eyes. 
Then they took me to Kitshanga, where I stayed for five months. (p. 9)  
In a study of 7,000 Somali combatants, Kingma and Gebrewold (1998) found that the 
combatants are more likely to participate in a DDR programme if there is a possibility 
                                                 
36 The state capacity could be measured by terrain, mountains, gross domestic product (GDP), natural 
resources or infant mortality, among other factors. See Collier (2004); Doyle & Sambanis (2006) and 
Fearon & Laitin (2003). 
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of returning to an economically stable zone. We need to bear in mind that the DDR 
provision is designed to develop different strategies such as vocational training or 
loans to start businesses, in order to make it more attractive for combatants to 
transition to civilian work rather than to continue fighting (Kingma, 1997; Kingma & 
Gebrewold, 1998). 
 
The stability of the political regime and some elements of democracy should have an 
interesting link with the DDR programme. However, at the moment, there are no 
systematic studies concerning this relationship. Democracy is “more than an 
occasional cast of a ballot, and democracy-building efforts by outsiders must be much 
more attuned to local dynamics and much more focused on principles of inclusion 
and actual participation of civil society and informal authorities in decision making. 
[…] democracy is about the accountability of the state to its people.” (Sisk, 2013, 
p.129). It is important for implementation of the DDR phase (and any other peace 
agreement provision) to have democratic institutions where the population 
(inhabitants and former combatants) can solve their concerns and problems using 
legal tools. For instance, Dixon (1994) has explained how democracies have efficient 
tools for resolving conflict and are more prone to achieving a peaceful solution. 
Banholzer (2013) states that participation in a democracy is necessary for the success 
of the DDR because “combatants feel that they can voice their concerns and 
contribute to political decisions” (p. 26). Following the same logic, Kingman and 
Gebrewold (1998) emphasised that the absence of a legal system as a tool for 
peaceful conflict-solving mechanisms could lead to the failure of DDR initiatives and 
92 
 
the resumption of armed conflict. However, the DDR programme in Tajikistan was 
developed by an authoritarian regime which was characterised by the absence of 
transparency and accountability (Matveeva, 2012). 
 
It can be seen from the above analysis that both the economic and political conditions 
are inextricably linked to peace settlements and stability in post-conflict situations, 
especially in terms of the DDR implementation. These studies have demonstrated the 
importance of the state’s capacity and political regime for establishing peace or 
creating war, because the reconstruction of the country needs a consolidated and 
legitimate central government, and sufficient economic resources must be gathered to 
support the process (Zartman, 1995). However, how do those factors affect the 
negotiation of DDR provision during peace discussions? The relation could be 
spurious because different research shows us that “bad or low” economic and political 
factors induce conflict and decrease the probability of a positive post-conflict 
outcome. At this point, political and economic background are important in terms of 
bargaining DDR, because the stability of the political regime and the economy should 
be used as a reactive commitment, by the government, to induce the rebel’s group to 
include DDR in the peace agreement. Based on the game outcome, the government 
would promise to ensure the availability of financial resources and to maintain the 
stable and strong institutions necessary for guaranteeing the implementation phase.  
 
In sum, a background of a badly performing economy and unstable political regime 
will impede a DDR negotiation, because the former rebels would not feel that the 
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government has the capacity to guarantee the agreements in economic, political and 
security terms. At the same time, if combatants have power, money and the respect of 
others,37 then they will need substantial incentives to remain in the legal arena. Thus, 
it is important that the government is presenting a stable economy and strong political 
regime: then rebels may believe that it has the resources to include DDR in a peace 
agreement. 
 
Based on the theoretical review, I can derive some implications which highlight the 
relationship between rebels, conflict, country characteristics, peace processes and the 
DDR provision. In my general statement, I focus on three factors that affect whether 
or not a DDR provision is included in the negotiation process. These factors are the 
intensity, duration and multiparty aspects of the conflict, the rebel’s military and 
tactical capability, and the government capability. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: a conflict which has a long duration increases the probability of DDR 
provision.  
Hypothesis 1b: a conflict which has a high intensity is more likely to have a DDR 
provision. 
 
                                                 
37 This circumstance is called the “Thucydidean and Hobbesian triangle of motives”. (Doyle & 
Sambanis, 2006). 
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If the rebels survive the initial period of war, when they are most vulnerable, the 
possibility for the government to achieve a military victory is low and, for this reason, 
the government should give them an enticing set of concessions. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: The presence of multiple armed groups in a conflict decreases the 
probability of DDR.  
 
If there are more rebel groups, it is difficult for individual rebel groups to surrender 
their weapons and disband their armed structures, as they feel vulnerable to a military 
attack by other factions (i.e. by other rebel groups).  
 
Hypothesis 2a: a DDR condition is more likely to be negotiated when rebels are 
considered much weaker (tactical) by the government or do not have territorial 
control. 
Hypothesis 2b: a DDR condition is more likely to be negotiated when rebels have a 
political wing. 
 
In many cases, the rebels have less military capability than the government and, for 
this reason, I expect very weak groups to be more likely to negotiate with a DDR 
provision.  
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Hypothesis 3a: a DDR condition is more likely to be negotiated when the state has a 
history of high capacity. 
Hypothesis 3b: a DDR condition is more likely to be negotiated when the state has a 
democratic background. In other words, it is more likely when the country has a 
political regime which is considered a democracy. 
Hypothesis 3c: a DDR condition is more likely to be negotiated when the country has 
a stable political regime. 
 
Research Design 
 
To address the hypotheses concerning the likelihood for peace negotiations to include 
a DDR, this study employs logistic regression models which are clustered by conflict 
(Agresti, 2013; Agresti & Finlay, 2014; Long & Freese, 2014). The unit of analysis 
for all models is the peace negotiation-dyad. Every line in the dataset represents a 
peace process between a government and rebel group involved in a peace negotiation 
from 1975 to 2012.  The criteria for including a specific peace negotiation are as 
follows:  
• The negotiation is for solving the same incompatibility 
• It is negotiated by national government and at least one rebel group 
• The negotiation is a new peace process  
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This study considers a peace process as new if: 
• During the negotiation, the main rebel group or government has previously 
retired from the table, or,  
• There are more than three years between signed agreements.  
 
The resulting dataset consists of 129 observations (dyad) regarding 102 peace 
processes. The cases for this study are limited to extra systemic armed conflict, 
internal armed conflict and internationalised internal armed conflict. Missing data 
across my variables subsequently reduced the number of observations included in 
each model. 
 
Dependent variable 
 
The hypotheses concern DDR negotiation during a peace process. I used five 
dichotomous variables in the DDR dataset. The core models were estimated with at 
least one stage of DDR variable. The other models are presented in Appendix D. 
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics: 
• Variable DISARMAMENT: It identifies if the negotiation has a 
disarmament or not. 
• Variable DEMOBILISATION: It identifies if the negotiation has a 
demobilisation or not. 
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• Variable REINTEGRATION: It identifies if the negotiation has a 
reintegration or not.  
• Variable DDR_1: It registers if the agreement included provisions for at 
least one stage of the disarmament, demobilisation or reintegration 
mechanism.   
• Variable DDR_2: It registers if the agreement included a complete DDR 
provision, partial DDR (only two stages) or one stage.  In other words, the 
peace agreement has one or more stages of disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration. 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variable 
      
VARIABLES N %Yes % No Min max 
      
Disarmament 129 65.89 34.11 0 1 
Demobilisation 129 62.02 37.98 0 1 
Reintegration 129 62.02 37.98 0 1 
DDR provision 129 44.1938 20.16 0 3 
At least one stage of DDR 129 79.84 20.16 0 1 
      
 
 
 
                                                 
38 The dataset reports that 13.95% cases have one stage and 21.71% have two stages. 
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Key independent variables39 
 
I am primarily interested in the effect of the characteristics of the conflict, rebel’s 
military and tactical capability, and government capability on the likelihood of 
negotiating DDR provision during a peace process. Table 7 shows the descriptive 
statistics of independent variables. Characteristics of the conflict are measured by the 
cost of civil war: duration and fatalities, and spoilers. This study measures the cost of 
civil war by counting the number of conflict years in which the rebel group is active, 
and the battle-death figures derived from the Battle Deaths Dataset 1946–2008 
(version 3.0) (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2015). The duration reflects the 
longevity of the armed conflict. The number of deaths reveals the intensity of the 
armed conflict. High values for both variables indicate a costly armed conflict.  
 
The presence of spoilers40 is defined as the presence of other rebel groups. I record 
the maximum number of rebel groups by conflict and the number of rebel groups by 
conflict-year. The multiparty41 variable is based on a definition developed by 
Christia, as “civil wars in which there are three or more major domestic combatant 
groups” (Christia, 2012, p. 11). 
 
                                                 
39 Due to the study being cross-sectional I created new variables, which use the last information 
registered in the original dataset, to reduce missing values. 
40 A spoiler can be defined as “one (as a political candidate) having little or no chance of winning but 
capable of depriving a rival of success.” (Mish, 2004, p.1,206; Stedman, 1997). 
41 Cunningham observes that “[…] the multy-party conflicts are dynamic. The number of actors can 
change dramatically across the course of these wars” (Cunningham, 2011, p. 81).  In this paper I have 
not taken into account the dynamic variation. I have taken a static account of the number of rebel 
groups.  This is an interesting point for further research. 
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The following variables will measure the second group of hypotheses: rebel strength 
(tactical) which is measured in terms of “its ability to target government forces, the 
ability of rebel groups to resist repression and the availability of nonviolent 
alternatives” (Cunningham et al., 2009, p. 580). This variable is composed of six 
proxies with different characteristics, for example, whether the group has a clear 
central command, strong central leadership, mobilisation capacity, access to arms, the 
fighting capacity42 and political wing. Low values indicate weaker rebel groups.  I use 
the compound variable and single variables. 
 
For the economic and political factors, I use the following variables. The total real 
GDP per capita (2005 prices) is drawn from the data collected and expanded by 
Gleditsch (2014, v. 6.0). The democracy duration is from Boix, Miller and Rosato 
(2014) and represents the number of consecutive years the country has had the same 
regime (Boix, Miller, & Rosato, 2014; Przeworski, 2004). Polity is “…computed by 
subtracting the AUTOC43 score from the DEMOC44 score; the resulting unified polity 
scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic)” (Marshall, 
Jaggers, & Gurr, 2014, p. 16). Polity’s correction, by Vreeland (2008), removes the 
                                                 
42 The fighting capacity is “the ability of the rebels to effectively engage the army military and win 
major battles” (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009, p. 580); high values show that rebels have 
high capacity. 
43 Autocracies are defined in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics: 
“…autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives 
are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they 
exercise power with few institutional constraints” (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2014, p.15). 
44 “Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of 
institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative 
policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by 
the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all … We do not include coded data on civil 
liberties” (Marshall et al., 2014, p.14). 
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components of Polity that are defined by civil conflict, which are repressed to 
competitive (PARCOM) and political participation (PARREF). 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics – Independent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Years in conflict 129 9.806 11.39 0 55 
Annual battle fatalities 129 7.030 1.436 3.912 10.68 
Spoilers 129 5.946 4.086 1 17 
Maximum rebels (accumulated) 129 1.620 1.597 0 7 
Political wing 129 0.473 0.761 0 2 
Territorial control 129 0.442 0.499 0 1 
Rebel strength (much weaker) 129 0.202 0.403 0 1 
Rebel strength (stronger) 129 0.225 0.419 0 1 
GDP per capita (real)1 128 0.278 0.350 0.0221 2.190 
Years of current regime2 128 33.68 43.29 0 187 
Polity minus parreflag & parcomplag (V) 93 1.097 4.051 -6 7 
Regime (V) 93 0.871 0.797 0 2 
Polity_Adj Square (V) 93 17.44 16.82 0 49 
Polity IV, 2 years before PA 102 0.765 4.089 -6 7 
Polity IV, 3 years before PA 102 0.961 4.124 -6 7 
Regime, 2 years before PA 102 0.941 0.830 0 2 
Regime, 3 years before PA 102 0.873 0.829 0 2 
Incompatibility 129 0.682 0.467 0 1 
Civil war 129 0.620 0.487 0 1 
      
1 A year before war. 
2 Five years before war (average).  
 
Empirical findings 
 
I estimate several models with different combinations of variables. The models 
displayed in Table 8 and Table 9 present only one combination of variables out of the 
various specifications. The models include the variables which were explained in 
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detail above. I make the following logistic regression diagnostics:45 specification 
error, the goodness of fit, multicollinearity, influential observations and coefficient 
sensitivity. I conclude that the models do not have specification error or collinearity 
problems and the models fit the data well but could present selection bias46 (see 
Appendix B). 
 
The model captures the basic logic of previous theoretical discussion. In summary, 
the DDR process is expected to be less likely if the conflict is long, intense and has 
more than one rebel group. The longevity is statistically significant in all models. As 
Regime is based on Vreeland variable. 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates, the probability47 of a DDR decreases by 21 percentage points 
(average) if the duration of the conflict is increased from 048 years (min) to 56 years 
(max). The longest conflicts in the world are Myanmar, at 56 years (different rebel 
groups), and Colombia, at 48 years: both are carrying on with negotiations. The next 
longest conflicts include Myanmar against the Kachin independence army (1991), at 
31 years without DDR; Cambodia against Khmer Rouge (1992), at 31 years with a 
                                                 
45 I used Stata ® and estimated the following tests: linktest, lfit, collin, estat classification, graph 
analysis (standard residual, deviance, leverage) and ldfbeta. 
46 One of the concerns of the previous models is called “sample selection bias”, which is a systematic 
error due to a non-random sample of the data. This means that the selection process influences the data 
availability and it is related to dependent and independent variables (Stock & Watson, 2015; 
Wooldridge, 2010).  This study is based on conflicts which have negotiated an agreement: some of 
them have DDR and others do not. However, not all wars end with a deal; some may end because of a 
military victory or they may peter out. One of the weaknesses of my data is that I did not collect 
information on the presence of a DDR process in the case of military victory or low activity. For 
further research, it is important to extend the data collection to different types of conflict end.  
47 In Appendix C, I show the predicted probability for each variable and their confidence intervals. 
48 Zero means less than one year. 
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complete DDR; and the United Kingdom versus the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (1998), at 28 years but only with a disarmament process. Conversely, conflicts 
with less than one year of longevity have a complete DDR provision, such as Chad 
(2007) against the Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD), Liberia (2003) versus the 
Movement for Democracy and Lebanon (1989) against the Hobeika faction.  
 
The proxy of intensity is not statistically significant. The proxy of intensity has a 
negative relationship with the probability of negotiating a DDR, and it is ONLY 
statistically significant in model 2B. The models are based on a high estimation of 
fatalities. However, I ran the same models with a low estimation of battle death. The 
results, regarding relation and significance, are similar. Regime is based on Vreeland 
variable. 
 
Figure 4 displays how the probability of a DDR decreases by 12 percentage points 
(average) if the intensity is increased from min (3.9) to max (10.68). The theoretical 
review shows two possibilities: first, if the conflict is high intensity, the confidence 
between parties is difficult to generate and thus DDR provision has a low probability 
of being negotiated. Second, if the conflict is long and high intensity, the fatigue of 
both parties could induce a DDR addition. The model supports the first possibility. 
This result means that mistrust, state weakness and the breach of the peace accord is 
more powerful than the idea of fatigue in combatants. However, it is important to 
understand what the relationship is between types of violence and DDR, because 
there are cases with a high intensity and state repression which have DDR as part of 
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the negotiation, such as Guatemala and Salvador. In contrast, South Africa negotiated 
DDR after a peace agreement due to the political violence that rebels had suffered. 
 
Additionally, I estimate the models using the previous number of warring groups. I 
also use two different variables as a proxy of spoilers: maximum rebels and 
multiparty civil war. The results are constant and persistent in all models.  The 
models reinforce the hypothesis that the presence of other rebels reduces the 
likelihood of negotiating a DDR. The probability of a DDR decreases by 22% 
(average) when the presence of rebel groups is increased; however, this result is not 
significant when I estimate the model using the correction by type of regime. For 
example, the United Kingdom and El Salvador were not multiparty conflicts and 
these conflicts negotiated a DDR provision. In contrast, Colombia is considered to be 
a multiparty conflict where nevertheless the parties had negotiated a DDR. 
 
The theoretical assumptions concerning rebel groups are divided into the political 
wing and tactical and military abilities. I estimate the models with three proxies for 
the political wing; the relation is positive, but it is only slightly statistically 
significant. The rebel abilities are measured by rebel strength and its components 
(clear central command, territorial control and fight capacity). If the rebels are strong 
or have territorial control, it is less likely there will be a DDR addition.  The 
coefficient is negative and significant throughout the models. The first difference 
suggests that the probability of a DDR is about one percentage point lower with 
rebels that are considered as stronger than much weaker, which constitutes my 
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baseline. Territorial control is the unique variable, which is negative and statistically 
significant; this factor should decrease the expectation of DDR process.  
 
In sum, rebel organisations with a political wing, limited tactical and military ability 
and a lack of territorial control have more interest in obtaining a DDR provision by 
negotiation, because it is the best way to achieve their goals without losing their 
credibility. A good example of this is the peace negotiation between the Burundian 
government and Frolina, Palipehutu49 and CNDD50 rebels in 2000. The rebels were 
considered weak, without territorial control, but they did have a political wing.  The 
agreement provided for DDR with army reform and democratic transition. The 
agreement was not signed by CNDD and Palipehutu, which are considered to be 
stronger than Frolina.51 In 2002, two smaller factions of the CNDD and Palipehutu 
groups signed a deal, but the majority of these groups continued to fight. In 2003, the 
CNDD-FDD signed and agreed to the implementation of the Arusha Accords. In 
2006, Palipehutu-FNL signed a peace agreement but the conflict was not terminated 
until 2008 when a final agreement was reached.52  
 
When considering economic and political factors, it becomes clear that a DDR 
programme needs a specific environment that includes economic and political 
stability. The theoretical review shows that if the country had a stable economy 
                                                 
49 Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People. 
50 National Council for the Defense of Democracy. 
51 In the dataset, CNDD and Palipehutu are classified as weaker groups while Frolina is coded as much 
weaker. 
52 For a further explanation of the situation in Burundi, see Douma & Gasana (2008) and Gilligan, 
Mvukiyehe, & Samii (2013). 
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before the war started, they are more prone to negotiate a DDR. I use GDP as a proxy 
of state capacity. The relation is negative and statistically significant. The dataset 
shows us that only 11% of countries with high GDP had developed a complete DDR 
provision, while 47% of the countries with low GDP did. Regime is based on 
Vreeland variable. 
 
Figure 4 shows the probability of a DDR decrease by 48 or 82 percentage points if 
GDP is increased from min (0.0221) to max (2.190). The model supported the notion 
that developing countries are more prone to develop a complete DDR strategy than 
rich countries. One explanation is that rich countries have a more innate capacity for 
absorbing former rebels into the society, while developing countries need to create 
economic strategies for including ex-combatants into a productive life.  
 
Many of the conflicts occur in countries that are considered as anocracies.53 The DDR 
dataset shows us that 16% (13/81) of anocracies, and 25% (13/52) of the countries 
which are not an anocracy, had not developed a DDR provision. Meanwhile 46% 
(37/81) of the anocracies, and 38% (20/52) of non-anocracies, had negotiated a 
complete DDR. The theoretical analysis shows that if the country has a democratic 
background and stable political regime they are more disposed to negotiate a DDR. I 
estimate the same models using different polity variables. The results are non-
significant but differ between the polity variables. In Table 8, we can see that the type 
of regime (where democracy constitutes the baseline) has a negative but non-
                                                 
53 These are states at the mid-range in the polity IV. 
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significant relationship with DDR negotiation. Table 9 uses the correction by 
Vreeland (2008), and in this case the results show that autocracies have a positive but 
non-significant relationship and anocracies are negatively related. In terms of political 
factors, the models are not conclusive and, as Vreeland (2008) suggests, “we should 
employ more sharply defined variables to capture the effects of political institutions” 
(p. 420) for further research. 
 
To summarise, I may conclude that the peace processes with armed groups that have 
a clear political interest, but are without territorial control, are more likely to 
negotiate a DDR provision. However, this likelihood is affected by the conditions of 
the conflict, especially the presence of other rebels that threaten the security of these 
fighters and challenge the state's capacity. Additionally, the dynamics of long and 
intense conflicts make the settlement of the conflict (understood as the rebuilding of 
society and issues of trust between citizens and institutions) more difficult. The 
correct economic and political conditions within the country are essential factors. 
This first exercise showed that gross domestic product has a negative and significant 
effect on DDR. The relation of the regime stability and type of regime and the 
probability of DDR is negative but statistically non-significant. 
 
In conclusion, the parties should negotiate a DDR provision either during the peace 
negotiation or after the signing of certain agreements, such as political participation 
or ethnic recognition. The literature has shown that DDR provision is a necessary 
condition of trust and stability. However, not all peace processes, given the specific 
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characteristics of the conflict, the rebels and the country, need to develop this 
provision. This research can be interpreted as an invitation to the policymaker to 
design programmes considering those differences by not following a general recipe. 
This is the interesting characteristic in the Colombian programme, which has 
developed its policy bearing in mind the basic guidelines of the United Nations but 
with a national and differential emphasis. 
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Table 8: Determinants of at least one stage of DDR during peace negotiations  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Years in conflict -0.0474* -0.0467 -0.0541** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) 
Annual battle fatalities -0.166 -0.148 -0.0538 
 (0.296) (0.256) (0.332) 
Spoilers -0.298*** -0.223** -0.311*** 
 (0.102) (0.091) (0.088) 
Political wing = 1, Political wing 1.252 0.995  
 (1.520) (1.066)  
Political wing = 2, Legal political wing -0.146 0.393  
 (0.650) (0.663)  
Territorial control -1.754**   
 (0.735)   
GDP per capita (real) -2.991*** -2.056** -3.160*** 
 (0.892) (1.048) (1.044) 
Years of current regime -0.0129* -0.00848 -0.00997 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Regime, year before PA = 1, Anocracy -0.615 -0.821 -0.859 
 (0.956) (0.950) (1.082) 
Regime, year before PA = 2, Autocracy -2.206 -2.543* -2.328 
 (1.503) (1.322) (1.443) 
Civil war 3.501***  3.113*** 
 (0.923)  (0.757) 
Incompatibility  2.534***  
  (0.718)  
Rebel strength (much weaker)   1.007 
   (0.913) 
Rebel strength (stronger)   -0.256 
   (0.689) 
Constant 6.170*** 4.571*** 4.883*** 
 (1.658) (1.491) (1.687) 
Observations 128 128 128 
Cluster Conflict Conflict Conflict 
Pseudo R-squared 0.400 0.295 0.337 
Chi-squared 32.16 21.25 36.24 
Significance 0.000720 0.0194 7.66e-05 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regime is based on Polity IV variable. 
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Table 9: Determinants of at least one stage of DDR during peace negotiations  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Years in conflict -0.0620** -0.0505** -0.0508** 
 (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) 
Annual battle fatalities -0.587 -0.527* -0.444 
 (0.454) (0.281) (0.356) 
Spoilers -0.150 -0.0932 -0.248*** 
 (0.094) (0.090) (0.083) 
Political wing = 1, Political wing 3.502** 1.992**  
 (1.524) (0.917)  
Political wing = 2, Legal political wing 0.196 0.782  
 (0.967) (0.742)  
Territorial control -1.921**   
 (0.797)   
GDP per capita (real) -2.757** -1.458 -2.903*** 
 (1.165) (0.986) (1.074) 
Years of current regime -0.0114 -0.00274 -0.00168 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Regime, 2 years before PA = 1, Anocracy -1.334 -0.644 -0.736 
 (1.253) (1.005) (0.971) 
Regime, 2 years before PA = 2, Autocracy 0.320 0.188 0.372 
 (1.183) (0.884) (0.851) 
Civil war 3.702**  2.509*** 
 (1.498)  (0.877) 
Incompatibility  2.091***  
  (0.766)  
Rebel strength (much weaker)   0.639 
   (0.709) 
Rebel strength (stronger)   -1.868* 
   (1.002) 
Constant 7.420** 5.303*** 6.614*** 
 (2.935) (1.745) (2.517) 
    
Observations 97 97 97 
Cluster Conflict Conflict Conflict 
Pseudo R-squared 0.405 0.263 0.308 
Chi-squared 21.43 18.94 26.87 
Significance 0.0292 0.0410 0.00273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regime is based on Vreeland variable. 
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Figure 4: First difference estimates 
  
  
  
 
To illustrate the previous results, I will now consider two important peace 
negotiations in more detail: the Myanmar case and the Colombian case. 
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Myanmar case 
 
The Union of Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) received its independence from 
Britain in 1948. It is ethnically diverse with more than 100 ethnic groups; the Bamar 
is the majority ethnic group (representing around 68% of the population). During the 
periods between 1958 to 1960 and 1962 to 2011, the country was under a military 
regime. In 2011, the government became civilian with a robust military influence. 
Since its independence from Britain, Burma has been involved in internal conflict.54 
From 1989 to 2010, several ceasefire agreements were signed55 between the 
government and at least 40 ethnic rebel groups. Fifteen rebel groups signed and 
joined the new army or militia. Twenty groups agreed to maintain the ceasefire, and 
five56 rebel groups did not sign. Those agreements were more akin to “gentleman’s 
agreements” without political settlements, which permitted the rebels to retain 
weapons, territorial control, and business privileges such as natural resource 
extraction. This process was stable in terms of limiting clashes or fighting incidents 
and was characterised by the constant mistrust between parties and the lack of clear 
codes of operationalisation. The government was accused of using “divide and rule 
tactics”, by not permitting the coalition rebel groups to negotiate a general agreement 
                                                 
54 “The most protracted conflict is the Karen struggle, but there have also been long-running 
insurgencies in the Mon, Kachin, Karenni, and Shan-dominated regions. Briefer fighting spells have 
occurred in the conflicts over Lahu, Wa and Kokang rights, but there has been little progress to find a 
long-term solution to the conflict issues.” 
See http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=112&regionSelect=7-Eastern_Asia 
55 There were two stages to the ceasefire process: 1989 to 1995 and 1998 to 2010. 
56 The five rebel groups who did not sign were the Kachin Independent Organization (KIO), the New 
Mon State Party (NMSP), the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Karen Peace Council (KPC), and 
the National Democratic Alliance Army. See http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/peace-
process/negotiation-timeline 
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and by not creating the new army57 that was supposed to be integrated with non-state 
armed groups.  In summary, these cycles of agreements were not completely 
successful because the process was not a political solution to solve the cause of 
conflict. Indeed, in terms of the rebel groups, “Some of them regret being disarmed. 
In some cases, new armed groups emerged to replace disarmed groups” (Zaw Oo, 
2014, p.13). 
 
A new peace process started in 2011 with a new democratic regime which “made its 
first reconciliatory announcement on the peace process on 18 August 2011 inviting 
ethnic armed groups “to secure lasting peace” in the country” (Zaw Oo, 2014, p.16). 
This new process is advancing well, and it has been characterised in the following 
terms: 
• Uncertainty about how the process would end ethnic conflict and carry out 
political and economic reforms;  
• Being more of a political than military solution, the rebels were very clear in 
their negotiation strategy; they wanted to achieve a political settlement and a 
collective negotiation before the disarmament;  
• Accountability;  
                                                 
57 “The government at this time considered that non-state armed groups should be transformed into the 
Border Guard Force (BGF) to become a part of Tatmadaw. By extension, these groups would be 
constitutionally legal. The BGF was a form of an armed unit that was neither militia nor part of the 
regular army. Some ethnic armed groups criticized that the government’s plan to form the BGF was 
intended for undermining the command and control of existing commanders of ethnic armed groups”  
(Zaw Oo, 2014, p.11). 
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• Problems with the implementation because it is not clear how it would be 
executed;  
• The presence of intra group violence58 and the geographic dispersion of rebel 
units; 
• Lack of economic resources and the presence of the war economy.  
 
Table 10 summarises the statistical results for the Myanmar case. I suggest that the 
probability of having a DDR with The Karen National Union (KNU) is 80% and with 
The United Wa State Army (UWSA) the probability is around 37%. The likelihood of 
DDR with the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) is around 97%. The 
probability of DDR with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army 
(MNDAA) is 95%.  This negotiation process demonstrates the challenges that the 
parties face. They have learnt that the political settlement is more important than the 
military one; they need to solve different kinds of problems such as the presence of 
weapons, lack of opportunities, dismantling the war economy and maintaining 
credibility if they do not want to repeat the legacy of previous negotiations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 “Intra-minority conflict is another concern that may potentially undermine the ceasefire process, 
especially in Shan State where multiple armed groups operate. These groups in conflict are concerned 
not only with the government, but also with other armed groups who might take advantage of 
ceasefires to undermine their interest. Multiple armed groups in one geographical location intensify 
overlapped territorial claims that are often linked to the war economy” (Zaw Oo, 2014, p.33) 
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Table 10: Probability of Myanmar DDR.  
Variable 
Myanmar Myanmar Myanmar Myanmar 
/KNU /KNPP /UWSA /MNDAA 
Years in conflict 46 55 1 1 
Annual battle fatalities  1351 35 135 270 
Political wing  Yes Yes No No 
Legal political wing  No No No Yes 
Territorial control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Previous number of warring groups 10 10 10 10 
Years of current regime  51 51 51 51 
Autocracy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Anocracy  No No No No 
Civil war No No No Yes 
GDP per capita (previous negotiation) 5733,37 5733,37 5733,37 5733,37 
Constant         
PROBABILITY (%) (Model 1B) 0,80 0,97 0,37 0,95 
 
Colombian case  
 
The Republic of Colombia attained its independence from Spain in 1819. It is not 
ethnically diverse, as 86% of the population are “mestizos”. Colombia has been 
immersed in an internal armed conflict since the late 1940s (1948 – 1958: the 
violence; 1953 – 1964: political party violence; since 1964: low-intensity conflict, 
guerrilla activity, drug trafficking, paramilitary involvement) (González, 2014).  
 
The first period, “La Violencia” (1948 – 1958), was the historical age in Colombia 
when the liberal party and conservative party were fighting. During this period, 
different kinds of armed groups were created. These were called “Chulavitas” and 
“Pájaros” (liberal guerrillas). On 13 September 1953, during Rojas Pinilla’s 
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dictatorship, the liberal guerrillas of “los Llanos” decided to demobilize around 3,540 
combatants for two reasons. First, the guerrilla group was divided, demoralised and 
weakened militarily. Second, the national government gave an amnesty and offered 
different economic benefits. However, the Colombian government could not fulfil its 
promises: the guerrilla leaders were murdered and rebels who came back to their 
lands were displaced by people who were militants in the conservative party. In other 
words, the demobilised rebels could not benefit from the peace, and many of them 
decided to take up arms. Consequently, the seeds of new violence were sown.   
 
In 1964 a new cycle of violence started; new rebel groups appeared, including the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – FARC, The National Liberation Army – 
ELN, The Popular Liberation Army (1967) – EPL; The 19th of April Movement 
(1970) – M-19 and other smaller guerrilla groups. In 1984, the government began 
peace talks with each rebel group. However only the M-19, EPL and some minor 
groups or factions signed a peace agreement. Nevertheless, this process was 
considered a successful pact because the political reintegration had been positive; 
however, the rate of political homicide has witnessed an upwards trend, and the social 
and economic reintegration of former combatants was poorly designed and 
improvised (Villarraga, 2008, 2015).  
 
During this negotiation period, a new armed group began to fight against guerrilla 
groups and attack their social support; this group has been referred to as a 
paramilitary organisation. In 2003, the Colombian government started a peace process 
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with these paramilitary forces. The process has triggered multiple controversies and 
has been considered unsuccessful because of the problems with the process of 
reincorporating the former combatants,59 the lack of public policy that seeks out a 
solution for the real reasons of the Colombian conflict, the lack of reparation and 
justice, and the re-emergence of new groups called criminal bands that are linked to 
drug trafficking and criminality (Gutiérrez & González, 2012).  
 
Colombia has had many peace talks and three peace agreements with disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration provisions. Currently, there is a peace 
implementation in progress with FARC, but the challenge for the Colombian 
government and civil society is enormous because the government will need to 
implement a DDR programme for roughly 10,000 rebels. This programme will need 
to improve the institutions, to develop some mechanism for reparation, truth and 
justice and to solve the real causes of the conflict, for instance, the grievances relating 
to land issues, poverty and inequality. 
 
Table 11 summarises the statistical results for the Colombian case. I can suggest that 
the probability of having a DDR with “Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia” 
(FARC - EP) is between 86% and 92%. The likelihood of DDR with “Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional” (ELN) is more than 90%. 
 
                                                 
59 There are around 31,617 former combatants. 
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Table 11: Probability of Colombia DDR.  
Variable 
Colombia Colombia 
/FARC /ELN 
Years in conflict 48 45 
Annual battle fatalities  310 27 
Political wing  No No 
Legal political wing  Legal No 
Territorial control Yes Yes 
Previous number of warring groups 6 6 
Years of current regime  53 53 
Autocracy No No 
Anocracy No No 
Civil war Yes Yes 
GDP per capita (previous negotiation) 7,728.66 7,728.66 
Constant     
PROBABILITY (%) (Model 1B) 0,90 0,97 
 
Conclusion - Discussion 
 
This paper seeks to explain why some peace negotiations have DDR provision while 
others do not. The dataset shows that there are 80 peace negotiations which include 
DDR provision and 22 without this provision.  The theoretical framework in this 
discussion views DDR provision as an important mechanism to not only build trust 
and avoid defection and cheating between parties during a peace negotiation, but also 
to serve as the bridge in connecting the former combatants to a new post-conflict life. 
DDR is an instrument for reaching peace but it is not a solution for the root causes of 
conflict. 
 
118 
 
The theoretical argument developed eight empirical predictions for three general 
factors, with the main objective being to answer the following question: what are the 
determining characteristics as to whether a peace process includes a DDR provision 
or not? The three factors explored are the features of the conflict (duration, intensity 
and spoilers), the characteristics of the rebels (tactical and military capacity and 
political interest), and the attributes of the country (capacity state, type and stability 
of political regime). The quantitative analysis of 102 peace agreements, dating from 
1975 onwards, has supported some predictions and this result invites deeper 
exploration into other variables that may influence DDR negotiations. 
 
The answer to the question is that the peace processes with armed groups who have a 
clear political interest, but who are without territorial control, are more likely to 
negotiate a DDR provision. However, this likelihood is affected by the conditions of 
the conflict, especially the presence of other rebels which threatens the security of 
these fighters and challenges the state’s capacity; additionally, the dynamics of long 
and intense conflicts make the settlement of the conflict (understood as rebuilding the 
society and the tissues of trust between citizens and institutions) more difficult. The 
economic and political conditions of the country are essential factors. Countries with 
a democratic regime and a low economic capacity have a greater propensity to 
negotiate a DDR. 
 
Finally, the analysis of peace agreements with DDR provisions provides a vital 
contribution to policymakers, by showing the importance of the characteristics of 
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conflict, country, and rebels in the negotiation, development and implementation of a 
DDR solution. However, unlike the statistical analyses, they are not analyses 
designed for testing theories. This research demonstrates an area where further 
theoretical work and further empirical work are needed. We need to understand why 
the characteristics of conflict, country, and rebels are necessary to negotiate a DDR. It 
is also important to understand the incentives of parties to achieve peace if we want to 
solve the underlying conflict. 
 
To illustrate the general patterns, I have considered two important peace negotiations 
in more detail: Colombia and Myanmar. Both have similarities and dissimilarities: for 
example, they are both long and multiparty conflicts with a clear and strong war 
economy. However, Myanmar has an ethnic conflict with a transitional regime, which 
is considered to be anocratic in nature. Colombia is a democratic republic with a civil 
war.  Analysing these cases I conclude that government, policymakers and 
stakeholders are faced with a significant challenge, as both countries have a historical 
context of failed negotiations. Each needs to design a DDR provision considering the 
necessities of the host community and former combatant, and also develop a strategy 
of reconciliation and reparation between populations.   
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Appendix A: Dataset for DDR analysis – Co-variables 
Description of co-variables 
 
1. DURATION: Time elapsed in years of conflict. It is based on start date and 
EpEnd. Source, UCDP dyadic dataset and UCDP dyadic conflict termination 
dataset. Transformation:  ln_duration_1:  ln (Duration_1 +1) 
2. INTENSITY:  Source, UCDP dyadic dataset. “The intensity variable is coded 
into two categories:  
0. (Minor): Between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year. 
      1. (War): 1000 or more battle-related deaths in a given year.” 
 
3. DEATH-BATTLE:  Source, Battle Deaths Dataset 1946–2008 (version 3.0). 
Transformation: I calculate the log, max and mean for death-battle low, high 
and estimate. 
4. REBEL STRENGTH: Source, Non-State Actor Data. “This field provides a 
coding of the strength of the rebel forces relative to the government forces.” 
Transformation 1: I recoded the variable original: 0. Much weaker; 1. Weaker; 
2. Parity; 3. Stronger; 4. Much stronger. Transformation 2: I reclassified the 
original variable: 0. Much weaker; 1. Weaker; 2. Stronger. 
5. FIGHTING CAPACITY: Source, Non-State Actor Data. “The ability of the 
rebels to effectively engage the army military and win major battles, posing a 
credible challenge to the state.” Coding: 0. No; 1. Low; 2. Moderate; 3. 
High. 
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6. CENTRAL CONTROL: Source, Non-State Actor Data. “The rebels have a 
clear central command.” Coding: 0. No; 1. Yes. 
7. POLITICAL WING:  Source, Non-State Actor Data. Coding:                          
0. No; 1. Explicit link; 2. Alleged link; 3. Acknowledged link. I recoded the 
original information by whether the rebel group has a political wing or not: 0. 
No; 1. Yes. 
8.  LEGAL POLITICAL WING:  Source Non-State Actor Data. Coding: 0.  No; 
1. Yes.  
9. MAX OF REBEL FORCES: The maximum number of rebel groups in every 
conflict. Source, UCDP dyadic dataset. I also created the variable SUM_ SB 
which is the number of rebel groups by conflict-year. 
10. MULTIPARTY CIVIL WAR: Source, Christia. “Civil wars in which there are 
three or more major domestic combatant groups.” (p. 11) 
11. NWG_P: Source, Christia. Previous number of warring groups-Maximum 
number of warring groups. 
12. INCOMPATIBILITY: Source, UCDP dyadic dataset. Coding: 0. Territory; 1 
Government. Incomp_l:  the last incompatibility registered for the conflict 
dyad. Max_incomp: the maximum incompatibility registered for the conflict 
dyad.  
13. DEMOCRACY, AUTOCRACY AND ANOCRACY: Source, Polity IV.  
“The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the 
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DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strong 
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) […] POLITY2 is a modified version 
of the POLITY variable added in order to facilitate the use […] in time-series 
analyses. It modifies the combined annual POLITY score (-66, -77, -88) to 
conventional polity scores.” I generate a dummy variable for each type of 
regime and a categorical variable (Polity_ADA) 
0. Democracy if (polity2 >= 6) 
1. Anocracy if (polity2<6) and (polity2 >-6) 
2. Autocracy   if (polity2 <= 6) 
14. REGIME VREELAND:  Recombines the Polity components “leaving out the 
variables ‘contaminated’ with reference to political violence and civil war.” 
(Vreeland, 2008, p. 402)  
0. Democracy if (xpollag >= 4) 
1. Anocracy if (xpollag <4) and (xpollag >-3) 
2. Autocracy if (xpollag <= -3) 
15. DEMOCRACY DURATION: Source, Boix, Miller, and Rosato. “The number 
of consecutive years the country has had the same regime type.” 
16. TYPE OF CONFLICT: Source, Non-State Actor Data. I generate a dummy 
variable for each conflict. Coding: 1. Anti-colonial; 2. Autonomy conflict; 3. 
Civil war; 4. Communist rebellion; 5 Coup d’etat; 6. Ethnic conflict; 7. 
Islamist; 8. Secessionist conflict; 9. Terrorist. 
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17. GDP: Source, Gleditsch. Version 6.0 BETA (9 September 2014). 
Transformation: natural logarithm and division by thousand. 
 
Appendix B:  Statistical Test – main models 
 
Specification error 
I use the command linktest to detect a specification error. “The idea behind linktest is 
that if the model is properly specified, one should not be able to find any additional 
predictors that are statistically significant except by chance” (IDRE Stats, 2014). 
Table 12 shows the different results of this test; I argue that the models do not have 
specification error, because Hat is statistically significant at 5% and Hatsq is not. 
 
Table 12: Specification error 
Model Hat Hatsq 
Model 1A Coef: 1.1037 
P-value: 0.000 
Coef: -.04842 
P-value: 0.561 
Model 2A Coef: 1.3370 
P-value: 0.001 
Coef: -0.1329 
P-value: 0.221 
Model 3A Coef: 1.02526 
P-value: 0.000 
Coef: -0.014397 
P-value: 0.886 
Model 1B Coef: 1.249518 
P-value: 0.000 
Coef: -0.09257 
P-value: 0.145 
Model 2B Coef: 1.3482 
P-value: 0.002 
Coef: -0.142032 
P-value: 0.237 
Model 3B Coef: 1.496787 
P-value: 0.002 
Coef: -0.178239 
P-value: 0.129 
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Multicollinearity 
Table 13 summarises the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the control variables. 
Note that the variables have a VIF under 5, indicating that these variables do not 
present multicollinearity problems. 
 
Table 13: The variance inflation factors 
Variables Model 
1A 
Model 
2A 
Model 
3A 
Model 
1B 
Model 
2B 
Model 
3B 
Years in conflict 1.17 1.17 1.18 1.20 1.19 1.16 
Annual battle fatalities 1.36 1.40 1.43 1.32 1.38 1.37 
Spoilers 1.30 1.23 1.39 1.18 1.13 1.35 
Political wing = 1, 
Political wing 
1.03 1.03  1.05 1.04  
Political wing = 2, Legal 
political wing 
1.03 1.03  1.05 1.04  
Territorial control 1.03   1.05   
Rebel strength: much 
weaker 
  1.24   1.25 
Rebel strength: stronger   1.19   1.25 
GDP per capita (real) 1.14 1.22 1.15 1.15 1.21 1.18 
Years of current regime 1.12 1.10 1.15 1.14 1.10 1.21 
Regime (Polity IV) 1.35  1.36  1.25  
Regime (V)    1.24   
Civil War 1.30  1.33 1.27  1.32 
Incompatibility  1.45   1.44  
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Influential observations 
I calculate predictions, residuals, standardised residuals, and studentized (jackknifed) 
residuals; the standard error of the forecast, prediction, and residuals; the influence 
measures Cook’s distance, DFBETAs, DFITS, and leverage. The graphs generated as 
part of the exploratory analysis, which are not included within this thesis, identify 
some influential cases. I estimate new models without these cases, but the result is 
similar. 
 
Classification statistics 
We use the command estat to estimate the correct classification of the model. Table 
14 shows the overall rate of correct classification for each model is estimated to be 
around 85, with 51.34% (approximately) of the normal weight group correctly 
classified (specificity) and 95.80% (approximately) of the low weight group correctly 
classified (sensitivity).  
 
Table 14: Classification statistics 
Model Classification 
Model 1A Correctly classified          88.28% 
Model 2A Correctly classified          85.16% 
Model 3A Correctly classified          85.94% 
Model 1B Correctly classified          89.69% 
Model 2B Correctly classified          86.60% 
Model 3B Correctly classified          86.60% 
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Goodness of fit 
We use the command lfit to estimate the goodness of fit:  
The idea behind the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test is that the 
predicted frequency and observed frequency should match closely and that the 
more closely they match, the better the fit. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-
of-fit statistic is computed as the Pearson chi-square from the contingency 
table of observed frequencies and expected frequencies (IDRE Stats, 2014).  
Table 15 show the results: with a p-value of above 5%, we can say that Hosmer and 
Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test indicates that our model fits the data well. 
 
 
Table 15: Goodness of fit 
Model Hosmer-Lemeshow 
Model 1A H-L chi2(8) =         8.41 
Prob > chi2 =         0.3948 
Model 2A H-L chi2(8) =         12.10 
Prob > chi2 =         0.1469 
Model 3A H-L chi2(8) =           5.58 
Prob > chi2 =         0.694 
Model 1B H-L chi2(8) =           10.29 
Prob > chi2 =         0.2450 
Model 2B H-L chi2(8) =            7.26 
Prob > chi2 =         0.5083 
Model 3B H-L chi2(8) =           22.36 
Prob > chi2 =         0.0043 
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Residual plots 
Figure 5: Residuals - Models Table 8 
 
Figure 6: Residuals – Models Table 9 
 
 
Figure 7: Residual and predict values – Models  Table 8 
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Figure 8: Residual and predict values – Models Table 9 
 
 
Selection models 
One of the concerns in all fields of empirical political science is “sample selection 
bias”, in which non-random samples affect the properties of conventional estimators. 
There are different methodological approaches to solve this type of bias, such as 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), or the Heckman model which “…is composed 
of two equations. The first is the selection equation that determines whether the 
variable of interest is observed…The second equation is the linear model of 
interest…” (Adkins & Hill, 2011, p. 533). The problem surfaces when we consider 
that the selection equation determines that the dependent variable is observed.  
 
In the model of the determinants of DDR, observations regarding the effect of 
duration, intensity, GDP, regime and rebel characteristics have been conveniently 
selected, based on whether the conflicts had negotiated a peace agreement. The 
implication is that the disturbances are not truly random, because I do not collect data 
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on the presence of a DDR process in the case of a military victory or low activity, or 
in the case of hidden agreements or for DDR provisions created without negotiation.  
 
It is important to consider whether the effect of any of the independent variables on 
DDR could be conditional on having an agreement. I consider that the relationship is 
not likely to be different in other cases where there is not a peace agreement because, 
in this research, I analysed influential cases and I estimated models in cases without a 
peace agreement and the results (relationship) were robust. However, for further 
research and to prove my initial findings, I need to extend the dataset to include those 
cases and to check if there are conditional effects because, clearly, DDR is less likely 
when a conflict ends without some type of negotiation. 
 
Appendix C:  Predict probabilities by control variables 
 
I use the command “prgen” to calculate the predict probabilities and to plot the 
confidence intervals.  The probabilities are calculated from the min to max ranges of 
the key variable and the mean of other variables. The results are shown in Figure 9. 
 
For example, the predict probability of DDR when the duration of conflict changes 
from 0 years to 30 years shows a clear negative effect by the increasingly small 
probabilities. I can see that the probabilities decrease as duration increases. The graph 
(duration) shows that the confidence interval is smaller at the beginning and increases 
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as the conflict ages. We can observe a similar performance in the intensity and spoiler 
variables. 
 
The graph displaying the political factor was based on the duration of the regime 
(from 0 to 50 years). It shows that the confidence interval is broad, and the 
probability decreases mildly. It is important to bear in mind that the political factor is 
not statistically significant in the models. The graph of the economic factor shows the 
clear negative effect of real GDP per capita (based on 2005 prices); the confidence 
interval is smaller at between 0.0221 to 0.8 and increases as I move to a higher GDP 
figure.  
 
Figure 9: Predicted probabilities of DDR by control variables 
MODEL A MODEL B 
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Figure 9: Predicted probabilities of DDR by control variables (continuation) 
MODEL A MODEL B 
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Figure 9: Predicted probabilities of DDR by control variables (continuation) 
MODEL A MODEL B 
  
 
Appendix D:  Other models 
 
This appendix presents the results of other models containing each path of DDR or a 
combination of paths. Table 16 to Table 23 present the results for disarmament, 
demobilization, reintegration and the stages of DDR; these models have the same 
structure as the core models (Table 8 and Table 9). 
 
In the case of the determinants of disarmament, the presence of spoilers and the rebel 
strength have a negative and statistically significant effect. In the case of 
demobilization, spoilers, GDP and regime stability, these variables are statistically 
significant with a negative relationship with the dependent variable. When the model 
is controlled by the type of political regime, following the argument of Vreeland, the 
results are quite similar to the core model in Table 9. The determinants of 
reintegration model show that territorial control by rebels, GDP and the duration of 
regime are negative and significant. The last tables present the ordered logistic model, 
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where the dependent variable has the following information: 0, no DDR; 1, one stage 
of DDR; 2, two stages of DDR and 3, DDR. The likelihood ratio chi-square of 52.68, 
with a p-value of 0.0000, tells us that the model as a whole is statistically significant. 
These models show that spoilers, GDP and the type of conflict are statistically 
significant. 
 
These models may highlight the importance of the presence of other rebel groups for 
bargaining a DDR. The spoilers have a direct link with the security dilemma, because 
the implementation of DDR is difficult and unrealistic where the security is 
problematic and also because those groups provide potential options for recidivism if 
the ex-combatants do not have economic and social opportunities. 
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Table 16:  Determinants of disarmament bargaining during peace negotiations  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Years in conflict -0.0253 -0.0217 -0.0231 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Annual battle fatalities 0.0446 0.00350 0.00648 
 (0.213) (0.211) (0.182) 
Spoilers -0.208*** -0.194*** -0.191*** 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) 
Political wing = 1, Political wing 0.631 0.471  
 (0.621) (0.558)  
Political wing = 2, Legal political wing 0.142 0.222  
 (0.636) (0.620)  
Territorial control -0.278   
 (0.450)   
Rebel strength (much weaker)   -0.743 
   (0.829) 
Rebel strength (stronger)   0.00953 
   (0.517) 
GDP per capita (real) -1.420* -0.921 -1.395* 
 (0.733) (0.723) (0.807) 
Years of current regime -0.00486 -0.00467 -0.00469 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Regime, year before PA = 1 -0.544 -0.484 -0.644 
 (0.641) (0.645) (0.763) 
Regime, year before PA = 2 -1.098 -1.176 -1.255 
 (0.894) (0.856) (0.919) 
Civil war 1.239  1.097 
 (0.831)  (0.750) 
Incompatibility  1.370**  
  (0.687)  
Constant 2.289* 2.006* 2.726*** 
 (1.384) (1.217) (0.963) 
Observations 128 128 128 
Cluster Conflict Conflict Conflict 
Pseudo R-squared 0.136 0.136 0.138 
Chi-squared 21.54 22.68 23.47 
Significance 0.0282 0.0120 0.00912 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regime is based on Polity IV variable 
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Table 17:  Determinants of disarmament bargaining during peace negotiations  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Years in conflict -0.0234 -0.0225 -0.020 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) 
Annual battle fatalities -0.232 -0.263 -0.195 
 (0.281) (0.257) (0.208) 
Spoilers -0.144** -0.134* -0.183*** 
 (0.068) (0.072) (0.065) 
Political wing = 1, Political wing 1.680 1.356*  
 (1.159) (0.795)  
Political wing = 2, Legal political wing 0.329 0.426  
 (0.712) (0.649)  
Territorial control -0.733   
 (0.485)   
Rebel strength (much weaker)   -0.581 
   (0.808) 
Rebel strength (stronger)   -1.391* 
   (0.744) 
GDP per capita (real) -1.363* -0.926 -1.534** 
 (0.746) (0.732) (0.780) 
Years of current regime 0.00164 0.00248 0.00496 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Regime, year before PA = 1 -0.986 -0.748 -0.710 
 (0.801) (0.713) (0.798) 
Regime, year before PA = 2 0.567 0.524 0.498 
 (0.734) (0.712) (0.716) 
Civil war 1.037  0.526 
 (0.995)  (0.828) 
Incompatibility  0.976  
  (0.661)  
Constant 3.277* 2.868** 3.724*** 
 (1.762) (1.419) (1.307) 
Observations 97 97 97 
Cluster Conflict Conflict Conflict 
Pseudo R-squared 0.175 0.159 0.157 
Chi-squared 17.45 17.21 16.62 
Significance 0.0952 0.0698 0.0833 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regime is based on Vreeland variable 
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Table 18: Determinants of demobilization deal during peace negotiations 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Years in conflict -0.0253 -0.0103 -0.0241 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) 
Annual battle fatalities -0.369 -0.359* -0.272 
 (0.248) (0.207) (0.235) 
Spoilers -0.185** -0.130* -0.191*** 
 (0.079) (0.068) (0.070) 
Political wing = 1, Political wing 1.272 0.756  
 (0.824) (0.761)  
Political wing = 2, Legal political wing 0.351 0.537  
 (0.769) (0.672)  
Territorial control -0.148   
 (0.557)   
Rebel strength (much weaker)   -0.0224 
   (0.696) 
Rebel strength (stronger)   -0.807 
   (0.573) 
GDP per capita (real) -6.392*** -4.646*** -6.023*** 
 (2.081) (1.644) (1.611) 
Years of current regime -0.0142** -0.0106 -0.0137** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Regime, year before PA = 1 -0.216 0.426 0.248 
 (0.844) (0.769) (0.753) 
Regime, year before PA = 2 -0.787 -0.605 -0.572 
 (1.153) (0.979) (1.057) 
Civil war 3.533***  3.204*** 
 (0.896)  (0.853) 
Incompatibility  2.728***  
  (0.754)  
Constant 4.591** 3.258* 4.122** 
 (2.000) (1.695) (1.821) 
Observations 128 128 128 
Cluster Conflict Conflict Conflict 
Pseudo R-squared 0.378 0.311 0.371 
Chi-squared 31.70 25.04 31.07 
Significance 0.000851 0.00526 0.000570 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regime is based on Polity IV variable 
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Table 19: Determinants of demobilization deal during peace negotiations  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Years in conflict -0.0629** -0.0369 -0.0392* 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) 
Annual battle fatalities -0.777* -0.618*** -0.520 
 (0.403) (0.238) (0.333) 
Spoilers -0.0893 -0.0339 -0.132* 
 (0.097) (0.081) (0.079) 
Political wing = 1, Political wing 3.816*** 2.490**  
 (1.217) (1.151)  
Political wing = 2, Legal political wing 0.0286 0.410  
 (1.012) (0.847)  
Territorial control -0.269   
 (0.692)   
Rebel strength (much weaker)   -0.270 
   (0.691) 
Rebel strength (stronger)   -0.593 
   (0.859) 
GDP per capita (real) -5.773*** -3.384** -5.496*** 
 (1.807) (1.335) (1.584) 
Years of current regime -0.0139** -0.00787 -0.0129* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Regime, 2 years before PA = 1 -1.003 -0.0978 0.374 
 (1.080) (0.888) (0.994) 
Regime, 2 years before PA = 2 -0.396 -0.289 -0.193 
 (1.069) (0.840) (0.921) 
Civil war 4.823***  3.537*** 
 (1.140)  (0.954) 
Incompatibility  3.142***  
  (0.878)  
Constant 6.682*** 4.344*** 5.500** 
 (2.565) (1.630) (2.258) 
Observations 97 97 97 
Cluster Conflict Conflict Conflict 
Pseudo R-squared 0.465 0.344 0.393 
Chi-squared 36.95 24.30 27.04 
Significance 0.000117 0.00684 0.00256 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regime is based on Vreeland variable 
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Table 20: Determinants of reintegration bargaining during peace negotiations  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Years in conflict -0.0124 -0.00905 -0.0258 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.020) 
Annual battle fatalities -0.141 -0.250 -0.0369 
 (0.207) (0.201) (0.211) 
Spoilers -0.0812 -0.0890 -0.100 
 (0.072) (0.068) (0.069) 
Political wing = 1, Political wing 0.0557 -0.123  
 (0.804) (0.599)  
Political wing = 2, Legal political wing 0.767 0.705  
 (0.586) (0.656)  
Territorial control -1.559***   
 (0.488)   
Rebel strength (much weaker)   -0.0203 
   (0.543) 
Rebel strength (stronger)   -0.994 
   (0.606) 
GDP per capita (real) -3.376*** -2.427** -3.086*** 
 (1.219) (1.155) (1.145) 
Years of current regime -0.0119** -0.0118*** -0.0101** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Regime, year before PA = 1 -0.622 -0.816 -0.647 
 (0.690) (0.816) (0.661) 
Regime, year before PA = 2 -0.525 -1.185 -0.817 
 (0.910) (0.962) (0.858) 
Civil war 1.996***  1.778*** 
 (0.722)  (0.654) 
Incompatibility  2.772***  
  (0.732)  
Constant 3.307** 2.733* 2.562* 
 (1.507) (1.633) (1.476) 
Observations 128 128 128 
Cluster Conflict Conflict Conflict 
Pseudo R-squared 0.258 0.254 0.204 
Chi-squared 25.15 37.30 18.41 
Significance 0.00868 5.01e-05 0.0485 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regime is based on Polity IV variable 
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Table 21:  Determinants of reintegration bargaining during peace negotiations  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Years in conflict -0.00320 -0.00641 -0.0327* 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) 
Annual battle fatalities -0.569 -0.573** -0.414 
 (0.352) (0.291) (0.328) 
Spoilers -0.141 -0.119 -0.172* 
 (0.098) (0.096) (0.096) 
Political wing = 1, Political wing -0.581 -0.583  
 (1.169) (0.794)  
Political wing = 2, Legal political wing 0.243 0.640  
 (0.718) (0.887)  
Territorial control -1.906**   
 (0.785)   
GDP per capita (real) -5.738*** -3.828** -4.981*** 
 (2.194) (1.577) (1.608) 
Rebel strength (much weaker)   -0.233 
   (0.708) 
Rebel strength (stronger)   -2.349** 
   (0.942) 
Years of current regime -0.0164*** -0.0137** -0.0112* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Regime, 2 years before PA = 1 1.286 1.056 0.454 
 (0.982) (0.799) (0.835) 
Regime, 2 years before PA = 2 -0.518 -0.636 -0.471 
 (0.856) (0.790) (0.848) 
Civil war 2.844***  1.999** 
 (0.992)  (0.804) 
Incompatibility  2.631***  
  (0.799)  
Constant 6.568*** 4.904** 5.817*** 
 (2.381) (2.292) (2.193) 
Observations 97 97 97 
Cluster Conflict Conflict Conflict 
Pseudo R-squared 0.371 0.315 0.356 
Chi-squared 19.15 26.64 22.52 
Significance 0.0584 0.00297 0.0127 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regime is based on Vreeland variable 
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Table 22: Determinants of DDR during peace negotiations (1975 – 2012) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Years in conflict -0.0172 -0.00792 -0.0258 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
Annual battle fatalities -0.0934 -0.147 -0.0369 
 (0.201) (0.174) (0.211) 
Spoilers -0.158** -0.170*** -0.100 
 (0.066) (0.064) (0.069) 
Political wing = 1, Political wing 0.429 0.223  
 (0.660) (0.480)  
Political wing = 2, Legal political wing 0.465 0.497  
 (0.551) (0.604)  
Territorial control -0.621*   
 (0.353)   
GDP per capita (real) -2.593*** -1.970*** -3.086*** 
 (0.621) (0.689) (1.145) 
Years of current regime -0.00896* -0.00950** -0.0101** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Regime, year before PA = 1 -0.531 -0.483 -0.647 
 (0.662) (0.727) (0.661) 
Regime, year before PA = 2 -0.806 -1.149 -0.817 
 (0.970) (1.001) (0.858) 
Civil war 1.936***  1.778*** 
 (0.591)  (0.654) 
Incompatibility  2.474***  
  (0.509)  
Constant cut2 -2.937*** -2.543**  
 (1.073) (1.111)  
Constant cut3 -1.767 -1.307  
 (1.151) (1.126)  
Rebel strength (much weaker)   -0.0203 
   (0.543) 
Rebel strength (stronger)   -0.994 
   (0.606) 
Constant cut1 -3.916*** -3.498*** -2.562* 
 (1.128) (1.148) (1.476) 
Observations 128 128 128 
Cluster Conflict Conflict Conflict 
Pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.157 0.204 
Chi-squared 52.68 42.67 18.41 
Significance 2.05e-07 5.70e-06 0.0485 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regime is based on Polity IV variable 
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Table 23:  Determinants of DDR during peace negotiations (1975 – 2012) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Years in conflict -0.0281 -0.0183 -0.0279 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) 
Annual battle fatalities -0.355 -0.369* -0.308 
 (0.253) (0.216) (0.227) 
Spoilers -0.105 -0.109 -0.129** 
 (0.066) (0.070) (0.050) 
Political wing = 1, Political wing 0.993 0.659  
 (0.835) (0.616)  
Political wing = 2, Legal political wing 0.344 0.495  
 (0.638) (0.692)  
Territorial control -0.775   
 (0.485)   
Rebel strength (much weaker)   -0.691 
   (0.617) 
Rebel strength (stronger)   -1.506** 
   (0.703) 
GDP per capita (real) -2.194*** -1.499** -2.393*** 
 (0.587) (0.687) (0.749) 
Years of current regime -0.00683 -0.00446 -0.00215 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Regime, 2 years before PA = 1 -0.123 -0.0140 -0.0648 
 (0.754) (0.663) (0.701) 
Regime, 2 years before PA = 2 0.101 -0.0261 0.00325 
 (0.681) (0.648) (0.680) 
Civil war 1.859***  1.517** 
 (0.664)  (0.696) 
Incompatibility  1.953***  
  (0.552)  
Constant cut1 -4.913*** -4.146*** -5.174*** 
 (1.466) (1.357) (1.326) 
Constant cut2 -3.858*** -3.162** -4.157*** 
 (1.388) (1.306) (1.231) 
Constant cut3 -2.850* -2.153 -3.118** 
 (1.482) (1.358) (1.273) 
Observations 97 97 97 
Cluster Conflict Conflict Conflict 
Pseudo R-squared 0.147 0.139 0.151 
Chi-squared 42.62 44.51 44.69 
Significance 1.26e-05 2.66e-06 2.48e-06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regime is based on Vreeland variable 
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Failure of Peace and Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Existing studies suggest that DDR programmes do not strengthen peace after 
negotiations or treaties.  This research argues that the various components of DDR 
can have different impacts on the failure of peace. This paper examines the 
implications of the DDR provision in internal armed conflict negotiation for 
preventing the recurrence of war. This research addresses the following question: 
Does a DDR provision, in internal armed conflict settlements, prevent the recurrence 
of war in the post-conflict scenario? Using an original database that registers 102 
peace negotiation processes during the period 1975 to 2012, I demonstrate that peace 
is more likely to be achieved when the peace agreement includes a DDR provision, 
especially the reintegration process. 
 
Keywords: disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, peace, conflict resolution, 
war recurrence 
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Introduction 
 
There have been 117 conflicts during the period from 1980 to 2015; of these 
conflicts, 47 have ended with a peace agreement, and 14 have ended with a military 
victory (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2016). The literature on the failure of peace argues 
that the probability of recurrence of conflict is likely in around 60% of the cases 
(Collier et al., 2003; Collier & Sambanis, 2002; B. Walter, 2010). The Colombian 
case is a good example in this respect. Colombia has had nine peace talks60 and three 
peace agreements since 1953.61 These agreements could be considered as only 
partially successful because the armed conflict is ongoing. Many former combatants 
have subsequently relapsed into different militant groups, including guerrilla groups, 
criminal bands and drug cartels. Thus, the criminal and homicide rates are still very 
high.  Currently, there is an implementation of a peace process with FARC and a 
peace negotiation with ELN. If the peace is achieved, the challenge for the 
Colombian government and civil society is enormous, because the warring parties 
need to uphold the compromises and maintain trust in one another. However, 
Colombian history has demonstrated the challenges and difficulties for lasting and 
fruitful peace.  
 
The Colombian example raises the important question, why does peace sometimes 
last and sometimes fail? Countries in conflict have formulated different provisions to 
try to achieve and (or) maintain peace. These mechanisms are often implemented as 
                                                 
60 For details, see Villarraga (2015). 
61 These peace agreements include different provisions such as political participation and DDR. 
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part of peace negotiations. Warring parties (rebels and government) negotiate 
different provisions such as power sharing, cease-fire conditions, amnesties, political 
participation, third-party verification and DDR.  Do these measures work?  This paper 
will answer the following question: Does a DDR provision, in internal armed conflict 
settlements, prevent the recurrence of war in the post-conflict scenario?  
 
The existing scholarly work on peace failure62 mainly focuses on the determinants of 
peace building after the civil war, the impact of the provision which is negotiated and 
its implementation. These works focus on the relationship between the failure of 
peace and hostility, local capacities, international support, power-sharing, military 
sharing, cease-fire agreements or mediation. There are hundreds of works63 on 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration that focus on case studies, evaluation 
of results and lessons learnt. However, only a few studies adopt a macro vision of the 
relationship between DDR64 provision and the durability of peace or failure of peace. 
This deficiency seems somewhat surprising since international organisations, like the 
World Bank, United Nations, national governments and NGOs, emphasise the 
positive effect of developing this type of programme to achieve peace and stability in 
post-conflict. In addition, these organisations invest not only financial capital but also 
                                                 
62 This paper adopts as synonymous the concepts of war recurrence, resumption of conflict, conflict 
relapse, peace duration, durability of peace and durable peace. For excellent discussions of these topics 
see Balcells & Kalyvas (2014); DeRouen, Lea, & Wallensteen (2009); Gurses, Rost, & McLeod 
(2008); Sambanis (2007); Doyle & Sambanis (2006); Fortna (2004a, 2004b); B. Walter (2002); 
Stedman, Rothchild, & Cousens (2002); B. Walter (1997); Rudloff & Findley (2016); Kreutz (2014) 
and Doyle & Sambanis (2006). 
63 For example, see Ansorge (n.d.); Barbero-Baconnier (1993); Bauer, Fiala, & Levely (2014); Berdal 
& Ucko (2009); Boas & Bjørkhaug (2010); Douma & Gasana (2008); Matveeva (2012); Munive & 
Jakobsen (2012) and Striuli (2012). 
64 For example, see Krebs & Licklider (2016); Haer & Bohmelt (2015); Banholzer (2013); DeRouen et 
al. (2009); Glassmyer & Sambanis (2008); Hartzell & Hoddie (2003) and Hoddie & Hartzell (2003). 
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technical and human capital in DDR programmes.  However, a systematic analysis of 
this relationship is missing, and the academic works on the failure of peace do not 
study the role of the DDR programme.65 This paper seeks to contribute to this debate 
by explaining the importance and the impact of DDR on the longevity of peace, 
taking into consideration a complete process, individual paths and different types of 
reintegration. Previous studies have produced inconclusive or contradictory findings, 
but these works do not identify the different phases of DDR, as they only focus on 
one stage.  This current study divides the DDR into its components in order to 
understand if there is a differential impact. I found that reintegration (military and 
social) has a positive and statistical impact on preventing conflict recurrence. It is 
important to highlight that the information collected is focused on whether or not the 
peace agreement has this provision.   
 
This chapter argues that a DDR mechanism within a peace negotiation can make 
peace more durable, because this provision has a high political and economic cost for 
both sides in the event that either of them should decide to renege on the commitment 
or to alter the agreement. In the Nicaraguan case, rebel leaders agreed that they would 
not disband until the political system changed (Chamorro, 2015; CIDOB, 2000; 
Fauné, 2014). In the Salvadorian case, the FMLN maintained a significant stock of 
weapons in secret places because they did not trust in the government’s political will 
and the government was also reluctant to demobilise military forces, “citing the need 
to combat the country’s rising tide of crime” (Hill, 2004, p. 162). Another example is 
Angola, which signed three peace agreements (1991, 1994 and 2002) with not only 
                                                 
65 Some studies are focused on military reintegration, military power sharing or disarmament. 
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power-sharing clauses but also DDR provision and military reform. The first two 
agreements failed due to the lack of credibility of the parties, and the lack of 
resources, planning and security. Other reasons for failure were that many of the 
aspects of military provision were only discussed after the peace agreement was 
signed, and the rebels experienced election defeat (Hill, 2004). It is worth noting that 
both sides have the possibility to keep weapons, maintain control of their former 
soldiers and preserve territorial control, meaning that they could cheat. Therefore, 
DDR is a fundamental element of bargaining power. This provision reduces the 
uncertainty of actions and intentions during the implementation phase and prevents 
recidivism because the re-organisation of armies would be costly (B. Walter, 2002, p. 
21). As Hartzell (2013) highlights,  
power-sharing provisions such as those that mandate the integration of rivals’ 
troops into the state’s military make it more difficult for adversaries to return 
to armed conflict, opposing factions that implement these measures should be 
more likely to abide by the terms of the bargain they agree to at the war’s end. 
(p. 243) 
If the previous argument is upheld, then the inclusion and contents of a DDR 
provision should affect the duration and success of peace.  
 
This paper relies on an original DDR database compiled for this dissertation, that 
registers 102 peace negotiation processes during the period from 1975 to 2012 and 
identifies the three components of DDR and the type of reintegration (military, civil 
or both).  The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, which registers if the 
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peace is achieved after 2 or 5 years from the date of signature of a peace agreement 
between the government and the same rebel group. The key independent variables are 
the DDR provision, using different combinations of each stage of this provision and 
the type of reintegration process, which could be civil, military, or both. These 
variables are dichotomous: 1, if the peace agreement has the DDR (or disarmament, 
demobilisation, reintegration, military reintegration, social reintegration or both), or 
0, in other cases. 
 
A peace negotiation is considered as a set of peace accords which are negotiated 
between representatives of the government and the rebel group that resulted in 
compromises involving how to solve the conflict causes, how to manage the 
consequences of conflict and how to rebuild war-torn societies.  Hoddie and Hartzell 
(2003) identify four different power-sharing provisions in a negotiation settlement: 
political, territorial, military and economic. The military power sharing is defined as 
the integration of armed forces into a new common security force. It includes a 
proportion of each group’s former combatants into the new army and the inclusion of 
rebel leaders into equivalent ranks in the new army (DeRouen, Lea, & Wallensteen, 
2009; Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003).  In this paper, DDR provision is defined as much 
broader than military power sharing. Military provision is a process related to security 
sector reform and military institutions, and DDR is a social, political and economic 
process based on individuals. This paper therefore defines DDR from the United 
Nations point of view. It is understood as a path between the end of military life and 
the journey towards a new start, within a new civil life. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The first section develops a brief overview 
of why DDR is necessary for durable peace. Opening with a literature review, it lays 
out five causal mechanisms between the DDR process and the recurrence of war. The 
second section describes the research design and the dataset. The findings and 
conclusions are presented in the third and fourth sections. 
 
Literature review: Why does DDR contribute to a lasting peace?  
 
We can theorise that peace in armed conflict is the result of interchange and mutual 
dissuasion, in which both parties cease fighting while the government gives the rebels 
some concessions and the rebels must disband (Fortna, 2004b; B. Walter, 2002). 
However, this definition cannot be totally accepted, because there are cases where 
DDR is not negotiated or it is negotiated some years later, after the original signing, 
due to the lack of credibility or security between sides. We need to be mindful that 
peace negotiations and their agreements operate as a mechanism to solve the roots of 
conflict, to stop fighting and to maximise the expectations of both parties, in terms of 
military-political and economic power. For the government, authority and security 
can be interpreted as necessary to increase its credibility, to achieve the state 
monopoly of violence and to strengthen its institutions.  From the rebel side, power 
and safety can be understood as political participation,66 access to public resources, 
                                                 
66 Of the 129 peace agreements by rebel groups analysed in this sample, the groups only transformed 
into a political party in 50 cases (37%). Source: Dataset. 
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access to government agencies and security guarantees for its members.  Most 
theories about conflict resolution emphasise that the main difficulty in achieving 
peace relates to whether the parties can rely on the commitment of the other side. This 
difficulty is because “The government cannot trust the rebels to end their military 
campaign once they have been granted concessions [...] Similarly, the rebels cannot 
trust the government to honour its side of the deal.” (Mattes & Savun, 2009, p. 739). 
Muggah (2013) has highlighted how 
disarmament is an intensely political issue and linked to a widely recognised 
security dilemma for parties involved in or emerging from armed conflict […] 
Without transparent and credible guarantees that the terms of a peace 
agreement will be enforced, and the security of disarmed parties will be 
ensured, the rational response is to decline the handing over of armaments or 
the demobilisation of one’s forces. (p. 34) 
In sum, DDR is “a politically driven process, and its success depends on the will of 
the parties in the conflict to demilitarise after conflict.” (UNDDR, 2014, p. 25) 
Moreover, it is created as a cost provision which helps to recover the monopoly of 
violence by the state and to generate and demonstrate trust between parties. 
 
B. Walter (2002) points out that the implementation phase is when many peace 
processes fail and cooperation between parties collapses, because the accord “creates 
potentially devastating opportunities67 for post-treaty exploitation” (p. 20), and “after 
the signing of a peace agreement, both sides have incentives to try to renegotiate its 
                                                 
67 The possibilities include the occurrence of a surprise attack or being excluded from power after the 
rebels surrender arms and cede territorial control. 
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terms […] changes in the distribution of power between belligerents can provide 
incentives to return to armed strife” (Kreutz, 2014, p. 355).  This means that the 
possibility of commitment problems appears during the implementation68 phase of 
DDR, because parties are more vulnerable to be annihilated or captured at this time. 
For example, if the peace agreement only calls for rebels to disband, they are 
susceptible to attack if the government decides to defect on the deal, because the 
process implies that they are going to be identified and put into special camps. 
However, there is the possibility that rebels could hide the best weapons and 
combatants for reassembly of the rebel group and resume the war, in cases where they 
think that the government can renege on the deal, or should they not obtain the results 
and benefits that they want. To avoid this scenario, it is important that the design of 
the implementation of DDR should be planned and coordinated during the peace talks 
and its enforcement should start after the signing of the peace agreement. As UNDDR 
highlights, “DDR programmes are more likely to be successful when planning is 
integrated and starts early, preferably during peace negotiations” (UNDDR, 2014, p. 
57). Also, it is important to secure the involvement of the international community, 
because its support is essential in financial, logistical and military terms, since the 
state capacity is too weak at the early stage of post-conflict when both parties need to 
build trust (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2004b; B. Walter, 2002). 
 
                                                 
68 This paper is not focused on implementation, but I used the information collected by Joshi, Regan 
and Quinn (2015), Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) and Escola de Cultura de Pau for checking how many 
DDR programmes have been implemented. Of a total of 99 cases, 37 of them had not been 
implemented, 26 had been partially implemented, 28 had been fully implemented and eight cases were 
without information (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2006, 2007a, 2008, 2009; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; 
Joshi, Quinn, & Regan, 2015). 
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The main objective of this paper is to identify the effect of the inclusion of DDR 
provision on the subsequent peace stability when the parties have negotiated a peace 
settlement. There are five existing studies which are focused on the relationship 
between peace and this “military provision”. First, is the study conducted by Hoddie 
and Hartzell (2003) which explored the impact of negotiating and implementing 
military power-sharing69 arrangements on peace duration. They used the comparative 
method with a sample of 16 peace processes from 1980 to 1996. They found “a strong 
relationship between successful efforts at implementation of military power-sharing 
and the maintenance of peace” (Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003, p. 313). Following the 
same logic, DeRouen et al. (2009) studied the relation between costly power-sharing 
provision to government and the lifespan of the peace agreements. They analysed 
territorial autonomy and military power-sharing with a stratified Cox duration model 
and Weibull model and concluded that these provisions have a positive and 
significant effect on the duration of peace (DeRouen et al., 2009). 
 
In contrast, Sambanis and Glassmyer (2008) estimated logistic and Weibull models 
for determining the impact of rebel and military integration on peace. They built a 
dataset featuring 138 peace processes from 1945 to 1999. They conclude that military 
integration “fails to provide credible security guarantees and that it serves mostly as 
an economic strategy” Also, military integration does not have a significant effect on 
peace duration (Glassmyer & Sambanis, 2008, p. 3). Likewise, Haer and Bohmelt 
(2015) and Krebs and Licklider (2016), using different approaches and perspectives, 
                                                 
69 Power-sharing is understood as “rules regarding the distribution of the state’s coercive power among 
the warring parties” (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003, p. 320). 
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have analysed whether military reintegration70 or DDR reduces the risk of society’s 
relapse into civil war; both articles conclude that military integration or DDR has no 
impact on the durability of post-war peace.   
 
In conclusion, the scholarly studies of military power sharing have produced 
inconclusive or contradictory findings. As mentioned above, military power sharing 
is the configuration of a new army with the view to integrate entirely or partially the 
former combatants and legal forces. It is part of the reform of military institutions and 
security structures designed for consolidation of a post-conflict peacebuilding 
strategy. In contrast, DDR is a social and civil strategy, which involves transitioning 
former combatants (rebels and soldiers) from military to civil life or into a new army. 
This paper is focused on the DDR provision as a social, civil and military strategy for 
achieving peace; for that reason, I collect the information about what type of 
reintegration is mentioned in the peace agreement. 
 
The impact of DDR on peace 
 
Undoubtedly, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process is a 
multidimensional and complex mechanism involving political, military, security, 
humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions which help (re-)build national, regional 
and local capacities, create a political identity and generate reconciliation and 
                                                 
70 Military reintegration “means that combatants from the formerly warring parties – of which there are 
often more than two – and/or the populations they represent are all included in the state’s new national 
military” (Krebs & Licklider, 2016, p. 99). 
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reconstruction (W. A. Knight, 2008; UNDDR, 2014). This could be developed for 
rebels or all parties (rebels and military forces) involved in the conflict. It is 
considered a key component of the general recovery programme which is linked with 
security, humanitarian and peacebuilding programmes, such as landmine recovery, 
small arms control, security sector reform, poverty reduction, economic recoupment 
and political participation. Its implementation is the responsibility of central 
government with the involvement of non-state actors (NGOs), civil society 
organisations, the private sector and the support of the international community.  
 
Maintaining peace after war requires strong cooperation between parties because it is 
likely that they will have strong incentives to take advantage of each other and many 
reasons to fear each other. DDR operates on the basis of reciprocity in terms of 
security and confidence. But for this reciprocity to work, the expected utility of peace 
and the fulfilment of the agreements must be greater than the cost of war or a breach 
of the agreements. I argue that there are five mechanisms through which DDR 
provision might significantly help to increase the expected utility of peace: by 
preventing the parties from reneging on the commitment because of the high political 
cost; by improving the security; by building local capacities and generating 
community reconciliation through the creation of economic recovery programmes, 
and by inhibiting recidivism through the generation of employment and income and 
the development of professional and/or technical skills. These mechanisms suggest 
that when the peace negotiation proposes to establish the three stages of DDR 
provision, the greater its impact will be on the peace outcome. 
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Hypothesis 1: Peace is more likely if the peace agreement includes all three 
stages of DDR provision. 
 
Every stage of DDR has different challenges and mechanisms, but the effect on 
durable peace is positive because the entire strategy is focused on improving the 
quality of life of ex-combatants and their communities using human, social and 
economic incentives.  Özerdem (2002) emphasises that  
a DDR programme means investment in the capacity building of human 
resources and the revitalisation of livelihoods. The time-line for such 
programmes should be envisaged as much longer than a couple of years […] 
every effort should be made to ensure that a closely interwoven relationship 
exists between DDR strategies and the overall reconstruction process. (p. 972)  
Furthermore, a comprehensive DDR strategy seeks to divert military expenditure in 
war-torn countries which would otherwise expend a high percentage of income on 
war. Subsequent expenditures can be diverted toward other social sectors, such as 
education or health, and the recovery of infrastructure. 
 
It is important to highlight, regarding public policy, that disarmament and 
demobilisation are considered as short-term phases, but disarmament could be long-
term if it is expanded to the community level. However, the reintegration phase is a 
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long-term strategy. This stage means the end of criminal life for rebel combatants and 
the beginning of civil life.  
 
The first component of a DDR strategy is the disarmament phase. The main objective 
of this phase is the removal of weapons, ammunition and explosives. This step is 
highly symbolic for combatants for two reasons: it is the end of their military role, 
and it is the sign of their willingness for peace. Regarding the peace process and 
recovery, disarmament suggests there is a level of confidence between parties and 
communities. Additionally, this phase reduces the capacity of the parties to 
reassemble the armies and resume armed conflict. The UN suggests that its duration 
should last no more than 30 days per group (UNDDR, 2014). However, this step 
could be part of a long-term national strategy for arms reduction and control. 
 
The disarmament can fail as a result of three security risks: operational risk, time 
delay and technical risk. The disarmament has three operational phases: first, 
weapons collection; second, storage and management of weapons; ultimately, 
weapons destruction. The operational decision about how disarmament is going to be 
implemented could have an impact on the process and the duration of peace, because 
the illegal armed group could stockpile their best weapons because of their fears 
concerning the government’s inability to fulfil the agreement. This was the situation 
in Colombia during the disarmament of AUC. OAS, which was the international 
guarantor, reported the rebirth of a new wave of paramilitaries in Colombia at this 
time (OAS, 2007). 
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Hypothesis 2: Including disarmament provisions in a peace negotiation 
increases the likelihood of peace two (five) years after the peace accord. 
 
The second component is demobilisation. The main objective in this phase is the 
physical separation of combatants from their armed group; they are cutting formal 
military relations with their rebel group. Demobilisation is a multifaceted and short-
term phase (no more than two months per unit) which includes activities such as 
registration and documentation of combatants (a census), health screening, 
counselling and awareness of the challenges of transitioning from military to civil 
life. The process is completed when the combatants receive documentation that 
confirms their new social status. It is coordinated by civilians or peacekeepers who 
give guarantees of equality, security and protection from discrimination. It is a 
symbolic phase in the peace recovery because it is the end of the rebel structure as an 
army but the beginning of a new civil and (or) political structure.  
 
The demobilisation phase needs to consider the areas where the former rebels are 
going to be quartered. There are two types of quartering, static or mobile. Static 
quarters mean that ex-rebels are held in one place, and they are not allowed to leave. 
In contrast, those who are mobile have free movement and are able to live on their 
own. Both options pose critical security challenges; for instance, static quarters can 
become a focal point for crime (UNDDR, 2014, p. 145) and an easy target for 
spoilers. Mobile quartering is difficult with regard to control of participants and 
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security, because ex-combatants are more vulnerable to vendettas.  The design of the 
demobilisation phase needs to consider the minimum standards of living, the supplies 
and the special needs of ex-combatants, because the lack of appropriate conditions 
could induce internal security problems such as protests. These security 
vulnerabilities require attention not only in terms of the management of personal ex-
combatant information, but also highlight the need to avoid internal riots and to 
protect the ex-combatants from external military attacks. The phase between 
demobilisation and reintegration is called reinsertion, which helps with the immediate 
and basic needs of the former combatants and their dependents. It is focused on short-
term financial allowances but not on (long-term) sustainable income.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Including a demobilisation provision in a peace negotiation 
increases the likelihood of peace two (five) years after the peace accord. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Including disarmament and demobilisation (DD) provisions in a 
peace negotiation increases the likelihood that internal armed conflict will not 
resume in the early phase. 
 
The last phase of the process is called reintegration. The reintegration should be 
military and/or civil. Military reintegration means that both armed forces could be 
merged into a new single entity (Glassmyer & Sambanis, 2008; Hoddie & Hartzell, 
2003; Krebs & Licklider, 2016). Civil reintegration is the inclusion of former 
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combatants in communities (Kaplan & Nussio, 2015). Some peace processes decide 
to develop both types of reinstatement, others incorporate only one type. Of the 81 
peace agreements observed with reintegration, 79% have military reintegration, 73% 
have civil reintegration, and 52% have both options (see Table 24). The challenge, in 
this phase, is to generate a sustainable reintegration of former rebels into the 
communities’ social life and a new army. This reintegration should be implemented 
in economic, political and social terms and should include a mix of different 
programmes, such as psycho-social therapies, vocational programmes and land 
access. The UN highlights that “failure to produce sustainable reintegration will 
increase the security risk posed by ex-combatants and the potential for relapse into 
conflict” (UNDDR, 2014, p. 157).  
 
Table 24: Type of reintegration 
  Yes No 
Military 
Reintegration71 62 (78%) 17 (22%) 
Civil reintegration 59 (73%) 22 (27%) 
Military and civil 
reintegration  41 (51%) 39 (49%) 
 
Military reintegration can be designed “varying along three dimensions: the 
magnitude of the integration, the horizontal integration of units, and the vertical 
integration of the officer corps” (Krebs & Licklider, 2016, p. 99). Civil reintegration 
can be planned with two approaches: individual and community-based. Both 
approaches require an understanding of the general context, psycho-social needs, 
                                                 
71 There is a missing value in this data sample. 
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capacities and necessities of former combatants and communities. Both have benefits 
and drawbacks. For example, the community-based reintegration creates a win–win 
situation, thus avoiding feelings of unfairness, and generates different economic 
opportunities which could have a positive impact on the development of the host 
community (Kaplan & Nussio, 2015). 
 
The reintegration phase has two important risks: first, the national economy is 
devastated, and there is limited access to employment, assets, investment and 
markets, which can make it too difficult to generate a successful economic 
reintegration. For that reason, the former combatants are more prone to participate in 
illicit activities such as drug trafficking, crime and illegal exploitation of natural 
resources for income.72 The second risk concerns the acceptance of former 
combatants within communities. The presence of ex-combatants could generate 
vendettas, isolation and rejection by inhabitants. Additionally, the ex-combatants are 
very vulnerable because they have lost their social support from the rebel 
organisation. Furthermore, they could suffer mental illness, and these situations tend 
to generate anti-social behaviours and violence (especially intra-family violence). The 
socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants and their families is a long-term 
process, but if the process is well-designed and implemented, it has a positive impact 
on peace. 
                                                 
72 I estimated four statistical models with interactions between reintegration, military reintegration, 
civil reintegration and GDP. The results are not statistically significant but in the model with 
dependent variable, 2 years, the effect is positive. In the model of 5 years, the interaction between 
military reintegration and GDP is positive but social interaction is negative. These results are relevant 
to further research on DDR and conflict resolution because they show the relevance of the first two 
years in a war-torn society. 
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Hypothesis 5: Including reintegration provisions in a peace negotiation 
increases the likelihood that the conflict does not resume. 
Hypothesis 5a: Including military reintegration provision in a peace 
negotiation increases the chances that the conflict does not resume. 
Hypothesis 5b: Including civil reintegration provision in a peace 
negotiation increases the likelihood that the conflict does not resume.  
Hypothesis 5c: Including both military and civil reintegration 
provisions in a peace negotiation increases the chances that the conflict 
does not resume. 
 
In conclusion, the DDR process has distinct perspectives, which are focused on the 
economic, social, political and security development of former combatants and their 
host communities. This process and their programmes have become a major part of 
the reconstruction strategy because it is a way to build confidence between parties, to 
recover the state monopoly of force and to provide economic and political guarantees. 
The state and private sector are important actors. The private sector is the main 
employer, while the state must re-configure its institutions and create legal and 
physical security. However, one of the challenges for the success of the programme is 
the implementation phase, because many post-conflict countries are considered as 
failed states where the central authority is too weak to implement the recovery and the 
private sector is very hesitant to hire former combatants. 
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Research design 
 
The main hypothesis is that DDR provision should contribute positively to peace, 
controlling for other relevant factors such as conflict duration, the presence of other 
rebels, GDP and political stability. This study employs a logistic regression for the 
analysis of the impact of DDR in the discrete times (two and five years).  
 
To find out how well DDR works, the dataset uses information on internal armed 
conflicts, the peace agreement, whether DDR was negotiated and how long peace 
lasted, and it uses specific control variables. Peace is defined as the absence of war.73 
The data was built using three distinct datasets: peace processes with DDR provision, 
dyadic conflict termination and internal armed conflict.  The former was developed as 
part of this thesis for a study of the determinants of DDR during peace negotiations. 
This dataset covers peace agreements between 1975 and 2012. The latter two are 
adapted from UCDP datasets: the UCDP Dyadic dataset (DD), version 1-2015, which 
is based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, but is a disaggregated version 
by rebel groups, and the UCDP dyadic Conflict Termination Dataset (CTD), version 
1-2010. 
 
The dataset includes peace processes by rebel groups that were signed from 1975 to 
2012. Each signed peace agreement by rebel group is an observation for the statistical 
                                                 
73 The absence of war is defined as negative peace. The discussion is developed by different authors. 
See  for example Doyle & Sambanis (2006); Richmond (2010, p. 15); Sambanis (2007) and Zartman & 
Kremeni︠u︡k (2005, p. 5). 
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analysis. The statistical results are performed on cross-sectional data. The dataset 
excludes wars that were not considered as internal armed conflicts and cases where 
there was not a peace process. If a peace process started and failed immediately, then 
it is coded as a peace failure in the first year. Three cases have failed immediately and 
30 have failed in less than one year. 
 
For independent variables, this study uses the following datasets: the Peace 
Agreement Dataset (PAD), version 2-2012; the UCDP dyadic dataset (DD), version 
1-2015; the UCDP dyadic Conflict Termination Dataset (CTD), version 1-2010; the 
Battle Deaths Dataset 1946–2008 (version 3.0); the GDP dataset by Gleditsch (2014, 
v.6.0); the number of rebel groups by Christia; the democracy duration by Boix, 
Miller and Rosato (2014) and Polity IV. The subsequent section describes the 
dependent and independent variables. 
 
Dependent variable 
 
This paper examines the durability of peace and evaluates the effect of the DDR 
provision on the eventual absence of war after the peace agreement is signed. Some 
studies of durability or civil war recurrence adjudicated the success or failure of peace 
by whether the conflict resumed within a certain period. In quantitative research, a 
common cut-off point is typically one five-year period (Archer and Gartner, 1976) or 
two five-year periods (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). For the discrete time route, the 
cut-off point is two and five years, because the term of two years is average for the 
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DD phase and the five-year measure is average for a typical DDR process. In many 
cases, the duration of disarmament and demobilisation is two years, and the 
reintegration is five years. 
 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, which measures if the conflict 
ended. Two dichotomous variables were created to measure this fact: one after two 
years and another five years from the time the peace agreement was signed.  The 
absence of war (peace) was coded as one (1) if the dyad (rebel and government) is not 
registered in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset. If the war resumes after the 
peace process, it is coded as zero (0) which indicates peace failure or civil war 
recurrence. A peace treaty is assumed to mark the beginning of the post-conflict 
phase. Peace treaty information was determined from two sources: first, the Peace 
Agreement Dataset (PAD) (Harbom, Högbladh, & Wallensteen, 2006), which 
registered the date when peace fails. Second, the UCDP Dyadic dataset (DD) 
(Harbom, Melander, & Wallensteen, 2008), which registered rebel group military 
activity. These two sources highlight discrepancies because some rebel groups, which 
had signed the peace agreement, are still active in the conflict, but do not meet the 
minimal requirement for being considered part of an armed conflict. For that reason, 
these groups are not in the DD dataset. In those cases, the general principle applied is 
that if the rebel groups are not in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict (DD dataset), I 
assume that peace has been achieved. Table 25 demonstrates how the peace fails after 
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two years in 21% of the cases;74 after five years, the peace fails in 17% of cases. See 
Appendix B – Table 29 for descriptive statistics of the dependent variables. 
 
Table 25:  Failure of peace cases 
  Failure Peace 
Peace 2 years 26 (21%) 96 (79%) 
Peace 5 years 20 (17%) 99 (83%) 
 
Key independent variable 
 
This paper is primarily interested in the effect of the DDR provision on the likelihood 
of peace failure after parties have signed a peace agreement. Appendix B – Table 30 
shows the descriptive statistics of the main independent variables.  These variables 
are binaries and identify if the peace process has a disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration provision. Other variables identify if the peace agreement only mentions 
or includes the implementation of this provision. The information also includes the 
type of reintegration negotiated by the parties. The reintegration may be military, civil 
or both. 
 
                                                 
74 The number of cases that are included in the dataset are as follows: If I use the two years’ variable, 
the dataset has 122 cases for the statistical analysis.  If I use the five years’ variable, the dataset has 
119 cases.  There are seven cases which are not included in this analysis because they are signed after 
2012. 
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The DDR process could be considered circuitous, and every stage is connected; 
therefore, I use the tetrachoric75 and Pearson measures to estimate the correlations 
between the dependent and key independent variables. The results show us that only 
disarmament has a statistically significant correlation with the two-year variable. 
Demobilisation has a negative relationship with the two-year variable but a positive 
correlation with the five-year variable. This result is very logical considering the 
security situation, since demobilisation requires that the rebels reside in a special 
place (a military area – cantonment) for a short period (following UNDRR, at no 
more than three months per group) before they start their reintegration process. 
Reintegration has a positive relationship with both variables. In conclusion, these 
figures suggest that the models should omit one of the three key variables due to the 
high correlation between them. (See Appendix B – Table 31). 
 
Table 26 indicates that 80 cases have demobilisation, 67 have disarmament, and 80 
cases have reintegration. Of the total cases, 57 have all three stages. In sum, 28 cases 
have two stages (disarmament – demobilisation; disarmament – reintegration; 
demobilisation – reintegration). Additionally, 18 cases have only one stage, and 26 
cases do not have DDR provision. Of the cases with three stages of DDR, 82% 
achieve peace whereas 18% do not. Of the 28 peace agreements with two DDR 
stages, 85% have reached peace (such as Papua New Guinea – The Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA), which has two previous peace accords), and 15% have 
                                                 
75 Tetrachoric correlation is “the correlation between two variables that originally arise from a bivariate 
normal distribution but are only observed as variables that have been dichotomized at some thresholds 
value, leading to a data set that is simply a 2x2 table of counts” (Everitt & Skrondal, 2010, pp. 427–
428) 
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not (for example, the peace settlement signed between the Chad government and 
different rebel groups). Finally, of the 18 peace accords with only one DDR stage, 
82% have achieved peace (for example, the United Kingdom and The Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (IRA)), and 18% have not (such as Lebanon and Forces of 
Michel Aoun; Mali and Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA)). To conclude, of the 
101 cases with a DDR provision, 66.33% reached peace, but 33.66% did not; in 
contrast, 54% of the cases without DDR achieved peace although 46% did not.  
 
Table 26: Contingency table 
Disarmament 
  
 
Yes No 
                                      Demobilisation 
    Yes No Yes No 
R
ein
teg
ratio
n
 
Yes 57 (44,18%) 9 (6,97%) 9 (6,97%) 5 (3,87%) 
No 10 (7.75%) 9 (6,97%) 4 (3,10%) 26 (20,15%) 
 
Control variable 
 
DDR provisions are clearly not the unique, influential factor in determining peace 
failure. I also need to control for other factors that are likely to affect the failure of 
peace. Different research has determined those control variables and the study by 
Doyle and Sambanis (2006) produced one of the most interesting results. The authors 
developed a model of peacebuilding, which has been used and modified by later 
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research. This model proposed that three dimensions determine the post-conflict 
circumstances: hostility, local capacity and international capacity. They used different 
proxies for each dimension and concluded that higher income, lower dependence on 
natural resources and less fractionalization of society reduce the risk of a new war. 
Ethnic wars are much more likely to have peacebuilding failure due to persisting 
claims over sovereignty. Economic growth and development are the critical 
determinants of a low risk to return to civil war (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Another 
example is the work developed by Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001). They 
demonstrated that the duration of peace is longer when a peace agreement includes 
the national autonomy provision and the support of third parties, because these 
provisions not only suggest a compromise but also offer security assurances among 
parties76 (Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild, 2001, p. 187). 
 
In summary, the factors identified by this literature can be classified into four sets: 
characteristics of the conflict, local capabilities, third-party mediation and power-
sharing agreements. Therefore, this study77 measures the intensity78 of conflict by 
using two variables. First is the number of years that the conflict by rebel group is 
active. This duration reflects the longevity of armed conflict. The second variable is 
the number of deaths, which reveals the intensity of the armed conflict. In both 
                                                 
76 See also Cochrane (2008); Doyle & Sambanis (2006); Fortna (2004a, 2004b); Gurses et al. (2008); 
Hartzell (1999, 2014, 2014); Hartzell & Hoddie (2003); Kreutz (2010, 2014); Sambanis (2007); 
Stedman et al. (2002); Svensson (2014) and B. Walter (1997, 2002, 2009). 
77 Since the study is cross-sectional I created new variables which use the last information registered in 
the original dataset to reduce missing values. 
78 I estimated the same models using the battle-deaths (from the Battle Deaths Dataset 1946–2008 
(version 3.0)), but the variables were not statistically significant and due to my sample size being small 
I decided to remove this variable in the final models. For further research, it is important to include this 
variable as well as displacement. 
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variables, high values indicate that the armed conflict is costly, and this should make 
peace less probable. However, Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) highlight that “war 
duration […] has an ambiguous effect: long wars can make signing a peace 
agreement more likely as victory seems unlikely, but they can also make peace-
building harder if longer wars also result in greater hostility and more damage” (p. 
368).  
 
The presence of spoilers79 is defined as the presence of other rebel groups. It is a 
binary variable, which registers if the conflict is on-going with another group. For 
robustness, I estimate some models using the multiparty definition developed by 
Christia: “civil wars in which there are three or more major domestic combatant 
groups” (Christia, 2012, p.11). I also utilised information about the maximum number 
of rebel groups by conflict and the number of rebel groups by conflict-year. The 
presence of a greater number of spoilers should make peace less probable, but if the 
negotiation includes other groups the probability of peace is more probable.  I 
measure local capacities with the most acceptable socio-economic indicator: gross 
domestic product (GDP). I use total real GDP per capita (2005 prices), which is 
collected and expanded by Gleditsch (2014, v.6.0). A high socio-economic indicator 
should increase the likelihood of peace. The democratic institutions are also measured 
by the duration of the regime and the type of regime. Appendix B – Table 30 displays 
the descriptive statistics of those variables. 
 
                                                 
79 Spoilers are defined as “one (as a political candidate) having little or no chance of winning but 
capable of depriving a rival of success” (Mish, 2004, p.1,206; Stedman, 1997). 
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Empirical findings80  
 
For these models, the dependent variable is peace (0: the war resumes; 1: the war 
does not resume). I calculate the models with disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration as a key independent variable. I also estimate models with other 
variables, such as civil or military reintegration, a variable that registers if the peace 
process utilised both civil and military reintegration simultaneously. Other variables 
include at least one stage of DDR, or only disarmament and demobilisation. In 
Appendix D, I present other models which include certain provisions such as 
peacekeeping, sharing government and the creation of a political party. I also control 
by the presence of mediators, previous peace agreements and other forms of 
interactions. 
 
The logistic regressions of peace on the main variables without other co-variables 
(model 1, model 2 and model 3: two years and five years) reveal the following 
results. On disarmament, a non-significant positive relationship: peace is more likely 
to be achieved when the peace agreement includes this provision. On demobilisation, 
a non-significant positive correlation: peace is more likely to be achieved when 
demobilisation has been negotiated. On reintegration (model 4 is estimated with civil 
                                                 
80 One of the concerns in all fields of empirical political science is “sample selection bias” This means 
a non-random sample affected the properties of conventional estimators. This study is based on a 
dataset which is a convenience sampling; in other words, this dataset is non-probability sampling and 
this type of sample is useful for pilot testing.  The DDR dataset does not collect data on the presence of 
a DDR process in the cases of a military victory or low activity, or in the case of hidden agreements or 
DDR provision without negotiation. In the future, the dataset should be extended to different types of 
conflict resolutions (Adkins & Hill, 2011; Stock & Watson, 2015; Wooldridge, 2010).   
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and military reintegration), a significant positive relationship. These results are 
displayed in Table 27 and Table 28. 
 
According to these results, I could accept hypothesis 1, 2, 5a, 5c and reject hypothesis 
3 and 5b (because the results are not statistically significant).  However, to evaluate 
the real effect of DDR, we also need to control for other factors that are likely to 
influence the chance of conflict recurrence. Model 5 and Model 6 show the results: on 
disarmament, the relationship is negative and non-significant. On demobilisation, the 
relationship is also negative and non-significant. On the reintegration, military 
reintegration and simultaneous reintegration, the models show us a positive and 
statistically significant relation; however, civil reintegration presents a negative and 
non-significant relation. The other factors, such as the duration of the conflict, 
conflict with other rebels, GDP per capita, and length of political regime, are 
statistically significant, and several kinds of literature corroborate these relationships. 
In sum, in the presence of other factors, the most important variable for achieving 
peace (in a statistical sense) is the reintegration phase and this result is stable when I 
control by other provisions (see models in Appendix D).  Figure 10 shows that the 
probability of peace is increased by 37 percentage points in the two-years model (or 
35 percentage points in the five-years model) if the process included reintegration or 
military reintegration but decreased by three percentage points if civil reintegration is 
included. Additionally, if the peace agreement includes civil and military 
reintegration, the likelihood of peace increases by 17 percentage points. 
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I also calculate the predict probability for model 5 and model 6 (see Appendix C). 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 in Appendix C show the predicted probabilities of peace 
when disarmament and demobilisation take values from 0 to 1. The negative effect of 
these variables is shown by the increasingly small probabilities. I can see that the 
probabilities decrease if the process has or does not have disarmament (or 
demobilisation). The graph (disarmament and demobilisation) shows that the 
confidence interval is wide in the possible scenarios. Bear in mind that these variables 
are not statistically significant in the models. 
 
The graph of reintegration (military and civil) (from 0 to 1) shows that the confidence 
interval is narrow, and the probability increases slightly. Analysing these results, we 
can see that military reintegration has an important role in the reintegration of former 
combatants.  The variables are statistically significant in the models.  
 
In conclusion, the statistical models demonstrate that DDR is an important provision 
to achieve peace. When the process is divided into stages, I can see that the 
reintegration, especially military reintegration, has a positive impact due to the long 
process involved, which develops different programmes focusing on generating new 
opportunities. In other words, the reintegration is going to change the individual 
incentives for preferring a civil life over war. This research presents new findings, 
compared with previous work, because it is based on the disaggregation of DDR, 
while other studies simply use one variable. I show that not all peace agreements have 
a complete DDR strategy, which is another distinctive quality of this research.
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Table 27: Effects of DDR on Peace (dependent variable: Peace after two years of PA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Disarmament 0.300    -0.353 0.0890 -0.0704   
 (0.504)    (0.480) (0.463) (0.475)   
Demobilization  0.531   -0.488 -0.0961 0.0950   
  (0.590)   (0.687) (0.826) (0.641)   
Reintegration   1.547***  1.984***     
   (0.550)  (0.529)     
Military reintegration    2.111***  2.123***    
    (0.602)  (0.594)    
Civil reintegration    -0.291  -0.286    
    (0.653)  (0.715)    
Military and Civil reintegration       0.989*   
       (0.568)   
Disarmament and Demobilization        0.458  
        (0.553)  
At least one stage of DDR         1.150* 
         (0.600) 
Real GDP per capita 0.0408** 0.0473** 0.0548** 0.0851** 0.0488** 0.0847** 0.0631* 0.0432** 0.0480** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.041) (0.023) (0.042) (0.034) (0.020) (0.022) 
Duration of conflict (ln) -1.137*** -1.139*** -1.224*** -1.335*** -1.279*** -1.337*** -1.299*** -1.156*** -1.091*** 
 (0.268) (0.277) (0.349) (0.341) (0.338) (0.344) (0.316) (0.290) (0.289) 
Conflict with other rebels -0.920* -0.964** -1.362*** -1.501*** -1.564*** -1.485*** -1.085** -0.902* -0.942* 
 (0.533) (0.490) (0.424) (0.507) (0.462) (0.524) (0.491) (0.530) (0.490) 
Ln year of current regime -0.386* -0.399* -0.397** -0.438* -0.366** -0.439* -0.374* -0.385* -0.447** 
 (0.200) (0.206) (0.189) (0.227) (0.184) (0.229) (0.214) (0.203) (0.208) 
Constant 4.983*** 4.866*** 4.686*** 5.100*** 5.174*** 5.098*** 5.138*** 4.941*** 4.350*** 
 (0.988) (0.974) (0.988) (1.094) (1.108) (1.235) (1.075) (0.946) (1.078) 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
Cluster Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel 
Pseudo R-squared 0.195 0.200 0.257 0.294 0.266 0.294 0.218 0.199 0.219 
Wald chi2 31.10 27.87 26.54 30.13 38.70 30.55 25.52 29.87 25.90 
Prob > chi2 8.94e-06 3.86e-05 7.01e-05 3.71e-05 2.23e-06 0.000169 0.000614 1.57e-05 9.33e-05 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Table 28: Effects of DDR on Peace (dependent variable: Peace after five years of PA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Disarmament 0.323    0.0323 0.149 0.443   
 (0.559)    (0.781) (0.727) (0.625)   
Demobilization  0.0745   -0.887 0.126 -0.171   
  (0.687)   (1.079) (1.056) (0.864)   
Reintegration   0.720  1.716**     
   (0.602)  (0.737)     
Military reintegration    0.496  0.772    
    (0.593)  (0.584)    
Civil reintegration    0.0446  -0.396    
    (0.611)  (1.072)    
Military and Civil reintegration       -0.0484   
       (0.714)   
Disarmament and Demobilization        -0.0211  
        (0.686)  
At least one stage of DDR         0.602 
         (0.618) 
Real GDP per capita 0.00474 0.00516 0.00655 0.00774 0.0480* 0.00837 0.00341 0.00458 0.00417 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.027) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) 
Duration of conflict (ln) -1.433*** -1.444*** -1.436*** -1.442*** -1.900*** -1.479*** -1.442*** -1.450*** -1.382*** 
 (0.390) (0.382) (0.400) (0.406) (0.539) (0.447) (0.397) (0.388) (0.382) 
Conflict with other rebels -0.356 -0.438 -0.549 -0.495 -0.615 -0.370 -0.349 -0.456 -0.353 
 (0.629) (0.632) (0.530) (0.550) (0.625) (0.679) (0.633) (0.666) (0.594) 
Ln year of current regime -0.0643 -0.0574 -0.0619 -0.0628 -0.00389 -0.0497 -0.0604 -0.0542 -0.0732 
 (0.220) (0.222) (0.219) (0.219) (0.260) (0.223) (0.220) (0.219) (0.224) 
Constant 4.922*** 5.133*** 4.791*** 4.939*** 5.655*** 4.910*** 4.990*** 5.213*** 4.566*** 
 (1.237) (1.325) (1.190) (1.215) (1.609) (1.454) (1.381) (1.244) (1.300) 
Observations 119 119 119 119 117 118 119 119 119 
Cluster Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel 
Pseudo R-squared 0.221 0.218 0.232 0.225 0.315 0.242 0.221 0.218 0.225 
Wald chi2 16.25 16.86 18.54 17.21 19.14 15.43 16.20 17.05 16.64 
Prob > chi2 0.00617 0.00478 0.00234 0.00856 0.00776 0.0513 0.0234 0.00440 0.00524 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Figure 10:  First difference estimates 
Two years after PA was signed Five years after PA was signed 
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Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper seeks to answer if the negotiation of a DDR provision, in internal armed 
conflict settlements, prevents the recurrence of war in the post-conflict scenario. The 
literature review helps us to identify different ways through which this provision might 
achieve peace, because DDR is not only a political process but it also a socio-economic 
process. The process is one of the requirements for consolidation of peace81 because it is 
considered as a bridge between the military and/or illegal status and civil life. I found 
that not all peace agreements have this type of provision; sometimes the DDR is partially 
negotiated, which means that the agreement only includes one or two steps, or it remains 
unclear how the government will implement it. I also found that reintegration (military 
and civil) has a positive relationship with peace. This is a logical result bearing in mind 
that the reintegration phase is the stage which includes professional training and 
psychological treatments for adapting the former combatants to life within civil society. 
 
I also highlight the fact that the literature concerning this topic has produced 
contradictory findings. The most important reason for this outcome is the different 
approaches to defining and measuring DDR. For this research, I only use an 
identification variable based on whether the peace agreement contains the provision or 
                                                 
81 “DDR is meant to address […]: ensuring that armed groups that have prospered during the active phase 
of hostilities do not return to the battlefield or find other ways of undermining local and international 
efforts to build lasting peace, and to do so by finding ways of integrating ex-combatants into the social, 
economic, and political life of post-war society” (Berdal & Ucko, 2009, p. 2). 
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not and if so, which stage(s); in other words, I determine if the peace agreement has a 
completed or partial DDR. Further research needs to analyse the level of implementation 
of the accords, because literature argues that it is during this phase when many peace 
agreements have failed. There have been remarkable advances in this area of study; for 
example, see the investigations by Joshi, Regan and Quinn (2015), Jarstad and Nilsson 
(2008) and Escola de Cultura de Pau. 
 
The review of the impact of DDR helps us to identify the vulnerabilities and challenges 
present within each stage. Demobilisation is a critical phase because the rebels are very 
vulnerable if this phase fails; at this time, the possibility of different conflicts, such as 
riots or protests, or even the resumption of conflict is high.  This was the case in 
Mozambique, where a register recorded 317 incidents arising for various different 
reasons (Striuli, 2012). The statistical models suggest a negative but not statistically 
relevant relationship with peace. However, disarmament is a fundamental element for the 
stability of peace. This stage is important because it reduces the stock of weapons in the 
society. However, it is a very vulnerable phase because in many cases there is evidence 
that the amount of weaponry collected, and its serviceability, is very low and the “best 
arms” are kept for commanders or combatants, as in the Mozambique, Nicaragua and El 
Salvador cases. The models may conclude that disarmament has a positive but not 
statistically significant relationship. These results, from my point of view, are entirely 
reasonable because disarmament and demobilisation are, in many cases, the short-term 
stages. 
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The reintegration phase is a long-term programme, but it is important to bear in mind that 
in some cases the disarmament process could also be long-term. The statistical models in 
this paper help us to conclude that disarmament and reintegration (civil and military) 
have a positive and statistical relationship with peace.  I also estimated the effect by 
controlling for other factors. These models conclude that reintegration is the most 
important stage to achieve peace.  If the peace negotiation has a clear mandate about how 
the process is going to develop, the rebels are going to be more confident about the 
guarantees and their future. The reintegration strategy develops different programmes to 
improve not only the quality of life of the ex-combatants, but also the quality of life of 
the hosting communities. However, when I disentangle the programme of civil and 
military reintegration, the statistical models suggest that when the parties develop a 
military reintegration peace is more achievable, because this type of reintegration could 
give the rebels more confidence about the process than social reintegration, where they 
would need to find not only economic stability (a job) but also social acceptance.  
 
This paper has sought to expand our understanding of the relationship between DDR 
provision and peace. The findings suggest that including DDR in a peace agreement, 
especially the reintegration programme, has a significant positive impact on the peace 
and shows evidence of the importance of military reintegration in the process of peace 
consolidation. Therefore, this research implies that the policy community, at the 
international and national level, should think carefully about the scope of negotiation and 
implementation of this provision so as not to generate a high expectation that cannot be 
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achieved. This paper serves as an invitation for researching this topic and its different 
interrelationships in more detail. For further research, many other important questions 
remain to be solved.  
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Appendix A: Dataset for DDR analysis 
Dependent variable 
 
1. Failure of peace variable: 
It is a dummy variable. The dependent variable measures if the conflict was ended after 
the peace agreement was signed. Source:  UCDP dyadic dataset and UCDP dyadic 
Conflict Termination Dataset.  
0. No 
1. Yes 
• Peace 2 year: The peace was achieved after two years. 
• Peace 5 year: The peace was achieved after five years. 
 
2. Duration of Peace: 
It is the time (in years) between the termination of conflict and the start of another war 
between the same parties. 
  
Description of co-variables 
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1. DURATION: Time elapsed in years of conflict. It is based on Startdate and 
EpEnd. Source, UCDP dyadic dataset and UCDP dyadic conflict termination 
dataset. Transformation:  ln_duration_1: ln (Duration_1 +1) 
2. MAX OF REBEL FORCES: It is the maximum number of rebel groups in every 
conflict. Source, UCDP dyadic dataset. I also create the variable SUM_ SB which 
is the number of rebel groups by conflict-year. 
3. MULTIPARTY CIVIL WAR: Source, Christia. “Civil wars in which there are 
three or more major domestic combatant groups.” 
4. NWG_P: Previous number of warring groups – Maximum number of Warring 
groups by Christia. 
5. DEMOCRACY DURATION: Source, Boix, Miller, and Rosato. “The number of 
consecutive years the country has had the same regime type.” 
6. GDP: Source, Gleditsch. Version 6.0 BETA (9 September 2014). Transformation: 
natural logarithm and division by thousand. 
 
Appendix B:  Statistical Test – main models 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 29 and Table 30 show the descriptive statistics of the independent and control 
variables. 
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Table 29: Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd Min max 
      
Peace 2 year 122 0.786 0.411 0 1 
Peace 5 year 119 0.832 0.375 0 1 
      
 
 
Table 30: Descriptive Statistics – Key Independent Variable and co-variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Disarmament 129 0.659 0.476 0 1 
Demobilization 129 0.620 0.487 0 1 
Reintegration 129 0.620 0.487 0 1 
Military reintegration 128 0.500 0.502 0 1 
Civil reintegration 129 0.457 0.500 0 1 
Military and Civil reintegration 129 0.318 0.467 0 1 
At least one stage of DDR 129 0.791 0.408 0 1 
Disarmament and Demobilization 129 0.519 0.502 0 1 
DDR stages 129 1.891 1.187 0 3 
Real GDP per capita 129 10.07 23.62 0.0300 150.6 
Duration of conflict (ln) 129 1.805 1.092 0 4.025 
Conflict with other rebels 129 0.682 0.467 0 1 
Ln year of current regime 129 2.966 1.262 0 5.283 
Peacekeeping operation 114 0.351 0.479 0 1 
Regime, 2 years before PA 102 0.941 0.830 0 2 
Third party 115 0.765 0.426 0 1 
Sharing Government 115 0.252 0.436 0 1 
Political Party 129 0.388 0.489 0 1 
Previous PA failure by conflict 129 0.457 0.500 0 1 
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Correlation 
 
Table 31 displays the correlation between the key variables. I calculate two types of 
correlation. The first is called a tetrachoric correlation. It is used to measure rater 
agreement for binary data. The results show us that there is only a weak association 
between peace after two years of signature and each stage of DDR. The association 
between the variable after five (5) years is still weak. The Pearson correlation 
corroborates these results. 
 
Table 31: Pearson and Tetrachoric correlation 
 
 
 
Multicollinearity 
 
Table 32 summarises the variation inflation factors (VIFs) of the control variables. Note 
that none of the variables have a VIF above 5, indicating that the controls do not present 
multicollinearity problems. 
Pearson Tetrachoric Pearson Tetrachoric Pearson Tetrachoric Pearson Tetrachoric Pearson Tetrachoric Pearson Tetrachoric
Disarmament 0.1945* 0.3125* 0.0938 0.1567 1 1
Demobilization -0.0005 -0.0009 0.0364 0.0612 0.5344* 0.7461* 1 1
Reintegration 0.1024 0.1674 0.0727 0.1217 0.5033* 0.7126* 0.5370* 0.7479* 1 1
Military reintegration 0.0945 0.1538 0.1197 0.1994 0.2826* 0.4379* 0.4321* 0.6391* 0.7365* 0.9437* 1 1
Civil reintegration 0.0991 0.1632 0.0403 0.0679 0.5440* 0.7936* 0.5975* 0.8459* 0.7194* 1.0000* 0.3877* 0.5748*
Military reintegrationReintegration2 years peace 5 years peace Disarmament Demobilization
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Table 32:  Multicollinearity 
  Model G1 Model G2 
  VIF VIF 
Disarmament 1,41 1,51 
Demobilisation 1,59 1,94 
Reintegration 1,60   
Military Reintegration   1,43 
Civil reintegration   1,85 
Real GDP per capita 1,16 1,24 
Conflict duration 1,07 1,11 
Spoilers 1,32 1,25 
Regime duration 1,22 1,24 
 
 
Diagnostics test  
 
Table 33 summarises the specification test, goodness of fit, classification, influential 
observation and coefficient sensitivity. Those tests reveal some influential cases; I 
estimate the models without these cases. The results do not present important changes. 
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Table 33:  Other statistical tests 
  
Model 1 (2 
years) 
Model 1 (5 
years) 
Model 2 (2 
years) 
Model 2 (5 years) 
Specification 
Error: link test 
Hat: significant Hat: significant Hat: significant Hat: significant 
Hat^2: no significant Hat^2: no significant 
Hat^2:  no 
significant Hat^2: no significant 
Goodness of fit: 
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow's test 
The test indicates 
that the model does 
not fit the data well 
The test shows that 
the model fits the 
data well 
The test indicates 
that the model fits 
the data well 
The test indicates 
that the model fits 
the data well 
Estat 
classification 81,97% 88,24% 78,69% 85,71% 
Influential 
observations 
The graph identifies 
Ivory Coast as an 
influential case; I 
estimate a new 
model without this 
case, but the result is 
similar. 
The graph analysis 
identifies 7 cases.  I 
estimate a new 
model without those 
cases, but the result 
is similar. The final 
model is estimated 
without    INDIA – 
ATTF (1993) and   
SOMALIA – USC 
(1994). 
The graph analysis 
identifies 6 cases.  I 
estimate a new 
model without these 
cases, but the result 
is similar. 
The graph analysis 
identifies 11 cases.  I 
estimate a new 
model without those 
cases, but the result 
is similar. The final 
model is estimated 
without    CHAD – 
MDJT (2002). 
Coefficient 
sensitivity 
No cases 
The graph analysis 
identifies 3 cases. 
The graph analysis 
identifies 3 cases. 
The graph analysis 
identifies 4 cases. 
 
 
Appendix C:  Predict probabilities by control variables 
 
I use the command ‘prgen’ to generate the predict probabilities and to plot the confidence 
intervals.  The probabilities are calculated from min to max ranges of the key variable 
and the mean of other variables. The results are shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12. 
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Figure 11: Predicted probabilities of Peace by key variables. (2 years peace) 
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Figure 12: Predicted probabilities of Peace by key variables. (5 years peace) 
  
  
 
 
Appendix D:  Other models  
Table 34: Effects of DDR on Peace (dependent variable: Peace after two years of PA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Disarmament = 1, Yes 0.820 0.662 0.799 0.306 0.614 0.189 
 (0.775) (0.687) (0.691) (0.645) (0.732) (0.579) 
Demobilization = 1, Yes 0.271 -0.452 -0.777 -0.817 -0.574 -0.669 
 (1.069) (0.955) (1.094) (0.759) (0.916) (0.714) 
Reintegration = 1, Yes 1.829 1.796** 2.403** 1.432** 2.024*** 1.830*** 
 (1.137) (0.751) (0.934) (0.688) (0.757) (0.571) 
Real GDP per capita 0.116 0.0425** 0.0442** 0.0505** 0.0548** 0.0488** 
 (0.077) (0.021) (0.019) (0.023) (0.026) (0.022) 
Duration of conflict (ln) -2.433*** -1.765*** -1.714*** -1.421*** -1.787*** -1.442*** 
 (0.913) (0.449) (0.466) (0.384) (0.447) (0.372) 
Conflict with other rebels = 1, Yes -3.186** -1.891*** -1.882*** -1.636*** -1.945*** -1.740*** 
 (1.354) (0.557) (0.639) (0.503) (0.564) (0.532) 
Ln year of current regime -1.222** -0.622*** -0.654*** -0.564** -0.599** -0.548** 
 (0.519) (0.233) (0.238) (0.256) (0.244) (0.257) 
Previous PA failure by conflict = 1, Yes 1.566* 1.869*** 1.888*** 0.791 1.870*** 1.367** 
 (0.851) (0.573) (0.586) (0.714) (0.590) (0.644) 
PeaceKeeping -0.143 -0.370 0.496  -0.494  
 (1.060) (0.564) (1.096)  (0.562)  
Regime, 2 years before PA = 1 1.612      
 (1.586)      
Regime, 2 years before PA = 2 1.747      
 (1.236)      
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Table 34: Effects of DDR on Peace (dependent variable: Peace after two years of PA) (continuation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Third party = 1, Yes -0.887 -0.961 -0.795    
 (1.499) (1.054) (1.020)    
Sharing Government = 1, Yes -2.459**      
 (1.078)      
Political Party = 1, Yes 3.516***      
 (1.201)      
Reintegration # PeaceKeeping   -1.298    
   (1.369)    
Reintegration # Previous PA failure    0.982   
    (1.006)   
Constant 8.408** 6.869*** 6.467*** 5.640*** 6.036*** 5.463*** 
 (3.307) (1.650) (1.749) (1.356) (1.241) (1.258) 
Observations 89 114 114 122 114 122 
Cluster Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel 
Pseudo R-squared 0.547 0.370 0.378 0.310 0.361 0.304 
Wald chi2 31.79 42.44 44.54 33.76 36.41 37.06 
Prob > chi2 0.00428 6.26e-06 5.86e-06 9.86e-05 3.35e-05 1.12e-05 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 35: Effects of DDR on Peace (dependent variable: Peace after two years of PA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Disarmament = 1, Yes 0.840 1.229 0.753 0.824 1.184 0.886 
 (0.945) (0.817) (0.826) (0.704) (0.831) (0.576) 
Demobilization = 1, Yes 0.754 0.0895 -0.354 -0.377 0.0292 -0.323 
 (1.250) (1.251) (1.168) (0.949) (1.292) (0.953) 
Military reintegration = 1, Yes 2.031 2.198*** 0.816 2.177** 2.341*** 2.111*** 
 (1.293) (0.754) (0.908) (0.881) (0.766) (0.686) 
Civil reintegration = 1, Yes 0.0630 -0.533 1.424 -0.853 -0.453 -0.354 
 (1.813) (0.958) (1.322) (0.894) (0.967) (0.843) 
Real GDP per capita 0.127* 0.0667* 0.0689 0.0776** 0.0876* 0.0838* 
 (0.070) (0.040) (0.059) (0.039) (0.046) (0.046) 
Duration of conflict (ln) -2.570*** -1.979*** -2.593*** -1.727*** -2.002*** -1.721*** 
 (0.931) (0.490) (0.733) (0.452) (0.490) (0.420) 
Conflict with other rebels = 1, Yes -2.928** -1.850*** -2.175*** -1.601** -1.902*** -1.633*** 
 (1.274) (0.602) (0.650) (0.666) (0.625) (0.626) 
Ln year of current regime -1.232** -0.779** -0.652* -0.810** -0.733** -0.796** 
 (0.604) (0.350) (0.360) (0.370) (0.352) (0.360) 
Previous PA failure by conflict = 1, Yes 1.382 1.736*** 1.767** 1.117 1.754*** 1.630** 
 (1.033) (0.626) (0.705) (0.751) (0.653) (0.664) 
PKO_1 = 1 -0.476 -0.926 -0.680  -1.010  
 (1.051) (0.677) (0.823)  (0.662)  
Third party = 1, Yes -0.514 -0.969 -2.027    
 (1.594) (1.167) (1.824)    
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Table 35: Effects of DDR on Peace (dependent variable: Peace after two years of PA) (continuation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Regime, 2 years before PA = 1 0.722      
 (1.763)      
Regime, 2 years before PA = 2 1.158      
 (1.175)      
Sharing Government = 1, Yes -2.095*      
 (1.180)      
Political Party = 1, Yes 3.446***      
 (1.098)      
Militar R # PeaceKeeping   5.047***    
   (1.929)    
Civil R  # PeaceKeeping   -4.364**    
   (1.896)    
Militar R  # Previous PA failure     -0.526   
    (1.536)   
Civil R # Previous PA failure    1.667   
    (1.486)   
Constant 8.506** 7.627*** 9.957*** 6.603*** 6.645*** 6.224*** 
 (3.617) (2.377) (3.623) (1.899) (1.652) (1.654) 
Observations 88 113 113 119 113 119 
Cluster Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel 
Pseudo R-squared 0.554 0.402 0.479 0.384 0.393 0.371 
Wald chi2 41.33 25.85 32.70 26.47 22.27 27.70 
Prob > chi2 0.000285 0.00684 0.00189 0.00552 0.0138 0.00107 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
191 
 
 
Table 36: Effects of DDR on Peace (dependent variable: Peace after five years of PA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Disarmament = 1, Yes -2.617* 0.673 0.616 0.618 0.722 0.576 
 (1.358) (0.744) (0.807) (0.712) (0.742) (0.683) 
Demobilization = 1, Yes 4.889** -0.240 -0.142 -0.946 -0.711 -0.869 
 (1.921) (0.962) (0.967) (0.922) (0.921) (0.889) 
Reintegration = 1, Yes 4.036*** 0.529 0.349 0.598 0.899 0.931 
 (1.431) (0.960) (0.978) (0.852) (0.803) (0.742) 
Real GDP per capita -0.101*** 0.000897 0.00124 0.00274 0.00426 0.00365 
 (0.030) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Duration of conflict (ln) -5.148*** -1.648*** -1.682*** -1.546*** -1.630*** -1.581*** 
 (1.682) (0.508) (0.487) (0.435) (0.465) (0.429) 
Conflict with other rebels = 1, Yes -4.207** -0.845 -0.881 -0.590 -0.760 -0.661 
 (1.644) (0.643) (0.664) (0.654) (0.670) (0.676) 
Ln year of current regime -0.892 -0.0175 -0.0257 -0.124 -0.0326 -0.112 
 (0.991) (0.258) (0.265) (0.225) (0.261) (0.231) 
Previous PA failure by conflict = 1, Yes 3.611* 0.695 0.699 0.0782 0.681 0.596 
 (2.040) (0.531) (0.540) (0.673) (0.532) (0.521) 
PeaceKeeping = 1 -1.648 -0.0667 -0.373  -0.240  
 (1.301) (0.756) (0.969)  (0.732)  
Regime, 2 years before PA = 1 -9.071**      
 (3.840)      
Regime, 2 years before PA = 2 0.672      
 (1.340)      
Third party = 1, Yes -8.094*** -1.589** -1.672*    
 (2.400) (0.784) (0.867)    
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Table 36: Effects of DDR on Peace (dependent variable: Peace after five years of PA) (continuation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Sharing Government = 1, Yes 5.076***      
 (1.865)      
Reintegration # PeaceKeeping    0.472    
   (1.323)    
Reintegration # Previous PA failure     0.851   
    (0.889)   
Constant 21.21*** 6.194*** 6.471*** 5.301*** 4.939*** 5.179*** 
 (4.955) (1.628) (1.767) (1.466) (1.547) (1.424) 
Observations 54 113 113 119 113 119 
Cluster Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel 
Pseudo R-squared 0.620 0.286 0.288 0.252 0.252 0.247 
Wald chi2 27.33 20.73 22.47 18.18 19.54 18.74 
Prob > chi2 0.0112 0.0231 0.0210 0.0332 0.0210 0.0163 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 37: Effects of DDR on Peace (dependent variable: Peace after five years of PA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Disarmament = 1, Yes -1.387 0.806 0.743 0.835 0.927 0.753 
 (1.147) (0.819) (0.938) (0.753) (0.769) (0.709) 
Demobilization = 1, Yes 3.133** 0.0351 0.108 -0.716 -0.380 -0.546 
 (1.531) (1.056) (1.161) (1.064) (1.066) (1.031) 
Military reintegration = 1, Yes 0.966 0.215 0.0563 -0.202 0.470 0.435 
 (1.671) (0.740) (0.950) (0.793) (0.660) (0.608) 
Civil reintegration = 1, Yes 1.209 -0.0561 -0.0892 -0.0684 -0.0180 0.0115 
 (1.284) (1.251) (1.536) (0.866) (1.054) (1.017) 
Real GDP per capita -0.0737*** 0.00142 0.00135 0.00460 0.00626 0.00567 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) 
Duration of conflict (ln) -3.944*** -1.640*** -1.682*** -1.504*** -1.611*** -1.548*** 
 (1.330) (0.527) (0.519) (0.448) (0.470) (0.441) 
Conflict with other rebels = 1, Yes -2.434** -0.751 -0.797 -0.319 -0.585 -0.487 
 (1.127) (0.594) (0.628) (0.665) (0.634) (0.684) 
Ln year of current regime -0.577 -0.0389 -0.0411 -0.148 -0.0501 -0.125 
 (0.779) (0.263) (0.266) (0.218) (0.268) (0.226) 
Previous PA failure by conflict = 1, Yes 3.159* 0.715 0.733 -0.199 0.706 0.648 
 (1.704) (0.527) (0.548) (0.697) (0.532) (0.539) 
PeaceKeeping -1.779 -0.161 -0.406  -0.392  
 (1.336) (0.800) (0.995)  (0.751)  
Third party = 1, Yes -5.368*** -1.688** -1.778*    
 (1.770) (0.823) (0.971)    
Regime, 2 years before PA = 1 -6.387*      
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Table 37: Effects of DDR on Peace (dependent variable: Peace after five years of PA) (continuation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 (3.485)      
Regime, 2 years before PA = 2 0.696      
 (1.049)      
Sharing Government = 1, Yes 3.335**      
 (1.463)      
Militar R  # PeaceKeeping   0.562    
   (1.587)    
Civil R # PeaceKeeping   -0.116    
   (1.406)    
Militar R # Previous PA failure     1.493   
    (1.314)   
Civil R  # Previous PA failure     0.258   
    (1.296)   
Constant 15.35*** 6.267*** 6.547*** 5.228*** 4.843*** 5.022*** 
 (3.363) (1.741) (1.956) (1.549) (1.609) (1.511) 
Observations 54 113 113 119 113 119 
Cluster Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel Country-rebel 
Pseudo R-squared 0.582 0.284 0.285 0.255 0.244 0.238 
Wald chi2 38.65 19.73 22.64 19.85 17.60 17.12 
Prob > chi2 0.000414 0.0491 0.0462 0.0475 0.0622 0.0469 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Reintegration programme, Ex-combatants and Post-Conflict Violence: 
The Colombian case 82 
 
Abstract 
 
The implementation of different provisions for achieving peace does not necessarily 
accomplish a reduction in the rates of criminal violence. Various theories explain the 
cause of post-conflict violence, but few demonstrate the relation between the post-
conflict violence, internal armed conflict, and peace agreement provisions, such as the 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process (DDR). DDR provision 
incorporates different objectives, not only creating stability in terms of developing 
economic, social and political programmes for former combatants, but also preventing 
new types of violence and crime by ex-combatants. This paper analyses the dynamics of 
violent crime in Colombia after the peace negotiations between the Colombian 
government and the paramilitary forces (AUC) (2003 – 2006), and the consolidation of 
the individual demobilisation of combatants as a counterinsurgency strategy (2002 – 
2014). The main objective is to contribute to explanations for patterns of violence post-
conflict and determine whether there is a relationship between this violence and the 
reintegration process. The Colombian case allows us to identify trends related to violence 
and DDR processes at a sub-national level of analysis. For this purpose, we have built a 
yearly-municipal panel database for the period from 2003 to 2014. The database registers 
violent events, municipality characteristics, the presence of former combatants, the 
                                                 
82 A later version of this paper was submitted to Conflict Management and Peace Studies on 7 May 2018. 
Authors: Andrea González and Han Dorussen. 
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presence of rebel groups, birthplace and recruitment place. The findings suggest that the 
presence of former combatants has no statistical effect on the rate of homicide. However, 
this variable has a positive and statistical effect on the rate of robbery. This research has 
important implications for the study of post-conflict violence and stability. 
 
Introduction 
 
El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa and Afghanistan, among others, have 
demonstrated that the rates of violence inside a society do not necessarily decrease, 
despite the signing of peace agreements and the employment of different strategies 
(programmes and policies) of peacebuilding. In fact, these case studies reveal two issues. 
The first issue is the co-existence of different types of violence (non-organized and 
organized or non-collective and collective) in these societies—such as homicide, 
robbery, sexual violence, violence against woman and trafficking—which may persist 
after the end of civil war.83 Second, there is a positive correlation between conflict 
violence and post-conflict violence (violent crime). The literature suggests that after a 
peace agreement, in many cases, the structural problems of a country are not solved; for 
example, the presence of an illegal economy, property disputes, the new balance of 
power (political and economic) and the weakness of peace deal provisions are all 
                                                 
83 See Berdal & Suhrke (2012); Collier & Hoeffler (2004); Deglow (2016); Dercon & Ayalew (1998); 
Geneva Declaration & Secretariat (2008); Kaplan & Nussio (2016); Martí Puig (2002); Rivera (2016) and 
Schuld (2013). 
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elements of vulnerability. In sum, these cases show an increase and diversification of the 
violence. 
 
The case studies mentioned above show that the relationship between conflict, conflict 
resolution and criminal violence is not straightforward. For these reasons, it is important 
to ask, why do rates of violence “typically” increase in post-conflict scenarios? What is 
the relation between DDR processes and the new forms of violence in post-conflict 
scenarios? When a country starts its post-conflict process or the peace consolidation, it 
also initiates a transformation of culture, of development, of the security concept and the 
violence. All those transformations oblige the state to create public policies that 
strengthen the state institutions, give guarantees of compliance and help to consolidate 
the peaceful coexistence of the population. The DDR process is a tool of peace 
consolidation that enables the state to obtain the monopoly of force and to give security 
guarantees to the rebels. From the viewpoint of the development theory, DDR stimulates 
and strengthens the socio-economic development of a country (Correia, 2009; Giustozzi, 
2012), because the programme should incentivise the desire to create an internal market 
and encourage the participation of the private sector, which in turn creates opportunities 
for the legal market. It should also develop strategies to address the traumas of the civil 
war and to generate reconciliation between inhabitants. 
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This paper investigates the question regarding the relation between DDR processes and 
the new forms of violence by examining the dynamics of violent crime in the Colombian 
case, after the peace negotiations with the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia 
(Autodefensas Unidad de Colombia – AUC) and the consolidation of the individual 
demobilisation of combatants as a counterinsurgency strategy,84 which is focused on 
guerrilla groups. This work intends to characterise the regional dynamics of the conflict 
and the post-conflict violence. The focus is on the presence of ex-combatants who 
participated in DDR programmes and patterns of different types of violence,85 
specifically homicide and robbery,86 at the municipality level. In other words, do 
communities with more ex-combatants experience more crime? Do DDR programmes 
matter? We are going to determine the factors that might explain this violence in a spatial 
context, including regional, demographic and economic perspectives. 
 
We contribute to advancing knowledge on the study of post-conflict violence by 
exploring how the presence of former combatants at a local level affects rates of post-
conflict violence (violent crime). Based on previous research, we argue that the presence 
of ex-combatants, who are part of a reintegration programme, leads to lower levels of 
                                                 
84 In Colombia, the individual demobilisation policy has been implemented since 1984. However, from 
2002 it became part of the war strategy. The main objective of the programme was to weaken the armed 
groups, by obtaining war material or strategic information from the deserters. “[…] the guerrilla fighters 
have often been lured away from their groups with the promise of reintegration benefits” (Kaplan & 
Nussio, 2015, p. 12). 
85 This paper is based on these two types of violence due to the lack of municipality data regarding other 
crimes such as intra-family violence, rape, etc. 
86 We use the term robbery to represent a set of different concepts, such as theft, burglary, mugging, raid 
and larceny. 
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violent crime. However, there is a different behaviour observed in former combatants 
from guerrilla or paramilitary groups. This paper contributes to understanding violence 
on the micro-level, based on distinguishable factors from district to district, and 
participates in the discussion about security and reintegration policy by comprehending 
the spatial and temporal variance. This work could be significant for the development of 
public policies to promote general stability during the post-conflict stage.  The 
Colombian case could highlight elements that help to elaborate the public policy of 
social, economic and political reintegration after the peace agreement with the FARC and 
ELN.87 
 
To evaluate our question on crime levels, we employ statistics in a sub-national dataset, 
covering homicide, robbery and the presence of ex-combatants, for the period from 2003 
to 2014 in Colombia on the municipal level. We focus on the municipality level due to 
data availability and to account for micro-level or regional variability. Because of its 
important statistical services and the well-developed monitoring of participants in 
demobilisation programmes, Colombia is unique among post-conflict countries and a 
relevant case for studying any effect of the presence of ex-combatants on crime. Previous 
studies have concluded that DDR programmes can reduce the rate of homicide and 
forced displacement, while other research does not present conclusive results because of 
                                                 
87 The FARC agreement was finally signed on 24 November 2016. The peace talks with ELN have been in 
the exploratory phase since January 2014. 
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the temporality or the lack of data.88 Our study highlights the difference between the 
presence of ex-guerrilla or ex-paramilitary soldiers, provides controls by endogeneity 
bearing in mind recruitment and birthplaces and employs a random effect model with 
additional time-invariant variables (A. Bell & Jones, 2015), and instrumental variables 
(Baltagi, 2005; Cameron & Trivedi, 2010) to solve heterogeneity, autocorrelation and 
endogeneity problems. 
 
We found that the ex-combatants involved in the reintegration programme are important 
in terms of explaining the difference in the municipality homicide rate, but if the number 
of former combatants in the programme increases over time, they do not have a statistical 
effect. There is a different story when we examine the rate of robbery, when the presence 
of ex-combatants has a positive and significant effect; this result suggests that the 
number of ex-combatants is an important factor for explaining the difference in the 
municipality robbery rate. 
 
In the next section, we briefly review the existing literature on the violence during post-
conflict and its relationship with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) 
programmes. It also presents a theory and hypotheses about the relationship between the 
presence of former rebels and violence. Next we provide a brief context of the 
Colombian case. Then, we describe the research design and data, and subsequently, 
                                                 
88 To our knowledge, there have been fourteen studies which have analysed, using different approaches, the 
effects of the DDR programme on homicide or displacement in Colombia. 
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present the empirical results of our statistical analysis and robustness checks. Finally, the 
summary of the main findings and other important implications are discussed. 
 
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework: violence in the post-conflict stage 
 
This paper defines violence broadly as the intentional causation of bodily harm and 
psychological injury to the person and damage to goods. Violence has various forms such 
as homicide, body injury, vandalism, displacement, kidnapping, torture, rape and 
robbery, among others (Eisner, 2009, 2013; Kalyvas, 2006; Tilly, 2003). Different 
authors distinguish violence according to its impetus, its effects, its dimensions and its 
genesis. For instance, the violence during war89 is seen as distinct from the violence in 
peacetime. Both states of violence share some mechanisms but differ in contexts, aims, 
techniques and modes (Kalyvas, 2006). 
 
When a civil war ends, we can expect a cessation of “war violence”. However, different 
forms of deadly violence continue and may even increase in the following years. Some 
studies have demonstrated this behaviour, for instance, the Global Burden of Armed 
Violence report (2008) or the work developed by Berdal and Suhrke (2012). The 
majority of research on violence has used homicide as the best indicator of violence 
                                                 
89 Kalyvas (2006) highlights that violence and war must be analysed separately because “areas consumed 
by the same conflict can exhibit substantial variation in violence. Hence, violence should be analytically 
decoupled from war, echoing the well-established distinction between jus ad bellum (lawful initiation of 
war) and jus in bello (lawful conduct of war)” (p. 20). 
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because it is the absolute violence (Kalyvas, 2006; Tilly, 2003) and data collection and 
coverage are broad and seem relatively reliable (Eisner, 2009, 2013). For example, 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show that homicide rates increase after the end of an internal 
armed conflict. Additionally, Archer and Gartner (1976) have stated that most warring 
nations 
[…] in the study experienced substantial postwar increases in their rates of 
homicide […]. The increases were pervasive and occurred after large and small 
wars, with several types of homicide indicators, in victorious as well as defeated 
nations, in nations with improved post-war economies and nations with worsened 
economies. (p. 961)  
Rivera (2016) also shows that post-conflict states in Latin America have a positive 
relationship with high homicide rates. In sum, post-war societies might be considered 
more violent than they were before the conflict and present new forms of violence. These 
new types of violence include domestic violence, riots, violent crime, sexual abuse, 
violent gangs and revenge assassinations (Aguirre, 2012; Barron, 2014; Berdal & Suhrke, 
2012; Geneva Declaration & Secretariat, 2008). 
 
There is a consensus that the post-conflict phase is a transitory period between war and 
peace. For example, Berdal and Suhrke (2012) define post-conflict as “a transition from 
war to more “normal conditions” (p.50).  Licklider (1995) suggests that this conversion 
process is around five years (one five-year period), while Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
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propose the time limit for studying post-war violence is two five-year terms. Reychler 
and Langer (2006) describe it as “multiple transition processes: […] Transforming 
conflict-torn, politically unstable, and socially and economically disintegrated countries 
into more politically and economically stable, equal and prosperous ones” (p. 4). The 
transitional stage is the period when cessation of warfare begins. Lambach (2007) defines 
post-conflict as the period in which the “violence perpetrated by actors in the conflict is 
no longer employed about the central narratives of the previous conflict” (p. 11). Schuld 
(2013) points out that “violence in post-conflict configurations (as far as it is considered 
illegitimate) is regarded as a violation of the re-established legal system, and usually 
referred to as crime, assumed to be driven by personal, emotional or economic 
motivations” (p. 62). Here, we define the post-conflict stage as a period after a conflict 
has ended with victory or a peace agreement. We can also define post-war violence as all 
acts of violence produced at the end of the civil war or internal armed conflict, and 
without (necessarily) political motivations (Geneva Declaration & Secretariat, 2008).  
 
Explanations for post-war violence 
 
Research on the different reasons for the variance in violence during the post-conflict 
stage is growing. Most studies of post-war violence are based on macro-analysis and 
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similar methodologies,90 but there are a few91 studies working on the micro-analysis of 
the type of violence within the post-conflict country.  The macro-analysis, which is 
focused on a national level rather than a regional level, analyses the relation between war 
and levels of post-conflict violence. These studies commonly rely on the so-called legacy 
of conflict, the culture of violence and peace agreement conditions hypothesis, to explain 
some of their findings, stipulating that war societies have more violent behaviour during 
peace stages.  The Global Burden of Armed Violence reports state that “[w]here wars are 
especially long and severe, post-conflict mortality and morbidity can escalate further 
still” (Geneva Declaration & Secretariat, 2008, p. 50), as the institutional framework has 
collapsed or is too weak to achieve the minimum requirements required by its 
inhabitants.  Berdal and Sunrke highlight that the post-conflict violence emerges for two 
reasons: legacy of war and conditions of the peace (Berdal & Suhrke, 2012). 
Accordingly, some vulnerabilities increase the probability of post-conflict violence, such 
as a failed DDR provision, the illegal economy92  and  its networks,93 property disputes 
(land problems), a weak justice sector (the creation of informal security and justice), a 
                                                 
90 See, for example, Berdal & Suhrke (2012); Dudouet, Giessmann, & Planta (2012); Dzinesa (2007); 
Giustozzi (2012); Leatherman (1999); Moser & McIlwaine (2001); Pearce (2016) and Rivera (2016). 
91 See Aguirre (2014); Barron (2014); Collier (1994); Deglow (2016) and Samset (2013). 
92 From the greed perspective, illegal economy means illegal opportunities for obtaining financial viability, 
such as drug trafficking or smuggling. 
93 These are “Armed groups that have not been effectively disarmed and demobilized may morph into 
organized criminal networks”(Geneva Declaration & Secretariat, 2008, p. 55). 
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culture of revenge, the new balance of power between parties94 and the presence of 
peacekeeping missions.95 
 
The legacy of conflict is also identified as relevant in micro-level studies of post-conflict 
violence. In Northern Ireland, Deglow (2016) shows that the legacy of the conflict has 
had a positive effect on post-conflict violent crime. His conclusion is that “the more an 
area has been exposed to violence, and the larger the proportion of this violence 
committed by anti-government groups, the more violent crime on the local level” 
emerges (Deglow, 2016, p. 1).  Schuld (2013) analyses the South African case and argues 
that the primary cause of post-conflict violence is a culture of violence inherited from the 
apartheid system. This violence is expressed by xenophobia, political assassinations, mob 
violence and protest violence (Schuld, 2013). 
 
The second explanation of post-conflict violence focuses on the structural problems of a 
country. A micro-study developed in Indonesia by Barron (2014) establishes that the 
cause of post-conflict violence is based on the reality of a country which employs its 
economic power and the political clout of its elites and their incentives to use violence 
and take advantage of calm (peaceable) conditions and opportunities. In sum, he shows 
                                                 
94 “As noted by Chaudhary and Shre (2008) if one party wins and controls security apparatus this can lead 
to violent purges to eliminate remnants of the enemy and its affiliates” (Geneva Declaration & Secretariat, 
2008, p. 53). 
95 Di Salvatore shows that peacekeeping helps to reduce political violence but could increase the criminal 
violence: “In the case of criminal violence, while political violence is reduced the collateral effect is the 
creation of favourable conditions for criminal activities”  (Di Salvatore, 2017, p.11). 
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that four related issues explain the post-conflict violence:96 first, the political economy97 
of violence; second, the power of elite bargaining; third, the impact of the previous 
conflict, and fourth the state capacity to lead and maintain the order (Barron, 2014).  
 
The third explanation concerns the peace agreement conditions. If the end of the conflict 
was achieved through negotiation, there are different provisions which can be negotiated 
such as amnesty, DDR, election, power-sharing, security sector reforms, third party 
participation, victims (refugees and internally displaced persons), and a truth 
commission. If the results of these provisions are not as expected, they could be 
considered “destabilising”. For example, Samset (2013) highlights the fact that, 
depending on the objective of the amnesty,98 it can contribute to reduce or increase 
postwar violence: 
 Amnesties help build peace if they are limited, that is, if they do not cover the 
most serious crimes committed during the conflict […] Amnesties help build 
peace if they are unlimited, that is, if they cover all the crimes … This is because 
an unlimited amnesty enables society to leave the divisive past behind.  (p. 77)  
                                                 
96 “Where violence proves to be an effective strategy for capturing resources or power, and where higher 
level authorities tolerate or support its use, future violence is more likely” (Barron, 2014, p. 59). 
97 “Examining the political economy of violence– the reasons why violence is profitable in some places at 
some times, and not in others–illuminates why post-conflict violence occurs or does not. Differing 
incentives for different sets of actors explains why post-conflict violence takes varying forms across areas 
for combinations of support for violence from different groups determines the forms post-conflict violence 
will take” (Barron, 2014, p. 320). 
98 In the case of amnesty, Samset presents a double argument. First, amnesty is described as an accountable 
mechanism. Second, amnesty is described as an opportunity to leave the past behind (peaceful 
coexistence). Each argument has a different effect on post-war violence. 
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Post-war elections are another feature of negotiated conflict termination. The literature 
on this subject reveals ambiguous conclusions: elections can contribute to reduce or 
increase postwar violence depending on the results and their acceptance. For instance, 
Samset (2013) points out that  
elections are particularly prone, moreover, to be dominated by ex-combatants-
turned-politicians and armed-groups-turned-parties; actors who will see the polls 
as just another battle. If they lose they may return to violence; if they win,  they 
can easily use the power they get to oppress their (former) enemies. (p. 86)  
There are other mechanisms, such as DDR or peacekeeping or third parties, which reduce 
the ability of opposition groups to use violence.  It is important to highlight that this 
paper is focused on only DDR programmes as a peace agreement provision and the effect 
on some indicators of criminality and violence of the presence of former combatants who 
are part of the reintegration programme. We are going to control our statistical models by 
considering some of the reasons outlined above. In the next section, we explain the 
relationship between DDR programmes and post-conflict violence. 
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Figure 13: Reasons for the variance in violence during the post-conflict stage  
 
Source: Literature review – Authors. 
 
In conclusion, the literature provides three sets of explanations for the increase of 
violence in a post-conflict phase: the legacy of conflict, structural problems of the 
country (state) and peace agreement conditions. At the same time, these explanations 
have various subcategories such as socio-cultural factors (culture of violence), 
institutional problems (weak state, faltering justice and institutions) and the political 
economy of violence. Figure 13 shows the classifications and demonstrates that if we 
analyse each category, we can find some interrelation and “simultaneous causality” 
(Stock & Watson, 2015). It is normal that most post-war countries exhibit multiple types 
of explanation. Nicaragua illustrates this point, as the country signed a peace agreement 
in 1987, but it was not fully implemented due to the unstable security situation, poor 
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governance, lack of basic planning during the recovery phase and lack of financial 
sources. Its post-conflict stage was characterised by armament, disarmament and 
rearmament cycles, high rates of violence and criminality among urban cities,99 high 
unemployment rates (particularly among youth), low levels of social capital and the 
presence of drug trafficking routes (Brune & Bossert, 2009; Chamorro, 2015; Martí Puig, 
2002; Rodgers, 2002, 2013; Rodgers & Jensen, 2015). 
 
DDR process and post-conflict violence 
 
El Salvador has demonstrated a growing tendency to delinquency and violence following 
the peace agreement of 1992. However, it is not clear if there is a direct connection 
between the violence and a “failed” DDR process or if it is, alternatively, simply a 
continuation (or mutation) of a historical process in which violence is an intrinsic part of 
the culture (Cruz, González, & Romano, 1998; Sida, 2003; K. Walter & Williams, 1993). 
Nicaragua has been characterized by high rates of violence and criminality, and Rodgers 
(2013) finds that the first wave of gang violence was largely related to practices of the 
Sandinista popular army and that the reasons for being part of the gang were “a natural 
                                                 
99 “Rather than leading to peace, post-conflict regime change marked a shift in Nicaragua’s geography of 
violence, the logic of which was well summarized by Galeano (1998: 322–24), who remarked that “while 
the streets of Nicaragua’s cities were peaceful during the years of formal conflict, once peace was declared, 
the country’s streets became scenes of war” as a result of a dramatic explosion in urban crime and 
delinquency. According to official Nicaraguan National Police statistics, crime levels rose steadily by an 
annual average of more than 10 per cent during the 1990s, compared to less than 2 per cent during the 
1980s, with the absolute number of crimes almost quadrupling between 1990 and 2000. Crimes against 
persons – including homicides, rapes, and assaults – increased especially significantly (Cajina, 2000: 185–
87)” (Rodgers, 2013, p. 9). 
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continuation of their previous role as a soldier” (p. 21). We can observe similar 
tendencies for Colombia, even though the case might be considered atypical100 because 
the DDR strategy had been developed in the middle of the conflict.101  
 
Betancourt (2010) has analysed the demobilisation of the AUC in Medellin (Colombia). 
She concluded that there was a positive impact because of the demobilisation process in 
the short term, as the homicide rates decreased dramatically. However, in the long run, 
the homicide rates increased. This was also shown by Howe (2012), who concluded that 
“[…] the more combatants who demobilised to an area, the higher the homicide rate in 
the post-demobilisation period, holding other causes of homicide constant” (p. 5). The 
explanations of this tendency are a “weak reintegration programme”, the inefficacy of the 
state to fulfil the arrangements and the continuity of the conflict. For example, there are 
some complaints from former AUC combatants who, after ten years of their 
demobilisation, have received prison sentences and economic sanctions, which will 
ultimately cost them their jobs and their new life  (El Tiempo, 2015). 
 
The last three examples are not unique and demonstrate that post-conflict countries face 
two potential risks: the regression to violence and the appearance of new types of 
violence (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2006). The DDR is one of the mechanisms to 
                                                 
100 Afghanistan has a similar DDR strategy to Colombia. 
101 See Betancourt (2010); Gutiérrez & González (2012); Howe (2012); Howe, Sánchez, & Contreras 
(2010); Muggah & Restrepo (2008); Nussio (2012); Nussio, Massé, Negrete, & Ugarriza (2011) and Palou 
(2009). 
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contribute to the security and the stability of the country in these situations. For instance, 
Dzinesa (2007) developed a comparative examination of DDR programmes in Southern 
Africa. He concluded that  
DDR processes stood a better chance where the principle of a comprehensive, 
coordinated, and sustainable approach was encompassed. In the absence of this, 
DDR floundered resulting in reigniting of fighting as Angola demonstrated. Also, 
in the absence of re-emergence of outright war ineffectively reintegrated ex-
combatants only went so far; there came a time when disillusioned and enflamed 
ex-combatants shifted from an acquiescent mood to a confrontational one against 
the state. The stability threat they paused aggravated when weapons were easily 
accessible-even though the more empirical evidence is required in this realm. (p. 
87)  
 
The relation between the DDR process and post-conflict violence must be studied to 
understand the real dynamics and factors that foster the transition from conflict violence 
to higher rates of violence, especially criminal violence, in post-conflict countries. 
Different macro-studies are analysing the many reasons for this type of behaviour and 
whether DDR is useful or not. For instance, Özerdem (2012) points out that the 
insecurity can increase102 if the former combatants do not have legal work opportunities 
                                                 
102 Insecurity may increase “if the demobilised combatants are not placed in employment as lack of skills, 
except in the use of weapons, is considered a potential risk for leading them to criminal activities, or they 
might be tempted to return to arms if their grievances and frustration continues to be neglected in peace-
building processes” (Özerdem, 2012, p.58). 
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or if the illegal market is more attractive. Different research has demonstrated that 
economic reintegration, as an employee or entrepreneur, is a good way to prevent 
recidivism or criminal activities. However, the problem is that in many countries the 
economy has been destroyed, resulting in high unemployment rates, high inflation and 
high poverty rates. Some of the challenges for the reintegration programme are to create 
legal and economic opportunities and develop job skills for demobilised combatants 
(Colletta, 1997). Dercon et al. (1998, 2003) analysed the demobilisation and reintegration 
processes in Ethiopia. This research concluded that the lack of a private sector economy 
and the traumas of civil war were the core difficulties in reintegrating the ex-combatants, 
primarily because “young people, with little hope of future work, may well engage in the 
opportunistic behaviour, and perhaps remain as an army in waiting” (2003, p.93). The 
former combatants were also sharing the low standards of living of the civil population. 
The authors also suggest that “facilitating the return to rural areas is crucial to avoiding 
pressure on the urban labour market and related problems such as housing shortage and 
crime” (Ayalew, Dercon, & Krishnan, 2003, p. 103; Dercon & Ayalew, 1998).  Aguirre 
(2012) examined the factors linking conflict and post-conflict violence, using the case 
study of Guatemala. She suggested that urban violence and organised crime are the most 
important types of post-conflict violence in Guatemala. Focusing on DDR, she concluded 
that  
The direct legacies of the war on contemporary violence in Guatemala cannot be 
dismissed, including the incomplete implementation of a DDR programme, 
involvement of former combatants in contemporary criminal activities, latent 
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availability of firearms, effects of displacement, increasing fear and paranoia, and 
a routinization of violence, among others.  (Aguirre, 2012, p. 98) 
 
Nevertheless, few studies are presenting the relation between demobilised personnel and 
the generation of violence in a post-conflict situation systematically. For example, 
Collier investigated the effect of demobilisation on crime in Uganda. He concludes that 
“in the short term demobilisation significantly increased crime if soldiers lacked access 
to land, but significantly reduced it if they had access” (Collier, 1994, p. 8). The reason 
could be as simple as fostering pride of ownership by giving an ex-combatant land. This 
pride of possession extends not only to the land but to the community.  Nussio and Howe 
(2014) argue that the breakdown of the illegal protection system established by 
paramilitary groups increases the post-conflict103 violence for three reasons: it reduced 
the cost of crime, opportunities for revenge and new competition. Their study on 
Córdoba (a Colombian department) supports these arguments (Nussio & Howe, 2014). 
 
In sum, the causal mechanism for post-conflict violence can be understood in two related 
ways, at an individual level or as a failure of the process. The former is related to ex-
combatants who could present problems such as drug addiction, post-war trauma or 
mental illness. Also, the former combatants are attracted to the illegal market due to their 
homicidal and war skills. If they do not receive the adequate attention, medical treatment 
                                                 
103 The authors use the term “post-demobilisation”. 
214 
 
 
and income opportunities the potential to return to criminality is high. The latter issue 
relates to a bad disarmament programme which increases gun supply in the civil 
population or enables the maintenance of hidden weapon reserves in the case of 
unfulfilment. The lack of justice and proper forgiveness mechanisms could generate 
retaliation events between victims and victimizers. If the national economy and 
infrastructure suffer a general devastation, the possibility to develop and implement the 
proper reintegration process is limited and weak. Bauer et al. (2014) highlight 
The importance of reintegrating former soldiers back into communities. The 
common view is that reintegration is complicated by the negative effect of trauma 
and the normative environment of rebel groups on cooperative tendencies of ex-
soldiers and by anger and lack of acceptance by receiving communities. (p. 9)  
However, when the government develops a community reintegration process the 
combatants are going to build infrastructure. This is one of the ways to gain acceptance 
from the community, and it is also a means to develop transferable skills for ex-
combatants. The likelihood of returning to criminality is lessened by fostering 
community acceptance (Kaplan & Nussio, 2015). Figure 14 summaries the causal 
mechanisms described above. 
 
In line with the theoretical expectations and existing studies, we hypothesise that the rate 
of post-conflict violent crime rate will increase, marginally, in municipalities with a large 
number of former combatants who are part of reintegration programmes. 
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Figure 14: Mechanisms to explain the relationship between DDR and post-conflict 
violence. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Literature review – Authors. 
 
Colombia’s DDR programme 
 
Since 2002 Colombia’s DDR programme has been developed104 in two ways; first, it 
functioned as a war strategy for combating illegal armed groups, inducing the 
renunciation and surrender of these members and offering social and economic 
reintegration for those who voluntarily participated in the programme. Secondly, the 
DDR was part of the peace agreement signed by the administration of President Álvaro 
Uribe and the paramilitary groups (AUC) from 2003 to 2006. Currently, the individual 
and collective programmes are run by the Ministry of Defence, Office of the High 
                                                 
104 The Colombian government has developed a legal framework since 1997 with Law 418 which gives to 
the state special faculties for developing peace negotiation with rebel groups. This law has been modified 
three times (Law 548, 1999; Law 782, 2002 and Law 1106, 2006). Thanks to that normativity, the 
Colombian state has put into practice two types of DDR: a DDR based on peace agreements and individual 
DDR. Under this normativity, in 1990 the first collective DDR of 5,700 ex-combatants took place 
(CONPES, 2008; Verdad Abierta, 2008). 
PROCESS AND CONTEXT 
• Stock of guns 
• Weak reintegration process 
(unfulfilled agreement) 
• Characteristics of the rebel group 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
• Drug addiction 
• Mental illness 
• War and homicidal skills 
 
• Revenge 
• Culture of violence 
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Commissioner for Peace (OACP)105 and Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR), in 
collaboration with many governmental institutions.  
 
As part of the accords signed during the peace process with the Paramilitary (United 
Self-Defence Forces of Colombia – Autodefensas Unidad de Colombia, AUC), according 
to the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR),106 31,698 combatants have 
participated in the DDR programme. There were two more collective demobilisations 
with the Guevarista Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista, ERG) and 
the Cacica Gaitana (FARC) with, respectively, 38 and 190 demobilised combatants. The 
individually disbanded soldiers are ex-members of FARC, ELN and small guerrilla 
groups and, according to the ACR, 24,757 have taken part in the individual 
demobilisation programme.  
 
The Colombian government has been able to develop a legal framework for DDR due to 
the normativity which gave the State special faculties. The public policy of DDR started 
with “Conpes 3554 de 2008”, which established the National Program for Social and 
Economic Reintegration for Persons and Illegal Armed Groups (PRSE). Other 
documents have modified this policy, such as the Conpes 3607 de 2009 and Conpes 3673 
de 2010. These modifications gave the programme a long-term vision and developed a 
path to reintegration (Ruta de Reintegration) which is an integral programme with eight 
                                                 
105 The full title of the OACP is the Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. 
106 The information relates to the period up to March 2014. 
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dimensions:107 personal, educational, productive, family, habitable, health, citizen and 
security. This process can last around seven years. 
 
The Agency for Reintegration (ACR) provided access to its information system for the 
purposes of this research. The system holds data about the ex-armed group, 
demobilisation, age, gender, education level, family, recruitment place, crimes after 
demobilisation and status in the programme. We are not working on an individual level. 
However, we consider it important to provide some statistical summaries about the 
programme. 
 
ACR’s information system reports a total of 56,358 former combatants, of which 83.73% 
have participated in the programme, and 16.27% have not been involved. Broken down 
by rebel group, the majority of the population comes from “paramilitary groups” 
(62.66%), followed by FARC (30.40%), ELN (6.08%) and other rebels (0.85%).108 Other 
interesting information provided by ACR is on recidivism. The data suggests that 19.45% 
of the ex-rebels involved in the reintegration programme have “possibly” committed a 
crime and 8.71% have committed a crime. The data also shows that ex-AUC fighters are 
more recidivist than guerrillas. See Table 38. 
                                                 
107 “The agreement of a work plan with the person undergoing a Reintegration Process requests comprise 
both the integrality of the person as well as the different barriers for the autonomous exercise of his/her 
citizenship. For this purpose, certain heuristic categories that reflect the different variables that have an 
impact on the development and/or enhancement of the capabilities of the individual and family are 
required. This means that a set of certain dimensions for operating the Reintegration Route is required that, 
in the end, is the entrance door for understanding the individual” (‘The Reintegration Route’, n.d.). 
108 These percentages are based on 47,189 ex-combatants involved in the reintegration programme. 
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We also use the information from the Colombian national police system and Colombian 
Agency for Reintegration (ACR) to disentangle violence committed by former 
combatants. There are 16,999 reports of crime, including ex-combatants who have 
committed more than one crime. Based on the Colombian penal code, there are 181 types 
of offence committed by former combatants. Crimes are grouped into two categories:  
public crimes (crimes against the state), of which there are 9,254 reports (54.43%), and 
private crimes (crimes against persons), of which there are 7,743 reports (45.55%). The 
main crimes against the state are: “Production, trading, purchasing, accepting or carrying 
addictive or recreation drugs for use” (34.91%), “weapons trafficking” (32.06%) and 
“conspiracy”109 (18.76%). The main crimes against persons are: homicide (27.61%), 
theft/larceny (24.63%), Mayhem/battery (11.11%), extortion (8.19%), domestic violence 
(6.15%), kidnapping (3.76%), sexual assault/rape (3.52%) and forced disappearance 
(0.67%). 
 
Table 38: Recidivism by rebel group  
 Possibly Proven 
AUC  23.81%  10.91% 
FARC 12.16%   4.87% 
ELN 11.24%    5.67% 
OTHERS 15.32%   4.34% 
 
Source: Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR) 
 
                                                 
109 The term is “concierto para delinquir”. 
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Research design 
 
To address our hypotheses, we employ short panel data with numerous individuals 
(municipalities) (N=1122) and a few time periods (T=12). These models allow us to 
control for immeasurable variables or variables that change over time but not across 
municipalities. Some drawbacks include data collection issues such as sampling design, 
coverage and missing values (Baltagi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2010). Therefore, the panel 
data models allow us to assess the effect of our variables of interest on crime considering 
the regional and time differences.  Furthermore, we rely on fixed effect, linear regression 
with panel-corrected standard errors and a random-effects linear model with an AR (1) 
disturbance,110 which distinguish not only the effect over time (within) but also the effect 
by municipalities (between); we used the within–between formulation because it is an 
effective solution to the correlation between control variables and residual. Additionally, 
as Bell at al. (2015) highlight, this separation has three advantages.  First, temporal data 
are more comprehensible; second the estimations are more precise and stable, and third, 
“if the multicollinearity exists between j and other time-invariant variables, j can be 
removed without the risk of heterogeneity bias”  (A. Bell & Jones, 2015, p. 142). Since 
crime rates can affect the presence of ex-combatants (because they may be attracted to or 
attempt to avoid lawless places), we also estimate an instrumental variable model to 
account for possible endogeneity. 
                                                 
110 We pursue Bell and Jones’ solution. The solution estimates for each municipality the within and 
between effects. The former is the difference between each observation and the panel mean. The latter is 
the panel mean (A. Bell & Jones, 2015). 
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The unit of analysis for all models is the Colombian municipality–year. Our study spans 
the period from 2003 to 2014 and includes 1,122 municipalities. The panel is unbalanced 
because of the creation of new municipalities over time. We applied the Amelia II 
programme to deal with missing data (see Appendix A). 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Our hypothesis concerns the determinants of post-conflict crimes against persons. Our 
main source of information is the Crime Observatory and we use its statistical data 
system (SIEDCO).111 We are going to base our analysis on homicide and robbery, for 
two reasons; first, both are good proxies to criminal violence and second, because of the 
quality of information available. The models are based on a rate per 1000 people. See 
Appendix A, Table 44, for the descriptive statistics. 
 
Key independent variable 
 
We are primarily interested in the impact of the presence of former combatants who are 
part of a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme on local crime rates. 
The number of ex-combatants is the count of individuals who have decided to leave a 
                                                 
111 Observatorio del delito - Sistema de Información Estadística, Delincuencial, Contravencional y 
Operativo (SIEDCO). Policía Nacional de Colombia. 
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rebel group. There are two kinds of disarmament and demobilisation (DD) process: 
“individual”, meaning that a former combatant left the organisation willingly and 
“collective”, which means that the ex-rebel’s reintegration is part of the peace agreement 
between the government and their rebel group. After a DD process, each former 
combatant begins his or her reintegration process. Some ex-rebels start their programme 
immediately, some commence their programme after several years and others could not 
or did not want to be involved in the reintegration path. In sum, it is a discrete variable, 
which is counting the number of former rebels who are engaged in the Colombian 
reintegration programme. We also identify their location and the year that he/she is 
demobilised or participating in the programme. At the same time, we correct the 
information for participants that have deceased or returned to crime. Our main source of 
information was the statistical information system of the Colombian Agency for 
Reintegration (ACR). See Appendix A - Table 48, for descriptive statistics, and 
Appendix B for statistical tests. Note that the key variables have a VIF112 under 5, 
indicating that the variables do not suffer from multicollinearity problems.  
 
Control variables  
 
We include some control variables to account for other factors thought to determine 
crime: population and youth population, municipality capacity, the presence of illicit 
                                                 
112 VIF: the variance inflation factor measures the speed with which variances and co-variances increase 
because of the presence of multicollinearity (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, p. 352). 
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crops, the legacy of the conflict, socio-economic factors, and ex-combatants who are not 
part of the reintegration programme. Appendix A - Table 49 and Appendix B summarise 
the descriptive statistics and statistical test (VIF) for each of the control variables. It 
should be noted that none of the controls have a VIF above 5.   
 
The selection of these variables is based on previous work on the determinants of 
violence and post-conflict violence. We principally consider variables that may influence 
the behaviour of violence. We grouped the control into groups, the legacy of conflict, 
characteristic of the municipality and structural problems of municipalities. The legacy of 
conflict indicates the presence of armed conflict in the past and present. Characteristic 
and structural problems of municipalities show different information relating to social 
conditions, poverty, regional distributions and economic conditions, such as population, 
the culture of violence and the illegal economy. We also control by the number of ex-
combatants who are not part of reintegration. 
 
Empirical Results 
 
We consider the impact of the presence of ex-combatants on homicides first and then 
review separately the effect on robberies. Figure 15 provides a visual impression of the 
relationship between homicide, robbery/larceny and the former combatants. Each point 
on Figure 15 represents a municipality-year pair. The solid line is fitted by an OLS of the 
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rate of homicide/robbery on a quadratic for total ex-combatants, and the dashed line is 
fitted by nonparametric regression (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). The rate of homicide 
does not show a particular behaviour. On the other hand, the rate of robbery increases 
after 60 former combatants. In Appendix B, Figure 23 presents the relationship between 
these variables based on different variations. The graphs do not suggest any non-linear 
relationship between these variables. 
 
Figure 15: Relationship between core variables and former combatants 
Homicide Robbery 
  
 
Table 39, Table 40, Figure 16 and Figure 18 summarise our findings from the random-
effects linear model with an AR (1)113 (models 1 and 3) and linear regression with panel-
corrected standard errors (models 2 and 4).  Our results are robust across several 
                                                 
113 The fixed effect models are presented in Appendix C - Table 61 and Table 63. Based on these models, 
we perform different statistical tests. The different tests confirm the need to control for cross-sectional 
dependence, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. See Appendix B. In Appendix C we present the control 
variables of the main models. First difference models are presented in Table 62 and Table 64. These 
models show different results than the core models. However, the results are still marginally significant. 
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specifications. These models consider the core explanatory variable, the covariates and 
temporal correction.  Our core variable is calculated in two different ways, counting the 
accumulative number of ex-combatants by total and by rebel group. The first group of 
models is focused on homicide. The second group is based on robbery/larceny. We 
present the short and marginal effect of our core variables by models in Figure 16, Figure 
17, Figure 18 and Figure 19. The marginal effects show the change in the rate of 
homicide/robbery when moving the key explanatory variable from the minimum to the 
maximum while holding all other variables at their mean. It is important to highlight that 
results present on models AR (1) are based on the over-time effect variable. 
 
Models based on homicide rate 
 
In the homicide model (Table 39), the presence of ex-combatants involved in the 
reintegration programme is at a 5% significance level. The result for former combatants 
involved in reintegration suggests that the within (over-time) effect of ex-combatants is 
positive but not significant, while the between (across municipality) effect is negative 
and significant. These findings suggest that the number of former combatants is 
important to explain the difference in the municipality homicide rate (see Figure 16). 
Figure 17 – panel A presents the marginal effects of the models, which show that the 
instantaneous rate of change of homicide (rate by 1000) would decrease if the number of 
ex-combatants in the plan increased by five people over time. However, this effect does 
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not have a statistical effect after 25 former combatants are included in the programme.  
We also split the core variable by rebel group. Former guerrilla members who are in 
reintegration have a negative effect (over time and across municipalities). The result for 
former AUC members suggests that the between effect is negative and significant, but 
the within effect is positive and not significant. A possible explanation is that people 
involved in the programme are linked to legal activities, or they do not want to return to 
the criminal world.  Figure 17 – panel B presents the marginal effects of the models by 
rebel group.  In the case of the presence of former AUC members, it shows a slight 
decrease over time in the dependent variable when the number of ex-AUC in 
reintegration increases by five. In the case of guerrilla groups, the marginal effects are 
contradictory between models.  The marginal effect in the AR(1) model are not 
significant and the marginal effect in PSCE presents a moderately significant decrease 
when the number of ex-Guerrillas in the plan increases by five.  The other control 
variables have the expected sign. 
 
Models based on robbery rate 
 
The robbery model 1 suggests that the within (over-time) and between (across 
municipality) effect of former combatants is positive and statistically significant (Table 
40). This result suggests that the number of ex-combatants is important in explaining the 
difference in the municipality robbery rate. This result is supported by the findings in 
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model 2 (see Figure 18). Figure 19 – panel A presents the marginal effects of the models, 
which show that the rate of change of robbery would increase if the number of ex-
combatants in the plan increased by five over-time. In the PCSE model this effect is 
significant, but in the AR(1) model it is only slightly significant after 30 former 
combatants are in the programme. We also estimate the model with the core variable by 
rebel group. Model 3 shows that the key variables are statistically significant. If the 
number of former AUC and ex-guerrilla members in the programme increase over time, 
municipalities become more prone to presenting a rising robbery rate per 1000 people. 
Model 4 supports these findings but show us that the variable ex-guerrilla is statistically 
significant, while ex-AUC is not significant. A possible explanation for this result is that 
ex-combatants can commit robbery as a means of economic survival. It is important to 
highlight that ex-combatants lose the benefits of the programme only if the crime is 
proven. The Colombian justice system leniently punishes this type of offence and they 
are very difficult to prove, which could be an incentive for becoming involved in this 
illegal activity without any risk. The marginal effects (Figure 17) of both models show 
that the rate of change of homicide (rate by 1000) would increase slowly if the number of 
ex-combatants increased by five. However, these results are moderately significant. 
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Table 39: Homicide and former rebels (2003 – 2014) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
VARIABLES Total 
Combatant 
Total 
Combatant 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Ex-combatants involved   -0.0099***   
  (0.002)   
Ex-combatants involved 
(within) 
0.0017    
 (0.004)    
Ex-combatants involved 
(between) 
-0.1161***    
 (0.026)    
Ex-AUC involved     -0.0102** 
    (0.005) 
Ex-AUC involved (within)   0.0089  
   (0.007)  
Ex-AUC involved (between)   -0.1270***  
   (0.031)  
Ex-guerrilla involved     -0.0091** 
    (0.004) 
Ex-guerrilla involved (within)   -0.0068  
   (0.009)  
Ex-guerrilla involved 
(between) 
  -0.2174***  
   (0.073)  
Constant 0.3894*** 0.5968*** 0.3903*** 0.5972*** 
 (0.085) (0.048) (0.085) (0.048) 
Observations 10,911 11,996 10,911 11,996 
Number of ID_Muni 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 
Method Xtregar xtpcse xtregar xtpcse 
N 10911 11996 10911 11996 
Sigma_u 0.200  0.200  
Sigma_e 0.273  0.273  
R-squared (Overall) 0.189 0.234 0.191 0.234 
R-squared_W 0.0433  0.0434  
R-squared_B 0.331  0.333  
Chi-squared 931.8 4265 937.9 4625 
Autocorrelation 0.0783  0.0781  
Cluster  municipality  municipality 
Variance  AR1  AR1 
          Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 16: Short effects – Homicide 
A: Total former combatant B: Former combatant by rebel group 
  
 
 
Figure 17: Marginal effects – Homicide 
PANEL A 
Model AR (1) total ex-combatants Model PCSE total ex-combatants 
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Figure 17: Marginal effects – Homicide (continuation) 
PANEL B 
Marginal effect – model AR (1) by rebel group 
  
Marginal effect – model PCSE by rebel group 
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Table 40: Robbery and former rebels (2003 – 2014) 
 Model (1)  Model (2) Model (3)  Model (4) 
VARIABLES Total 
Combatant 
Total 
Combatant 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Ex-combatants involved  0.0660***   
  (0.016)   
Ex-combatants involved in 
reintegration (within) 
0.0717***    
 (0.012)    
Ex-combatants involved in 
reintegration (between) 
0.4389***    
 (0.081)    
Ex-AUC involved    0.0313 
    (0.025) 
Ex-AUC involved (within)   0.0570***  
   (0.022)  
Ex-AUC involved (between)   0.1764*  
   (0.094)  
Ex-guerrilla involved     0.2365*** 
    (0.057) 
Ex-guerrilla involved in 
reintegration (within) 
  0.1458***  
   (0.028)  
Ex-guerrilla involved in 
reintegration (between) 
  2.6284***  
   (0.218)  
Constant 2.7318*** 2.6253*** 2.6852*** 2.6118*** 
 (0.266) (0.253) (0.253) (0.254) 
Observations 12,059 13,149 12,059 13,149 
Number of ID_Muni 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 
Method Xtregar xtpcse xtregar xtpcse 
N 12059 13149 12059 13149 
Sigma_u 0.619  0.579  
Sigma_e 0.733  0.733  
R-squared (Overall) 0.297 0.195 0.330 0.193 
R-squared_W 0.0398  0.0422  
R-squared_B 0.461  0.515  
Chi-squared 1233 1163 1480 993.4 
Autocorrelation 0.342  0.341  
Cluster  municipality  municipality 
Variance  AR1  AR1 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 18: Short effects – Robbery 
A: Total former combatant B: Former combatant by rebel group 
  
 
Figure 19: Marginal effects – Robbery 
PANEL A 
Model AR (1) total ex-combatants Model PCSE total ex-combatants 
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Figure 19: Marginal effects – Robbery (continuation) 
PANEL B 
Marginal effect – model AR (1) by rebel group 
  
Marginal effect – model PCSE by rebel group 
  
 
Instrumental Variable Analysis 
 
The basic relationship that we are studying can be written as:  
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Homicide/Robbery rateit = α + β1Former combatantsit-1 + βiXit-1 +εi , 
 
Where α is a fixed-effect reflecting the unobservable difference between municipalities, 
Xit is the control variable, and εi is an error term. This equation was estimated based on 
the previous section data using different methods. However, the relationship between the 
presence of ex-combatants and crime may, however, suffer from endogeneity. Reverse 
causality may be taking place: criminal rates may be affecting the decision of where ex-
combatants prefer to live. Using the previous statistical methods to estimate the 
relationship would, therefore, lead to biased results. To address this issue, we use fixed 
effect panel data with instrumental variables.  
 
The challenge here is to find suitable instrument variables. We propose data114 of birth 
and recruitment for the presence of ex-combatants as instruments, since it is unlikely that 
current crime rates will affect the probability of ex-combatants being born or recruited in 
a community. The geography of return and recruitment of former combatants and how 
they make their relocation decision have not been studied due to the lack of microdata. 
However, some studies have highlighted the importance of identifying these geographic 
patterns with the objective to improve the reintegration process and to prevent future 
violence. For example, Podder (2012) argues that the relationship between geographical 
                                                 
114 We collect the information where the rebels were born and recruited, then we collapse the information 
to generate variables that count the number of ex-combatants by municipality and year of reintegration (or 
year of beginning the programme). 
234 
 
 
recruitment and reintegration areas suggests a fundamental element for explaining the 
post-conflict tensions between communities and former combatants. Another example is 
the research of Daly (2016), which is focused on the remilitarization of rebel groups in 
Colombia. Her work is rich in sources of information. She concludes that “there exists a 
great deal of path dependence, with relocation determined by recruitment rather than by 
individual agency or post-war considerations. In particular, individuals should tend to 
return to where they were recruited, underscoring the importance of the geography of 
recruitment”  (Daly, 2016, p. 86). 
 
With the previous findings in mind, and for solving the endogeneity problem, we gather 
information about the areas where former combatants were born, where they were 
recruited and where they are living. We create different variables to identify if the former 
combatants are residing in the same place that they were born or were recruited. From 
this information, we identify the rebel group (guerrilla and paramilitary) recruitment 
pattern from 888 of 1,122 Colombian municipalities. In the paramilitary case, eight 
percent (8%) of the 32,508 individual combatants registered as a paramilitary member 
report the same birth, recruitment and living place; 31 percent report the same location of 
residence and birth, and 15 percent are living in the area of recruitment. In the guerrilla 
scenario, two percent of the 17,174 individual combatants registered as a guerrilla report 
the same birth, recruitment and living place; 11 percent report the same location of 
residence and birth, and four percent are living in the recruitment area. In sum, this 
information shows that 51.46% of the 49,682 ex-combatants do not return either to their 
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birth or recruitment place. However, the ex-paramilitaries present a high rate of returning 
to those locations. Meanwhile, the ex-guerrillas prefer new areas. Map 1 and Map 2 chart 
this information. For more details about this information see Appendix A. 
 
Table 41 and Table 42 present the instrumental variable results, but only include the 
birthplace instrument. We also estimate models with recruitment place and both (birth 
and recruit); these results are shown in Appendix C. The first section (instrument) of both 
Table 41 and Table 42 present the first-stage result for the instrumented variable. These 
models are fixed effect estimates without any type of correction, such as robust option.  
The second section (IV estimation) of both tables present the second-stage IV results, and 
the models are robust fixed effect. 
 
Table 41 presents the instrumental model with homicide rate as a dependent variable. In 
the first section, model (1),  the instrumental variable is significant, and the p-values for 
the F-statistic of the excluded instrument are less than 1%, and the F-statistics are over 
28. These results suggest instrument relevance.115 In model (2) the instrumented variable 
is former AUC, and we use as an instrument the birthplace of ex-AUC. The instrumental 
variable is significant and relevant. In model (3)  the instrumented variable is ex-
guerrilla, and the instrument is the birthplace of ex-guerrilla.  The instrument is 
                                                 
115 “Stock and Watson (2003) suggest a simple rule of thumb to check for weak instruments […] This first-
stage F-statistic should be larger than 10. Stock and Watson (2003) suggest that a first-stage F-statistic less 
than 10 indicates weak instruments which casts doubt on the validity of 2SLS, since with weak instrument, 
2SLS will be biased even in a large samples and the corresponding t-statistics and confidence intervals will 
be unreliable” (Baltagi, 2005, p. 263). 
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statistically significant, and the F-statistic suggests instrument relevance.  The second 
section of Table 41 column 1 shows results for the total former combatants; the key 
finding is that this variable has no statistical effect on the rate of homicide by 
municipality. Column 2 results suggest that former AUC does have a positive statistical 
effect, while former guerrilla has a negative statistical effect; both are significant at 5%. 
Column 3 results propose a different scenerio from column 2, however, as these results 
are not statistically significant. Possible explanations for these results could be, firstly, 
that the instrument variables are different in both models, and these instruments show 
different behaviour depending on the type of group. Second, the number of former 
combatants does not have a statistical effect on the homicide rate because they do not 
commit this kind of crime, since they could lose benefits if the offender is proven guilty. 
 
Table 42 presents the instrumental model with robbery rate as a dependent variable. The 
logic in these models is the same as Table 41.  We use as an instrument the birthplace of 
former combatants. In model (1), model (2) and model (3), the instrument is statistically 
significant, and the F-statistic suggests instrument relevance.  
 
The second section of Table 42, column 1, shows results for total former combatants; the 
key finding is that this variable has a positive but no statistical effect on the rate of 
robbery by municipality.  Column 2 results suggest that former guerrillas have a positive 
statistical effect, meanwhile former AUC has a positive but no statistical effect.   Column 
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3 results propose a different story from previous results; here, former AUC is positive 
and significant at 10% on the rate of robbery. However, ex-guerrillas have a negative but 
no statistical effect.  This result confirms the conclusion presented in the previous 
section: ex-combatants can commit robbery as a means of economic survival because this 
type of crime does not present any risk. 
 
Figure 20: Short effects – Instrumental variable model 
 
Figure 21:  Short effects – Instrumental variable model – robbery 
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Table 41: Instrumental Variable: homicide and former rebels (2003 – 2014) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
VARIABLES Total Combatant Combatant by 
rebel group 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Instrument    
Birthplace -0.0044* -0.0077* -0.0125* 
 (0.00047) (0.00025) (0.0015) 
N 10909 10909 10909 
Centered R-Square 0.0789 0.4026 0.3804 
F-statistic excluded instrument 89.23 914.88 67.90 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anderson LR-statistic (relevant test) 88.60 838.596 67.588 
P-Value for Anderson LR-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 89.22 914.876 67.905 
Stock-Yogo (critical values) 10% 16.38 16.38 16.38 
IV estimation    
Ex-combatants involved in reintegration 0.0852   
 (0.105)   
Ex-AUC involved in reintegration  0.0502** -0.0163 
  (0.022) (0.046) 
Ex-guerrilla involved in reintegration  -0.0214** 0.0987 
  (0.011) (0.135) 
Observations 10,909 10,909 10,909 
Centered R-squared 0.0130 0.0552 0.043 
Number of ID_Muni 1,093 1,093 1,093 
N 10909 10909 10909 
F-statistic 28.34 17.83 26.71 
Sigma 0.278 0.272 0.274 
Instrumented  AUC Guerrilla 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 42: Instrumental Variable: robbery and former rebels (2003 – 2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total Combatant Combatant by 
rebel group 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Instrument    
Birthplace -0.0029* -0.0077* -0.0145* 
 (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0015) 
N 12.057 12.057 12057 
Centered R-Square 0.0778 0.3742 0.4245 
F-statistic excluded instrument 39.58 954.73 97.87 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anderson LR-statistic (relevant test) 39.513 879.8 97.2 
P-Value for Anderson LR-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 39.58 954.72 97.873 
Stock-Yogo (critical values) 10% 16.38 16.38 16.38 
IV estimation    
Ex-combatants involved in reintegration  0.1191   
 (0.307)   
Ex-AUC involved in reintegration   0.0180 0.2392* 
  (0.074) (0.135) 
Ex-guerrilla involved in reintegration   0.1529*** -0.4266 
  (0.051) (0.360) 
Observations 12,057 12,057 12,057 
Centered R-squared 0.061 0.066 0.015 
Number of ID_Muni 1,098 1,098 1,098 
N 12057 12057 12057 
F-stat 31.98 29.62 27.40 
Sigma 0.782 0.780 0.801 
Instrumented  AUC Guerrilla 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Map 1: Same residence, birthplace and recruitment 
 
Map 2: Same residence and recruitment 
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Conclusions 
 
The existing literature on post-conflict violence identifies different reasons and types of 
violence appearing in post-conflict societies and explores the relationship between DDR 
processes and the new violence. Despite the valuable insights provided by this literature, 
there has been no systematic research directed towards studying the effect of former 
combatants who are involved in reintegration programmes in the post-conflict violence. 
An explanation for this absence could be the difficulty and the cost of gathering data.   
 
We have contributed in this area by examining the dynamics of violent crime in 
Colombia and characterising the regional dynamics of the conflict and the post-conflict 
violence, focusing on the presence of ex-combatants who participate in the DDR 
programme; in other words, we have analysed if communities with more ex-combatants 
have experienced more crime, and if DDR programmes  matter in this situation. The 
empirical findings are based on two types of crime—homicide and robbery—and 
consider data since 2003. The findings confirm our expectation: the presence of former 
combatants who are part of the reintegration programme influence the trend of the rate of 
homicide and robbery, and there is a regional differentiation in this tendency. 
 
We only examined the presence of former combatants in each municipality in the 
Colombian case. The Colombian case has been previously studied because it has a good 
242 
 
 
information system, but this research marks a difference because we gather information 
on where the former combatants were born and were recruited to control for endogeneity. 
However, we did not obtain authorisation for conducting the study at the individual level. 
An extension of the data could entail, for example, gathering information about another 
type of low-intensity violence, including the individual level information and building 
other indicators about recruitment, birthplace and recidivism; these research avenues may 
merit further exploration.  
 
The literature on post-conflict violence still has a lot to uncover and several options have 
been identified for further research. Throughout this paper, we have identified and 
referred to several causal mechanisms associating a DDR programme and ex-combatants 
with post-war violence. We focused on a regional level in our analysis and, consequently, 
we are not able to evaluate these mechanisms at the individual level. For this reason, for 
future research, it is important, initially, to develop a theory about the logic of violence in 
post-conflict societies. Second, it is necessary to understand the micromotives and 
macrobehaviours at the individual level. This would allow researchers and policymakers 
to assess the causes, reasons and preferences which determine why societies continue on 
a path of violence. 
 
Our argument on the presence of former combatants suggests that this population has no 
effect on homicide but increases the risk of robbery. For future studies, we need to 
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analyse other forms of violence, such as intra-familiar, gangs, revenge, sexual violence, 
smuggling, etc. These low-intensity forms of violence need to be studied because, first 
and foremost, we need to understand the legacy of the conflict, its ties with this type of 
violence and its motivations. Second, the government needs to create programmes and 
policies to solve the growing trend towards new forms of violence. 
 
The main contributions of our research include the disaggregation of types of crime, 
identifying the numbers of former guerrilla or paramilitaries engaged in reintegration or 
not, and the inclusion of the geography of recruitment as an instrument. Moreover, the 
analysis at the municipality level allows us to abstract from highly individual factors and 
consider municipality level effects that are more policy relevant.   With regard to the 
policy implications of our study, we believe that this research could influence the study 
of peacebuilding and post-conflict violence. For the policy community, it is important not 
only to consider the legacy of the conflict but also figure out how we can deal with the 
presence of ex-soldiers in a post-conflict society.  Our results show that the presence of 
this population is likely to impact the rates of robbery but not the rates of homicide. We 
do not know whether reintegration matters for homicide/robbery because former 
combatants are less likely to commit a violent crime, or whether the communities 
themselves become less violent. However, reintegration programmes should perhaps be 
less centralized, be focused on individual expectations, and bear in mind the geography 
of recruitment in order to develop a policy of prevention which focuses on reducing 
recidivism and new types of violence.  
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Appendix A: Dataset 
 
A design utilising a quantitative method was used to solve the research questions. We 
collected six official data sources and the municipality panel of The Centre for Economic 
Development Studies (CEDE116) and created an unbalanced panel data containing 
information for every municipality in Colombia (1,122 in total) for each year between 
2003117 and 2014. In this Appendix, we introduce the dataset and explain certain 
technical decisions. 
  
Missing data 
 
We use the Amelia II programme for solving the missing data issue.  Amelia II is an R 
package that performs multiple imputations to deal with missing data, running an 
Expectation Maximisation Bootstrap Algorithm. It was developed by Honaker, King and 
Blackwell (2011). 
 
The following variables were imputed: Total income, revenue from total taxes, revenue 
from property tax (predial), index of unsatisfied basic needs (2005), public health system, 
                                                 
116 For further information, see https://datoscede.uniandes.edu.co/contenido.php/1/about-cede-data-center/ 
117 We have some variables with information since 1993 or 2000. We used this information for estimating 
missing data. 
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coverage of public health system and infant mortality. Table 43 shows the amount of 
missing data. 
 
Table 43: Missing data 
Variable Missing Observation Min Max 
Index of unsatisfied basic needs 13,495 3,293 5,36 100 
Index of unsatisfied basic needs _imp   16,788 5,36 100 
Total income 332 16,456 0 10.187.876 
Total income _imp   16,788 0 10.187.876 
Income from taxes 330 16,458 0 6571326 
Revenue from taxes _imp   16,788 0 4101949 
Income property tax 332 16,456 0 2044135 
Income property tax _imp   16,788 0 2044135 
Infant mortality 6,701 10,087 7 91,97 
Infant mortality _imp   16,788 0 91,97 
Public_health 289 16,499 0 1681822 
Public_health_imp   16,788 -19098 1681822 
Coverage_public health 289 16,499 0 3 
Coverage_public health   16,788 0 3 
 
 
The following graphs (Figure 22) display the histograms for original and new variables.  
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Figure 22: Missing data - Histograms 
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Updated information 
 
The municipality panel of CEDE118 presents information about general characteristics of 
each town in Colombia from 1993 to 2012. We updated some variables with information 
from the original or primary sources, such as DNP, DANE or the Ministries.  
 
Dependent variables 
 
The statistical exercises have two dependent variables. We used two different types of 
offences. We analyse private crime with information about robbery and homicide. This 
information was gathered from 2003 to 2014.  See Table 44. 
 
Table 44: Descriptive Statistics – dependent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean Sd min max 
      
Homicide – PN 12,004 15.19 82.77 0 2,138 
Homicide – CEDE 13,375 15.49 83.57 0 2,678 
Rate of homicide per 1th inhabitants 12,004 0.337 0.418 0 7.186 
Total of theft 13,157 96.18 995.7 0 41,565 
Theft or larceny 13,025 55.13 586.9 0 28,118 
Rate of robbery per 1th inhabitants 13,157 0.805 1.221 0 20.81 
      
 
                                                 
118 We had access to the dataset in April 2015. 
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Independent variables 
 
Following the literature review, we clustered the variables into three groups: DDR, the 
legacy of conflict and municipality characteristics. The DDR block represents the 
information related to the demobilisation and reintegration programme. The legacy of 
conflict indicates the presence of armed conflict in the past and present. Characteristic of 
municipality shows different information about social conditions, poverty, regional 
distributions and economic conditions, such as poverty, the culture of violence and the 
illegal economy.   
 
 
Key independent variable:  Number of ex-combatants 
 
Our core variable is the number of former fighters. We distinguish between the rebel 
groups, ex-combatants involved in the ACR reintegration programme, recidivist and dead 
ex-combatants. Table 45, Table 46 and Table 47, show the total number of ex-
combatants. Table 48 displays the descriptive statistics. 
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Table 45: Total former combatants demobilised (2002 – 2014) 
 Frequency Percentage 
Paramilitary 35317 62.67 
Guerrilla 21041 37.33 
Total 56358 100.00 
   
Paramilitary 32508 65.43 
Guerrilla 17174 34.57 
Total 49683 100.00 
Source: Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR); Colombian National Police. Note 1 
Population 56,358 former combatants; sample 49,683 former combatants. 6,675 former 
combatants do not register municipality.  They have been dropped from the dataset. 
 
Table 46: Total former combatants involved in reintegration programme (2002 – 2014) 
 Frequency Percentage 
Paramilitary 29110 63.48 
Guerrilla 16750 36.52 
Total1 45860 100.00 
Source: Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR); Colombian National Police. 
Note 1 3823 former combatants do not involve in the reintegration programme 
 
Table 47: Former fighters participating in a reintegration programme but recidivist (2002 
– 2014) 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Paramilitary 9969 78.16 
Guerrilla 2786 21.84 
Total 12755 100.00 
Source: Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR); Colombian National Police 
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Table 48: Descriptive Statistics – Key Independent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean Sd min max 
      
Ex-combatants involved in reintegration 13,445 0.253 1.643 0 46.39 
Ex-AUC involved in reintegration 13,445 0.178 1.124 0 33.77 
Ex-guerrilla involved in reintegration 13,445 0.0745 0.738 0 30.57 
      
 
Table 49: Descriptive Statistics – Control Variables and instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean Sd Min max 
      
Ex-combatants uninvolved in reintegration 13,445 0.574 5.026 0 178 
Ex-Guerrilla uninvolved in reintegration 13,445 0.649 10.07 0 419 
Ex-AUC uninvolved in a reintegration  13,445 3.817 26.80 0 962 
Presence of ELN (lag) 13,440 0.179 0.383 0 1 
Presence of FARC (lag) 13,440 0.395 0.489 0 1 
Presence of AUC (lag) 13,440 0.138 0.344 0 1 
Total forced displacement (arrival) 13,445 317.8 1,600 0 52,260 
Natural logarithm of total forced displacement 13,445 3.609 2.120 0 10.86 
Ratio: rural population/total population 13,445 0.579 0.243 0.0010 1 
% youth population 13,445 0.186 0.0190 0.107 0.442 
Natural logarithm of coca crops 13,445 0.771 1.858 0 9.589 
Taxes Per capita 13,445 0.0585 0.0864 0 2.236 
Infant mortality rate 10,087 22.47 9.677 6.507 91.97 
Infant mortality rate (imp) 13,440 22.76 9.219 2.720 91.97 
Presence of illegal mining 13,445 0.175 0.380 0 1 
Altitude 13,445 1,153 1,158 1 25,221 
Distance from municipality to Bogota 13,445 321.4 194.6 0 1,271 
Total recruitment 13,445 2.389 18.35 0 930 
AUC recruitment 13,445 1.455 17.82 0 930 
Guerrilla recruitment 13,445 0.934 3.645 0 90 
Total birthplace 13,445 3.081 20.93 0 1,350 
AUC birthplace 13,445 2.032 20.23 0 1,337 
Guerrilla birthplace 13,445 1.049 3.459 0 120 
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Instrumental Variables 
 
We calculate total recruitment and identify if the ex-combatants return to their places of 
residence, recruitment and/or birth. These variables aim to control the endogeneity.  
 
1. Total recruitment by municipality 
 
We gather the information about the place where former combatants were recruited. This 
data was collapsed by municipality, year of demobilisation and rebel group.  We create 
three different variables: first, a general index of recruitment by the municipality; second, 
an index by district and year; lastly, a dummy as an identification variable. 888 out of 
1122 Colombian cities register recruitment.  The following Map 3 and Table 50 show the 
districts with rebel recruitment by rebel groups. 
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Map 3: Place of recruitment 
 
Table 50: Ranking of municipalities: recruitment by armed group 
Position Municipality AUC Position Municipality Guerrilla 
1 Medellín 1,059 1 San Vicente del 
Caguán 
502 
2 Tarazá 1,014 2 San José del Guaviare 302 
3 Valledupar 922 3 La Macarena 266 
4 Santa Marta 794 4 Planadas 260 
5 Tibú 487 5 Florencia 251 
6 Tierralta 393 6 Uribe 229 
7 Caucasia 389 7 Puerto Guzmán 217 
8 Riosucio 336 8 Barbacoas 211 
9 Puerto 
Boyacá 
335 9 Vistahermosa 209 
10 San Martín 282 10 Cartagena del Chairá 198 
TOTAL      
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2. Place of residence, place of recruitment and place of birth 
 
We collect the information where the rebels are living, where they were born and where 
they were recruited. We use this information to generate different variables that count the 
number of ex-combatants residing in the same place that they were born or were 
recruited. We calculate119 the variables using the year when they started the reintegration 
process. We also differentiate by rebel group (paramilitary and guerrilla).  We create the 
following variables: 
 
1. Former combatant was born and resides in the same municipality: 
This variable counts the number of ex-combatants who returned to their birthplace.  We 
have 39,616 responses and 10,066 not available (NA). 24% of the former combatants 
have returned to their place of origin, and 56% have not returned. 
 
Table 51:   Resident = Born 
  TOTAL AUC GUERRILLA 
Return 11,994 (24%) 10,182 (31%) 1,812 (11%) 
No return 27,622 (56%) 16,257 (50%) 11,365 (66%) 
No information 10,066 (20%) 6,069 (19%) 3,997 (23%) 
Total 49,682 32,508 17,174 
 
                                                 
119 We collapse the variables by year of reintegration (i.e. when they start the programme); for that reason, 
the sample is 45,860 former combatants. 
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2. Former combatant was recruited and resides in the same municipality: 
This variable counts the number of ex-combatants who returned to where they were 
recruited.  We have 31,936 responses and 17,746 were not available (NA). 11% of the 
former combatants have returned to their place of recruitment, and 53% have not 
returned. 
 
Table 52:  Resident = Recruited 
  TOTAL AUC GUERRILLA 
Return 5,691 (11%) 5,010 (15%) 681 (4%) 
No return 26,245 (53%) 14,533(45%) 11,712 (68%) 
No information 17,746 (36%) 12,965(40%) 4,781 (28%) 
Total 49,682 32,508 17,174 
 
3. Former combatant was born and recruited in the same municipality: 
This variable counts the number of ex-combatants who were recruited in their birthplace.  
We have 28,007 responses and 13,423 were not available (NA).   16% of the former 
combatants were recruited in their place of birth, and 52% were not. 
 
Table 53:  Birthplace = Recruited 
  TOTAL AUC GUERRILLA 
Return 6,587 (16%) 3,859 (14%) 2,728 (19%) 
No return 21,420 (52%) 13,993 (51%) 7,427 (53%) 
No information 13,423 (32%) 9,468 (35%) 3,955 (28%) 
Total 41,430 27,320 14,110 
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4. Former combatant was born, recruited and resides in the same municipality: 
This variable counts the number of ex-combatants who were born, recruited and live in 
the same place.  We have 28,007 responses and 21,835 were not available (NA).   6% of 
the former combatants have returned to their place of birth and recruitment, 50% have 
not returned. 
 
Table 54:  Birthplace = Recruited = Resident 
 
TOTAL AUC GUERRILLA 
Return 2,991 (6%) 2,631 (8%) 360 (2%) 
No return 24,856 (50%) 15,206 (47%) 9,650 (56%) 
No information 21,835 (44%) 14,671 (45%) 7,164 (42%) 
Total 49,682 32,508 17,174 
 
Appendix B:  Statistical Test – Fixed effect model 
 
Multicollinearity 
 
Table 55 summarises the variation inflation factors (VIFs) of the control variables. Note 
that the total ex-combatant involved and uninvolved variables have a VIF under 5; other 
variables have a VIF above 5, indicating that the controls present slight multicollinearity 
problems. 
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Table 55:  The variation inflation factors 
Variable VIF TOLERANCE 
Ex-combatants involved in reintegration 1.66 0.60 
Ex-AUC involved in reintegration 7.58 0.13 
Ex-guerrilla involved in reintegration 11.14 0.08 
Ex-combatants uninvolved in reintegration 
1.60 0.62 
Ex-guerrilla uninvolved in reintegration 9.64 0.10 
Ex-AUC uninvolved in a reintegration  8.32 0.12 
Presence of ELN (lag) 1.27 0.79 
Presence of FARC (lag) 1.46 0.69 
Presence of AUC (lag) 1.22 0.82 
Natural logarithm of total forced 
displacement 2.02 0.49 
Ratio: rural population/total population 1.76 0.57 
% youth population 1.23 0.81 
Natural logarithm of coca crops 1.38 0.73 
Taxes Per capita 1.20 0.83 
Infant mortality rate (imp) 1.68 0.59 
Presence of illegal mining 1.04 0.96 
Altitude 1.41 0.71 
Distance from municipality to Bogota 1.49 0.67 
Total recruitment 2.04 0.49 
AUC recruitment 2.03 0.49 
Guerrilla recruitment 2.12 0.47 
Total birthplace 2.79 0.36 
AUC birthplace 2.39 0.42 
Guerrilla birthplace 2.35 0.43 
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Scatterplot for variation 
 
Figure 23: Relationship between core variables and former combatants 
Homicide 
Overall 
 
Within120 
 
Between121 
 
Random122 
 
 
 
                                                 
120 The information is the deviation from individual means. Over-time effect. 
121 The information is the cross-section in the data (?̅?𝑖  𝑜𝑛 ?̅?𝑖). Across municipality effect. 
122 Random estimator uses both between and within variation in the data. 
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Figure 23: Relationship between core variables and former combatants (continuation) 
Robbery 
Between 
 
Within 
 
Overall 
 
Random 
 
 
Time-series autocorrelations 
Following Cameron and Trivedi (2010), we calculate autocorrelations at all lags and their 
average. Table 56 displays the average of lag-1 autocorrelation for individual-year, 
suggesting that the dependent variables have no autocorrelation at level one; in other 
words, AR(1) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010, p. 245). 
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Table 56: Time-series autocorrelation 
    Average of autocorrelation 
    Total ex-combatants Ex-combatants by rebel group 
Model 1:  Homicide 0.2948 0.2956 
Model 2:  Robbery (total) 0.3482 0.317 
 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation confirms the need to control for autocorrelation. 
 
Table 57: The Wooldridge test 
    Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
    Total ex-combatants 
Ex-combatants by rebel 
group 
Model 1:  Homicide 41.058 (0.00) 41.059 (0.00) 
Model 2:  Robbery (total) 37.313 (0.00) 37.241 (0.00) 
 
 
Unit root  
We use the Fisher-type test, which has as the null hypothesis that all the panels contain a 
unit root. Table 58 shows the test results, indicating that the models do not present unit 
root problems.  
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Table 58: The Fisher-type test 
    Inverse chi-squared 
Model 1:  Homicide       7393.0134 (0.0000) 
Model 2:  Robbery (total)      4990.6393 (0.0000) 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
Modified Wald test for wise group heteroscedasticity confirms that the models present 
heteroscedasticity problems. 
 
Table 59: The Wald test for heteroscedasticity 
    Wald test for groups’ heteroscedasticity 
    Total ex-combatants 
Ex-combatants by rebel 
group 
Model 1:  Homicide     520000 (0.00) 510000 (0.00) 
Model 2:  Robbery (total) 1200000 (0.00) 1300000 (0.00) 
 
 
Cross-sectional dependence 
The Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional independence indicates that the models present a 
cross-sectional dependence problem. 
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Table 60: The Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional independence 
    Total ex-combatants Ex-combatants by rebel 
group 
Model 1:  Homicide   57.316 (0.00)   57.887 (0.00) 
Model 2:  Robbery (total)   71.987 (0.00)   72.617 (0.00) 
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Residuals plots 
 
Figure 24: Homicide: Residuals plots 
Residuals plots: total ex-combatants Residual against predict value 
  
Residuals plots: rebel groups Residual against predict value: rebel groups 
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Figure 25: Robbery (total): Residual plots 
Residual plots: total ex-combatants Residual against predict value 
  
Residual plots: rebel groups Residual against predict value: rebel groups 
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Appendix C:  Other models 
Homicide 
 
Table 39: Homicide and former rebels (2003 – 2014) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
VARIABLES Total 
Combatant 
Total 
Combatant 
Combatant 
by rebel 
group 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Presence of ELN (lag) 0.0336***  0.0335***  
 (0.009)  (0.009)  
Between ELN1 0.0746***  0.0774***  
 (0.024)  (0.024)  
Presence of FARC (lag) 0.0300***  0.0301***  
 (0.008)  (0.008)  
Between FARC_1 0.0540***  0.0552***  
 (0.018)  (0.018)  
Presence of AUC (lag) 0.0640***  0.0647***  
 (0.009)  (0.009)  
Between AUC_1 0.0565  0.0694*  
 (0.040)  (0.041)  
Ratio: rural population/total population 0.8941***  0.9015***  
 (0.265)  (0.265)  
Between ind_rural -0.0244  -0.0281  
 (0.040)  (0.040)  
% Youth population -2.2425***  -2.2512***  
 (0.436)  (0.436)  
Between ind_youth -0.7556  -0.7591  
 (0.465)  (0.464)  
Between TMI_imp -0.0024*  -0.0023*  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
Between Taxes_percapita 0.0025  -0.0022  
 (0.120)  (0.120)  
Altitude (Between) -0.0000  -0.0000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Distance to Bogota (Between) -0.0003***  -0.0003***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 39: Homicide and former rebels (2003 – 2014) (continuation) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
VARIABLES Total 
Combatant 
Total 
Combatant 
Combatant 
by rebel 
group 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Presence of illegal mining (Between) -0.0156  -0.0157  
 (0.018)  (0.018)  
Ln-Total forced displacement (arrival)  0.0217***  0.0217***  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  
Between ln_DP 0.0490***  0.0501***  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  
Ln coca crop = L, 0.0065  0.0067  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  
Between ln_CC 0.0389***  0.0381***  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  
Taxes Per capita = L, -0.0848  -0.0831  
 (0.084)  (0.084)  
Infant mortality rate = L, 0.0023***  0.0023***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
LN of total forced displacement (arrival)   0.0365***  0.0365*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Ratio: rural population/total population   -0.0355  -0.0359 
  (0.022)  (0.022) 
% youth population = L,  -1.1283***  -1.1311*** 
  (0.234)  (0.236) 
Natural logarithm of coca crops  0.0393***  0.0393*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Taxes Per capita = L,  0.1993**  0.1990** 
  (0.088)  (0.088) 
Infant mortality rate (imp) =,  -0.0020***  -0.0020*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Presence of ELN (lag)  0.0534***  0.0539*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Presence of FARC (lag)  0.0591***  0.0591*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Presence of AUC (lag)  0.0574***  0.0569*** 
  (0.012)  (0.012) 
  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 61: Homicide – Fixed effect and GLS models 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Total 
Combatant 
Total 
Combatant 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Ex-combatants involved in 
reintegration 
0.0059* -0.0064**   
 (0.003) (0.002)   
Ex-combatants uninvolved 0.0004 0.0001   
 (0.001) (0.000)   
Ex-AUC involved in reintegration   0.0173* -0.00656 
   (0.0084) (0.004) 
Ex-AUC uninvolved    -0.00061 0.00039 
   (0.0004) (0.000) 
Ex-guerrilla involved in reintegration   -0.0088 -0.0064 
   (0057) (0.005) 
Ex-guerrilla uninvolved    0.00118 -0.0032* 
   (0.0009) (0.002) 
LN of total forced displacement 
(arrival) 
0.0328*** 0.0319*** 0.0330*** 0.0320*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
Ratio: rural population/total population -0.3444 -0.0274** -0.3398 -0.0280** 
 (0.504) (0.013) (0.504) (0.013) 
% youth population = L, -1.8116*** -0.9917*** -1.8225*** -0.9928*** 
 (0.642) (0.135) (0.642) (0.136) 
Natural logarithm of coca crops 0.0200** 0.0355*** 0.0203** 0.0354*** 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Taxes Per capita = L, -0.0222 0.1567*** -0.0186 0.1584*** 
 (0.114) (0.044) (0.114) (0.044) 
Infant mortality rate (imp) = L, 0.0025* -0.0020*** 0.0025* -0.0020*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 0.8154*** 0.4791*** 0.8132*** 0.4790*** 
 (0.311) (0.027) (0.311) (0.027) 
Observations 11,996 11,996 11,996 11,996 
R-squared 0.097  0.097  
R-squared 0.0968  0.0971  
Number of ID_Muni 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 
Cluster municipality municipality Municipality municipality 
Method Fixed effect GLS Fixed effect GLS 
Variance Robust AR1 Robust AR1 
N 11996 11996 11996 11996 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 62: Homicide and former rebels 2003 – 2012 – First Difference model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Total 
Combatant 
Total 
Combatant 
Combatant 
by group 
Combatant 
by group 
Ex-combatants involved in reintegration  0.0161*** -0.0028   
 (0.006) (0.004)   
Ex-combatants uninvolved   -0.0006 0.0000   
 (0.001) (0.001)   
Ex-AUC involved in reintegration   0.0135 -0.0023 
   (0.009) (0.006) 
Ex-AUC uninvolved    -0.0006 -0.0000 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Ex-guerrilla involved in reintegration   0.0386** 0.0084 
   (0.016) (0.013) 
Ex-guerrilla uninvolved    0.0025* 0.0012 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
LN of total forced displacement  0.0185*** 0.0172*** 0.0185*** 0.0172*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ratio: rural population/total population -0.2804 -2.3989** -0.3079 -2.4017** 
 (0.621) (1.056) (0.620) (1.057) 
% youth population -1.6842* 1.0398 -1.5980* 1.0634 
 (0.939) (1.468) (0.937) (1.470) 
LN of coca crops 0.0004 -0.0009 0.0004 -0.0009 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Taxes Per capita  0.0939 0.1413 0.0923 0.1419 
 (0.107) (0.122) (0.107) (0.122) 
Infant mortality rate (imp)  0.0012 0.0003 0.0012 0.0003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Presence of ELN (lag) = 1, Yes -0.0475***  -0.0477***  
 (0.011)  (0.011)  
Presence of FARC (lag) = 1, Yes -0.0289***  -0.0292***  
 (0.007)  (0.007)  
Presence of AUC (lag) = 1, Yes -0.0725***  -0.0730***  
 (0.014)  (0.014)  
Constant  -0.1146***  -0.1147*** 
  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Observations 10,909 10,904 10,909 10,904 
R-squared 0.0240 0.013 0.024 0.0134 
R-squared 0.024 0.0134 0.0242 0.013 
Cluster Municipality Municipality Municipality Municipality 
Method OLS Fixed effect OLS Fixed effect 
Variance Robust Robust Robust Robust 
N 10909 10904 10909 10904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Robbery  
Table 40: Robbery and former rebels (2003 – 2014) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
VARIABLES Total 
Combatant 
Total 
Combatant 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Combatant 
by rebel 
group 
Presence of ELN (lag) -0.0020  -0.0020  
 (0.022)  (0.022)  
Between ELN1 0.0332  -0.0475  
 (0.075)  (0.071)  
Presence of FARC (lag) -0.0304  -0.0314  
 (0.019)  (0.019)  
Between FARC_1 0.1957***  0.1718***  
 (0.057)  (0.055)  
Presence of AUC (lag) -0.0860***  -0.0765***  
 (0.025)  (0.025)  
Between AUC_1 0.2377*  0.0271  
 (0.127)  (0.123)  
Ratio: rural population/total population -5.1625***  -5.1457***  
 (0.775)  (0.774)  
Between ind_rural -1.5146***  -1.3927***  
 (0.125)  (0.119)  
% Youth population -2.3887*  -2.1409  
 (1.338)  (1.336)  
Between Ind_Youth -5.9289***  -5.8547***  
 (1.461)  (1.387)  
Between TMI_imp -0.0065  -0.0089**  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  
Between Taxes_percapita 3.0506***  3.1723***  
 (0.366)  (0.348)  
Altitude (Between) -0.0000  -0.0000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Distance to Bogota (Between) -0.0009***  -0.0007***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Presence of illegal mining (Between) -0.0201  -0.0292  
 (0.057)  (0.054)  
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 40: Robbery and former rebels (2003 – 2014) (continuation) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
VARIABLES Total 
Combatant 
Total 
Combatant 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Combatant 
by rebel 
group 
Presence of illegal mining (Between) -0.0201  -0.0292  
 (0.057)  (0.054)  
Ln-Total forced displacement 0.0139  0.0142  
 (0.009)  (0.009)  
Between ln_DP 0.0615***  0.0414**  
 (0.018)  (0.017)  
Ln coca crop = L, 0.0052  0.0050  
 (0.013)  (0.013)  
Between ln_CC -0.0485***  -0.0354**  
 (0.015)  (0.014)  
Taxes Per capita = L, 0.9720***  0.9510***  
 (0.200)  (0.200)  
Infant mortality rate = L, -0.0118***  -0.0115***  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
LN of total forced displacement   0.0248***  0.0240** 
  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Ratio: rural population/total population   -1.5909***  -1.5875*** 
  (0.181)  (0.184) 
% youth population = L,  -5.6561***  -5.5829*** 
  (1.202)  (1.192) 
Natural logarithm of coca crops  -0.0137***  -0.014145*** 
  (0.004)  (0.0036) 
Taxes Per capita = L,  2.6076***  2.559393*** 
  (0.245)  (0.244) 
Infant mortality rate (imp) = L,  -0.0098***  -0.009727*** 
  (0.002)  (.0022) 
Presence of ELN (lag)  -0.0072  -0.008456 
  (0.018)  (.0181) 
Presence of FARC (lag)  0.0176    0.017125 
  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Presence of AUC (lag)  -0.0265  -0.023362 
  (0.025)  (.0243) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 63: Robbery – Fixed effect and GLS models 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Total 
Combatant 
Total 
Combatant 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Combatant by 
rebel group 
Ex-combatants involved in reintegration  0.0547 0.0591***   
 (0.034) (0.012)   
Ex-combatants uninvolved  -0.0033 -0.0031***   
 (0.004) (0.001)   
Ex-AUC involved in reintegration    0.0327 0.0004 
   (0.048) (0.015) 
Ex-guerrilla involved in reintegration    0.1106 0.3842*** 
   (0.072) (0.056) 
Ex-AUC uninvolved    -0.0051* -0.0020 
   (0.003) (0.001) 
Ex-guerrilla uninvolved    0.0327** 0.0097 
   (0.014) (0.007) 
LN of total forced displacement) 0.0234*** 0.0129*** 0.0231** 0.0122*** 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Ratio: rural population/total population -2.5764*** -1.2478*** -2.6475*** -1.2370*** 
 (0.949) (0.034) (0.949) (0.035) 
% youth population  -6.8522*** -4.3515*** -6.6104*** -4.2733*** 
 (1.884) (0.307) (1.881) (0.306) 
Natural logarithm of coca crops -0.0003 -0.0116*** -0.0011 -0.0115*** 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) 
Taxes Per capita  0.6935 2.2826*** 0.6754 2.2347*** 
 (0.694) (0.123) (0.693) (0.123) 
Infant mortality rate (imp)  -0.0028 -0.0076*** -0.0028 -0.0075*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Presence of ELN (lag) = 1, Yes -0.0104 -0.0091 -0.0128 -0.0097 
 (0.024) (0.007) (0.024) (0.007) 
Presence of FARC (lag) = 1, Yes -0.0308 0.0309*** -0.0306 0.0294*** 
 (0.031) (0.006) (0.031) (0.006) 
Presence of AUC (lag) = 1, Yes -0.1754*** -0.0107 -0.1681*** -0.0093 
 (0.034) (0.009) (0.034) (0.009) 
Constant 3.4320*** 2.1375*** 3.4326*** 2.1160*** 
 (0.685) (0.060) (0.685) (0.060) 
Observations 13,149 13,149 13,149 13,149 
Cluster municipality municipality municipality municipality 
Method Fixed effect GLS Fixed effect GLS 
Variance Robust AR1 Robust AR1 
N 13149 13149 13149 13149 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 64: Robbery and former rebels 2003 – 2012 – First Difference model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Total 
Combatant 
Total 
Combatant 
Combatant 
by group 
Combatant 
by group 
Ex-combatants involved in reintegration 0.0244 -0.0266   
 (0.025) (0.017)   
Ex-combatants uninvolved -0.0003 -0.0009   
 (0.001) (0.002)   
Ex-AUC involved in reintegration    0.0038 -0.0354 
   (0.034) (0.023) 
Ex-AUC uninvolved in reintegration   0.0010 -0.0003 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Ex-guerrilla involved in reintegration   0.0462 -0.0557 
   (0.042) (0.044) 
Ex-guerrilla uninvolved in reintegration   -0.0087 -0.0087 
   (0.006) (0.006) 
LN of total forced displacement (arrival) 0.0147* 0.0074 0.0148* 0.0074 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ratio: rural population/total population, -1.2485 0.5144 -1.2465 0.5312 
 (0.796) (1.119) (0.796) (1.120) 
% youth population -2.3917 -5.1046 -2.3301 -5.1891 
 (1.670) (3.276) (1.671) (3.287) 
Natural logarithm of coca crops 0.0033 0.0054 0.0031 0.0053 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 64: Robbery and former rebels 2003 – 2012 – First Difference model 
(continuation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Total 
Combatant 
Total 
Combatant 
Combatant 
by group 
Combatant 
by group 
Natural logarithm of coca crops 0.0033 0.0054 0.0031 0.0053 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Taxes Per capita 0.3531 0.5634 0.3485 0.5600 
 (0.386) (0.390) (0.386) (0.391) 
Infant mortality rate (imp)  -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0009 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Presence of ELN (lag) = 1, Yes 0.0242  0.0238  
 (0.018)  (0.018)  
Presence of FARC (lag) = 1, Yes 0.0412***  0.0411***  
 (0.012)  (0.012)  
Presence of AUC (lag) = 1, Yes 0.0215  0.0231  
 (0.021)  (0.021)  
Constant  -0.1042***  -0.1038*** 
  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Observations 12,054 12,049 12,054 12,049 
R-squared 0.00301 0.040 0.003 0.040 
R-squared 0.003 0.0400 0.00311 0.0401 
Cluster municipality municipality municipality municipality 
Method Regress Fixed effect Regress Fixed effect 
Variance Robust Robust Robust Robust 
N 12054 12049 12054 12049 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Conclusion 
 
The central conclusion of this research is that DDR provision is a key aspect in any peace 
settlement because a fruitful disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of a warring 
faction contributes not only to improving the security of both society and the rebels, but 
also to fostering trust between the negotiating parties. The purpose of this dissertation 
was to examine the determinants and effects of disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration processes on peace. This dissertation presents some general and broad 
questions, and raises some specific issues, which were answered in this research. In 
chapter 3, I address the following question: what determines whether or not a peace 
negotiation has a DDR provision? In chapter 4, I examine the question of whether a DDR 
provision, in internal armed conflict settlements, prevents the recurrence of war in the 
post-conflict scenario. In chapter 5, I analyse whether communities with more ex-
combatants experience more crime, and ask the question: do DDR programmes matter? 
Together these three chapters contribute toward a broader understanding of how 
provisions, such as DDR, are determined by specific characteristics of the rebel group, 
country and conflict and its relationship with peace. The dissertation contributes to the 
debate regarding the failure of peace processes, and to existing literature about 
negotiations, the cessation of civil wars and peacebuilding. 
 
Chapter 3 analyses the characteristics of conflicts, the rebels’ capabilities and the 
economic and political factors of the states that have had peace negotiations with or 
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without a DDR provision. This chapter presents a Hawk – Dove game to illustrate how 
the incentives and conditions influence the bargaining of DDR and uses a statistical 
model for determining the factors of DDR negotiation. It argues that DDR is a cost-
increasing provision and a highly politicized process, as it is a key element of bargaining 
power, and that it is a crucial aspect of any peace settlement. The findings suggest that 
conflicts which are high cost, in terms of duration and death, are less likely to have a 
DDR in a peace negotiation. This highlights the fact that weariness and state weakness 
have a substantial effect on the decision to negotiate a DDR.  Rebel groups which are 
considered strong and have territorial control are not expected to negotiate a DDR. The 
rebel groups with a clear and identifiable political wing are more prone to negotiate a 
DDR provision, because they can use political means to advance their demands. When 
the conflict does not have more than two rebel groups, the rebel groups are more likely to 
negotiate a DDR. Countries considered as a stable regime and which have a robust 
economy are less prone to have a DDR in a peace negotiation, because society has the 
potential to assimilate former combatants without a special programme. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the implications of the DDR provision in internal armed conflict 
settlements for preventing the recurrence of war. This chapter points out that countries in 
conflict have formulated different provisions in order to try to achieve and (or) maintain 
peace. These mechanisms are often implemented as part of peace negotiations.  Warring 
parties (rebels and governments) negotiate different provisions such as power sharing, 
cease-fire conditions, amnesties, political participation, third-party verification and DDR. 
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I argue that the various components of DDR can have different impacts on the failure of 
peace. The review of the impact of DDR helps us to identify the vulnerabilities and 
challenges in each stage of the process. However, for further research, I need to improve 
the information about DDR; for example, I should investigate specific programmes, 
budgets and community participation, among other factors, to determine the real impact 
(policy evaluation) of each stage. At the moment, I only have dummy variables that 
identify whether the agreement includes this provision or not. The findings suggest that 
including DDR in a peace agreement, especially the reintegration programme, has a 
significantly positive impact on peace and shows evidence of the importance of military 
reintegration in the process of peace consolidation. For further research, I also need to 
develop cases studies to verify if the conclusions are in accordance with reality. 
 
Chapter 4 describes how post-war societies might be considered more violent than they 
were before the conflict and present new forms of violence. The relation between the 
DDR process and post-conflict violence must be studied to understand the real dynamics 
and factors that foster the transition from conflict violence to higher rates of violence. 
This chapter identifies the causal mechanism for post-conflict violence in two related 
ways: at an individual level or as a failure of the peace process. The former is related to 
ex-combatants and could present different types of problems. The latter is related to a 
haphazard disarmament programme which increases the gun supply in the civil 
population or the maintenance of hidden weapon reserves in case of unfulfilment or lack 
of justice and proper forgiveness mechanisms. This chapter examines the dynamics of 
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violent crime in the Colombian case during the period 2003 to 2014. The focus is on the 
presence of ex-combatants who participated in DDR programmes and the patterns of 
different types of violence, such as homicide and robbery, at the municipal level. Our 
findings on the presence of former combatants suggest that this population has no effect 
on homicide but increases the incidence of robbery. For future studies, we need to 
analyse other forms of violence.  
 
In general, this research contributes to filling the gap in comparative research focusing on 
the general characteristics and conditions of conflicts and countries that include DDR 
provision in a peace agreement. This study is the first rebel – government approach 
examining the determinants and the effect of DDR provision. This research implies that 
the policy community should think carefully about the scope of negotiation and 
implementation of each stage of this provision so as not to generate high expectations 
that cannot be achieved.  
 
The research on DDR provision and its determinants and impact on peace highlights that 
there are few studies which consider a macro vision of the relationship between DDR 
provision, durability of peace and post-conflict violence. This deficiency seems 
somewhat surprising, since international organisations emphasise the positive effect of 
this type of programme.  Additionally, the scholarly studies of military power-sharing 
have produced inconclusive or contradictory findings. Further research needs to analyse 
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the level of implementation of the accords. We also need to collect more information 
about the type of DDR which was negotiated; we should gather information about other 
kinds of low-intensity violence, to include the individual level information and to build 
other indicators about recruitment, birthplace and recidivism and extend the dataset to 
incorporate other types of conflict end, such as military victory or the petering out of 
hostilities. This dissertation extends an invitation for researching this topic and its 
different interrelationships. For further research, many other important questions remain 
to be solved. 
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